Com. v. Cromwell

• Decision Date: 14 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-P-1372.,00-P-1372.
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Craig O. CROMWELL.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

778 N.E.2d 936

56 Mass. App. Ct. 436

COMMONWEALTH v. Craig O. CROMWELL.

No. 00-P-1372.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued December 6, 2001.

Decided November 14, 2002.

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Christopher Paul Roberts, Boston, for the defendant.

Alex G. Philipson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: JACOBS, KANTROWITZ, KAFKER, JJ.

JACOBS, J.

Convicted by a District Court jury of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, G.L. c. 90, § 24, the defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) his motion for a required finding of not guilty should have been allowed; (2) evidence of injuries sustained by a motorist whose car was struck by the defendant improperly was admitted; and (3) a restitution order improperly was entered against him. We affirm the conviction and the order for restitution.¹

Following the collision of a car registered to the defendant with another car in the Dorchester section of Boston in the early afternoon of January 25, 1997, several police officers, State troopers, and emergency medical personnel arrived at the scene. Loralean Brown, the driver of the other car, and three State troopers provided testimony describing the collision and the aftermath as follows. When making a left turn from Gallivan Boulevard to Adams Street, Brown's car was struck from behind with "intense" force. The impact pushed her car into Adams Street, spun it around, and caused it to knock down a signal light on a traffic island. Hearing the "screeching" of tires, Brown saw a gold-colored Lincoln automobile speed by. She shouted to bystanders, "[G]et that guy, get that guy. That's the guy that hit me. He's trying to get away." Brown saw only the middle and the back of the car. She was injured and soon taken from the scene by ambulance.²

State Trooper Deborah Hennessey testified that as soon as she arrived at the scene, a Boston police officer directed the defendant to her.³ Upon request, the defendant produced his driver's license and registration. Trooper Hennessey noted that the defendant's eyes were glassy, that he had a very strong odor of alcohol about him, that he was "shaking all over," and that he was very nervous. She testified, without objection, that she offered him a seat in a nearby police cruiser "because he was shaking all over, like most people who are involved in accidents. He was very shaken up by the accident."

Two other troopers who were dispatched to the scene initially observed some fifteen or twenty civilians in the area. One of the troopers, John Slattery, testified that he performed a pat frisk of the defendant; that the defendant's eyes were bloodshot; and that he had slurred speech, seemed "jittery," and had a strong odor of alcohol about him. When given the defendant's license and registration by another trooper, Trooper Slattery matched the license picture with the defendant, and noted that the registration was for a gold 1987 Lincoln Town Car automobile. With the defendant's permission, Trooper Slattery conducted field sobriety tests, which the defendant failed. Slattery then arrested the defendant. At some point the trooper asked the defendant where his car was parked. The defendant directed him to a gold Lincoln Town Car that matched the registration and which was parked about thirty yards away. The troopers observed heavy and fresh damage to the right front passenger side of the Lincoln, as well as substantial damage to the right rear passenger side and trunk area of Brown's car.

1. The issue of operation. Because no one saw him driving and he made no admission of operation, the defendant claims he was entitled to a required finding of not guilty as matter of law.⁴ The absence of such direct evidence, however, is not diapositive, as "a conviction may rest entirely on circumstantial evidence." Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. 343, 354, 607 N.E.2d 1024, cert denied, 510 U.S. 815, 114 S.Ct. 65, 126 L.Ed.2d 35 (1993). Commonwealth v. Walter, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 255, 257, 406 N.E.2d 1304 (1980).

The relevant circumstantial evidence of the defendant's operation was as follows: (1) The Lincoln appeared to have recently collided with Brown's car. (2) The defendant was the registered owner of the Lincoln, and he acknowledged that it was his car. See Commonwealth v. Deramo, 436 Mass. 40, 43, 762 N.E.2d 815 (2002) (noting that in applying the reasonable suspicion standard to investigative stops, "courts have held that the police may, in the absence of any contrary evidence, reasonably conclude that a vehicle is likely being driven by its registered owner"). (3) The defendant was at the scene of the collision and "he was shaking all over, like most people who are involved in accidents." (4) Upon request, the defendant handed over his license and registration and cooperated with the field sobriety tests. See Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 420 Mass. 630, 632, 650 N.E.2d 800 (1995) ("finder of fact could infer operation from the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident and from the defendant's cooperation with the field sobriety tests"). (5) The lack of bystander reaction to the police treating the defendant as the operator by requesting his license and registration and subjecting him to a pat frisk and field sobriety tests. See Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass. App.Ct. 18, 22, 668 N.E.2d 850 (1996). (6) The absence of evidence tending to suggest that someone other than the defendant was operating the Lincoln. See Commonwealth v. Adams, 421 Mass. 289, 291-292, 657 N.E.2d 455 (1995).⁵

This evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reasonably supports an inference that the defendant was the operator. That any individual "item of evidence reasonably supporting operation may not be compelling does not render it fatally ambiguous or unduly speculative, especially when considered with other equally reasonable inferences tending to the same conclusion." Commonwealth v. Manning, supra. See Commonwealth v. Wood, 261 Mass. 458, 459, 158 N.E. 834 (1927); Commonwealth v. Hilton, 398 Mass. 63, 66-67, 494 N.E.2d 1347 (1986), quoting from Commonwealth v. Best, 381 Mass. 472, 483, 411 N.E.2d 442 (1980) ("That the case against [the defendant] was `circumstantial' in some sense of that dubious term does not suggest that the proof was insufficient").

"While it is not necessary to prove that the defendant had the exclusive opportunity to commit the crime[], ... the evidence must be such as to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, and no one else, committed the offence[] charged" (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Shea, 324 Mass. 710, 713, 88 N.E.2d 645 (1949). The evidence here was sufficient to comply with the requirements of Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979), and the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty properly was denied.

2. Alleged erroneous admission of evidence of victim's injuries. Before Brown testified at trial, the defendant unsuccessfully sought to exclude testimony about her injuries. He argues it was reversible error to admit that evidence because it served no purpose other than to appeal to the jury's sympathy.⁶ The injury testimony was factual, brief, and not detailed, and presented a more complete "picture ... of the events surrounding the incident itself." Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269-270, 431 N.E.2d 880 (1982). The judge reasonably could determine that the evidence of the injuries was probative of the nature of the collision and of Brown's condition. Such evidence permitted the jury to evaluate whether the injuries interfered with Brown's claimed observation of the Lincoln. Moreover, the injuries tended to corroborate the evidence that the impact occurred with such force as to support a reasonable inference that the collision was not a mere accident, and, among other plausible explanations, that the driver of the Lincoln may have been impaired. The judge did not abuse her discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice to the defendant. We conclude there was no palpable error, and that the matter was well within the judge's discretion. Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. at 355, 607 N.E.2d 1024.

The defendant also complains that the judge did not give any limiting instruction. She was not required on her own motion to give a contemporaneous limiting instruction to advise the jury not to decide the case on the basis of sympathy for Brown. Commonwealth v. Roberts, 378 Mass. 116, 126, 389 N.E.2d 989 (1979) ("Ordinarily, judges are not required, sua sponte, to instruct juries as to the purposes for which evidence is offered at trial"). It is defense counsel's duty to make such a request, and none was made here. In any event, the judge in her final charge instructed the jurors that they were not to be swayed by prejudice or sympathy.

3. Restitution. During the sentencing phase of the case, the prosecutor indicated that the Brown car had been "totaled" in the collision, and asked for a restitution order in the amount of $2,700. As part of her sworn, oral victim impact statement, see G.L. c. 258B, § 3(p ), Brown essentially confirmed that request. The judge scheduled a restitution hearing, indicating that "appropriate documentation [should] be provided at that time." At a restitution hearing over a month later before the same judge, no testimony was offered, but the prosecutor and defense counsel argued, and three documents were admitted as exhibits. The documents established that a bank had made a loan of approximately $14,000 to Brown with respect to the purchase of her car; the bank had received over $12,000 from Brown's insurance company; and that the bank was seeking payment of the balance of the loan. The judge ordered restitution in the amount of $2,407.04, the amount of that balance.

In light of the evidence of how the collision occurred and...