Com. v. D'Nicuola
| Decision Date | 28 June 1972 |
| Citation | 292 A.2d 333,448 Pa. 54 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Thomas P. D'NICUOLA, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Charles H. Spaziani, Dist. Atty., Easton, for appellee.
Before JONES, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.
Appellant, Thomas D'Nicuola, was arrested on October 22, 1969, and charged with the murder of Thomas Effting. D'Nicuola had been discovered in his automobile on October 20, 1969 by the Easton police in a comatose condition due to an overdose of the drug Doriden, a tranquilizer. At the time he was found in the vehicle, the police also discovered and seized a revolver that had recently been fired three times. It was later determined that this weapon had fired the bullets found in Effting's body.
On October 21, 1969, while a patient in Easton Hospital, D'Nicuola was questioned extensively by the police for 20 to 30 minutes. Allegedly, the interview was conducted as a routine follow-up to the apparent suicide attempt by D'Nicuola. However, even though the police were unaware of Thomas Effting's death at the time of the interview, they knew that Effting and D'Nicuola had not kept a previously scheduled appointment with an attorney the preceding day and that Effting was missing. In addition, the revolver found when D'Nicuola was removed from his car was shown to him during the interview and he was asked if it was his, and if so, where he had obtained it. It was at this point, upon further questioning, that certain incriminating statements concerning Effting were made by appellant causing the officers to leave the room after having 'enter into mind what possibly did happen.'
At a pre-trial suppression hearing appellant attacked the admissibility of the incriminating statements he made to the police while hospitalized but the trial judge denied the motion. The jury convicted D'Nicuola of first degree murder, and fixed the penalty at life imprisonment. Motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were dismissed in an opinion by the Common Pleas Court of Northampton County. This appeal followed.
The crucial issue before us in deciding whether the oral statements made by D'Nicuola are admissible is whether it was necessary under the circumstances of this case to warn him of his right to remain silent and his right to have a lawyer as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The Commonwealth maintains that it was not necessary to issue the Miranda warnings since the police were neither holding appellant in custody so as to restrain his freedom in any significant way nor were they questioning him concerning any particular crime.
When previously confronted with this issue of whether a 'custodial interrogation' had taken place, we conclusively established that Commonwealth v. Feldman, 432 Pa. 428, 432--433, 248 A.2d 1, 3 (1968). It has also been determined that '(c) ustodial interrogation is not limited to police-station questioning or that occurring after a formal arrest.' Commonwealth v. Jefferson, Supra, 423 Pa. at 546, 226 A.2d at 768.
Applying this rationale to the instant case, it is apparent that while hospitalized D'Nicuola had become the focus of an investigation and should have been given the Miranda warnings. Although at the time of the hospital interview the police were unaware of Thomas Effting's death, they definitely knew that Effting was missing and that he and D'Nicuola had not kept a previously scheduled appointment. Being aware of these circumstances and having found a recently fired revolver in D'Nicuola's automobile, it is naive to assume that when the police came to the hospital to question the appellant they were merely following up on an attempted suicide. This point is further substantiated by the fact that the first specific questions asked by the police concerned the ownership of the weapon. If the police were merely investigating the attempted suicide, it would not have been necessary to produce the revolver which clearly was not involved in the attempt and question appellant concerning its ownership. It was this type of forced questioning the Supreme Court was concerned with in Miranda when it interpreted custodial interrogation to 'mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise Deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Clearly, while appellant was confined to his hospital room his 'freedom of action' was restricted and this 'custody' coupled with the accusatory nature of the interview, mandates our conclusion that appellant's Constitutional rights were violated when he was not given the Miranda warnings before the 'custodial interrogation' began.
The Commonwealth's alternative argument that the Miranda warnings were not necessary since appellant was not under investigation for any particular crime overlooks the fact that in Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968),...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Com. v. Holcomb
...v. O'Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 318 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1092, 95 S.Ct. 686, 42 L.Ed.2d 685 (1974); Commonwealth v. D'Nicuola, 448 Pa. 54, 292 A.2d 333 (1972). In 1976, the United States Supreme Court clarified its definition of "custodial interrogation" in Beckwith, supra. Beckwith hel......
-
State v. Garrison
...questioned for one hour by police in hospital, where he was connected to IV tube and was unable to move); Commonwealth v. D'Nicuola , 448 Pa. 54, 55, 57–58, 292 A.2d 333 (1972) (defendant who had been admitted to hospital after apparent suicide attempt was in custody when questioned by poli......
-
Com. v. Hubble
...v. O'Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 318 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1092, 95 S.Ct. 686, 42 L.Ed.2d 685 (1974); Commonwealth v. D'Nicuola, 448 Pa. 54, 292 A.2d 333 (1972); Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 252 A.2d 575 (1969). We should repudiate their implication that Escobedo has continuing in......
- Commonwealth v. Brodo