Com. v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 16 March 1973
• Citation: 301 A.2d 841,451 Pa. 163
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Joseph DANIELS, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 841

301 A.2d 841

451 Pa. 163

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Joseph DANIELS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 16, 1973.

Albert Bartolomeo (submitted), Philadelphia, for appellant

Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty. (submitted), Richard A. Sprague, First Asst. Dist. Atty., James D. Crawford, Deputy Dist. Atty., Milton M. Stein, Chief, Appeals Division, Romer Holleran, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

EAGEN, Justice.

Joseph Daniels, the appellant, was convicted in a nonjury trial of two charges of voluntary manslaughter. Post trial motions were denied and prison sentences of one and one-half to seven years, to run consecutively, were imposed on each conviction. These appeals followed.

The prosecution stemmed from the stabbing of Perry Kellam and Dempsey Wilson shortly before midnight on January 23, 1971, in the hallway of an apartment house in which Daniels resided in Philadelphia. After the occurrence Daniels went outside, flagged down a passing police vehicle, led the police to where Kellam and Wilson both lay prostrate, admitted he stabbed them and produced the knife he used in the attack. Upon being taken to a hospital, Kellam was immediately pronounced dead. Wilson died from his wounds on February 4th.

Daniels asserts two assignments of error. He urges the trial evidence fails to support the convictions, and hence, the trial court erred in not sustaining a motion to arrest the judgments, or, even if the contrary is true, a new trial should have been awarded because of the evidentiary use at trial of a recorded incriminating statement he made to the police in the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. We shall discuss the last mentioned assignment of error first.

A pretrial motion to suppress the challenged statement was denied after an evidentiary hearing. The uncontradicted testimony of the Commonwealth at this hearing ¹ may be summarized as follows:

On February 8, 1971, about 8:15 a.m., Daniels was informed by a police detective that both Kellam and Wilson were dead; he was then warned of his rights in accordance with the mandate of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and asked if he wished to make a statement; Daniels responsively indicated he understood what he was told and said he was willing to make a statement without the assistance of counsel; he then proceeded to give his version of the stabbing occurrence which was recorded on both a typewriter and a tape recorder; during the interview Daniels was alert and responsive, but said he dropped out of school in the fourth grade and could not read or write; after the typewritten statement was completed, it was read verbatim to Daniels who then signed his name on each of its seven pages.

Daniels did not testify at the suppression hearing, ² but his counsel introduced a Psychiatric Evaluation Summary prepared by the Psychiatric Division of the court's Probation Department. This report stated, in part, that Daniels appeared to have 'some schizoid qualities' and 'has an I.Q. (73) funtioning in the defective mild range of intelligence.' This Evaluation Summary also stated the following:

'With regard to his (Daniels') ability to stand trial . . ., he can understand his present surroundings, he knows what the interview procedure is about and he knows the roles of the people talking with him. He knows the police version of the charges against him, he has an understanding of the possible verdicts for the offense and the possible penalties for the offense. He understands his legal rights and would understand any plea he might make.

'This man was spontaneous, coherent and relevant throughout the interview. He was oriented to time, place and person and his remote and recent memory were intact. There was no evidence of hallucinations or delusions. His affect (sic) is appropriate to the situation and he abstracts well clinically, although for the formal test do not show this (sic). His judgment in social situations appears to be adequate, but he is of course preoccupied with his own charges against him.'

It is argued here, as it was in the trial court, that because of his level of education and intelligence, Daniels was incapable of making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights to keep silent and to the assistance of counsel at the time the incriminating statement was made.

This Court has consistently refused to adhere to a Per se rule of constitutional incapacity based solely on physical and mental inadequacies to waive constitutional rights. For example, see Commonwealth v. Abrams, 443 Pa. 295, 278 A.2d 902 (1971), and Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971). On the contrary, we have emphasized that all of the circumstances must be considered in determining if a knowing and intelligent waiver was effected. After carefully considering the instant record, we are not convinced the trial court committed an error of law in finding that Daniels fully understood his rights at the time involved, and with this understanding freely chose to waive them.

We now turn our attention to the remaining assignment of error, namely, the convictions are not supported by the evidence. Reading the record in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the following facts emerge.

Shortly before midnight Daniels was playing cards with four female friends in his fourth-floor apartment when he answered a knock on the door and was confronted by Wilson, Kellam and two other men; Wilson demanded immediate payment of a debt of.$7.00 that Daniels allegedly owed him. Daniels denied the debt, told the men to leave and closed the door; three or five minutes later there was another knock or kicking on the door and Daniels went to the kitchen and placed a butcher knife in one of his pockets; when he opened the door Daniels was again confronted by the same four men, but this time Kellam did most of the talking; when Daniels again denied the debt, Kellam invited him outside; Kellam then drew his hand back and Daniels observed 'something like brass knuckles on his hand with a fork sticking out;' ³ Daniels kicked Kellam and he fell down a nearby stairs; Kellam then started back up the stairs and Daniels 'met him halfway;' Daniels pulled the knife and stabbed Kellam and the latter fell down; when Kellam tried to get up Daniels stabbed him again; Daniels then ascended the stairs and upon finding Wilson standing in the doorway of his apartment he stabbed him in the chest; Wilson then ran down a hallway and Daniels ran behind him and stabbed him in the back.

In view of the proof, outlined before, we agree with the appellant that the conviction based on the death of Kellam may not stand as a matter of law. The Commonwealth's own proof establishes this stabbing was committed in self-defense. The stabbing of Wilson, however, is another matter.

The killing of another human being without justification or excuse is felonious homicide. Commonwealth v. Nucherer, 351 Pa. 305, 41 A.2d 574 (1945), and 4 Blackstone Commentaries, 188 (1898). But a killing is not felonious and is excusable if it is committed in self-defense. Commonwealth v. Vassar, 370 Pa. 551, 88 A.2d 725 (1952). The following conditions must be satisfied before one can successfully invoke the defense of self-defense: (1) the slayer must have been free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the killing; (2) the slayer must have reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death, great bodily harm, or some felony, and that there was a necessity to kill in order to save himself therefrom; (3) the slayer must not have violated any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 438 Pa. 485, 263 A.2d 376 (1970).

It is clear that Daniels was without fault in provoking the altercation here involved. The Commonwealth argues however, that after initially repelling the four aggressors by kicking Kellam down the stairs, Daniels then became the aggressor by meeting him 'halfway' when he started up the stairs again. We are not so persuaded.

The staircase involved was located immediately outside the door leading to Daniels' apartment and consisted of eight steps leading to a landing located midway between the 4th and 3rd floors. The record is unclear as to how many steps Kellam fell, but assuming he fell to the described landing he was not far removed from Daniels at any relevant time. When Kellam started up the stairs again brandishing a bent fork, Daniels certainly had reasonable grounds to believe he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and since he was in his own dwelling house, there was not duty to retreat. Where a man is dangerously assaulted or feloniously attacked in his own dwelling house by one not a member of his household, he need not retreat, but may stand his ground and meet deadly force with deadly force to save his own life, or to protect himself from great bodily harm. Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246, 199 A.2d 411 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 939, 85 S.Ct. 344, 13 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969). The fact that Daniels descended the steps part way to better repel the attack did not, under the circumstances, render him the aggressor in the relevant sense.

While self-defense is an affirmative defense, and he who asserts it has the burden of proving it by the preponderance of the evidence (Commonwealth v. Wilkes, supra), this burden does not exist where the Commonwealth's own evidence establishes the killing was excusable. When this occurs, as it did in the instant case in so far as the Kellam killing is concerned, the Commonwealth has then failed to establish a felonious homicide beyond a reasonable doubt, which it must do before the accused may be convicted of even voluntary manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Flax, 331 Pa. 145, 200 A.2d 632 (1...