Com. v. Dinkins
Decision Date | 08 July 1993 |
Citation | 415 Mass. 715,615 N.E.2d 570 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. William E. DINKINS. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John R. Campbell, Boston, for defendant.
Paul B. Linn, Asst. Dist. Atty. (Daniel C. Mullane, Asst. Dist. Atty., with him) for Com.
Before LIACOS, C.J., and NOLAN, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the murder in the first degree of Junior R. Fernandez, assault with the intent to kill Francisco Rodriguez, and unlawfully carrying a firearm. The defendant appeals from these convictions, claiming error in: (1) the denial of his motion for a required finding of not guilty of each crime charged; (2) the denial of his motion to suppress the out-of-court and in-court identification of him by two witnesses; (3) the admission of a detective's testimony concerning an out-of-court photographic identification of the defendant by Francisco Rodriguez; (4) the judge's instructions to the jury concerning the burden of proof; and (5) the restriction of the defendant's cross-examination of a Commonwealth witness. The defendant also argues (6) that the defendant was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor's argument to the jury based on facts not in evidence. Lastly, the defendant requests that, in the event we reject his claims of error regarding the murder conviction, we exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E (1990 ed.), to order a new trial or reduce the verdict to a lesser degree of guilt.
We summarize the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Cordle, 404 Mass. 733, 734, 537 N.E.2d 130 (1989). Francisco Fernandez, Junior Fernandez's father, arrived at the Fernandez market at about 10 P.M., February 17, 1990, to help close the market for the night. He noticed two young men sitting on the steps of the house next door to the market. He recognized one of them, the defendant, as a frequent customer of the market. At about 10:30 P.M., Junior Fernandez's uncle, Francisco Rodriguez (Rodriguez) left the market and crossed the street to his Thunderbird automobile. He noticed two young men on the porch of the house next to the market. One of them was the defendant, whom he had seen in the market several times. A few minutes later, while Rodriguez was still in his vehicle, Junior Fernandez left the market and crossed the street to another automobile, a Datsun which his brother, William Fernandez, owned. The Datsun was parked directly behind the Thunderbird. When Junior Fernandez started the Datsun, the defendant and his companion walked across the street, the defendant going in front of the Thunderbird and his companion going behind the Datsun. The defendant propped himself up on the front bumper of the Thunderbird and pointed a gun at Rodriguez, who quickly laid down on the front seat. Rodriguez heard three shots and his windshield was shattered. Rodriguez crawled from his vehicle toward the market, still hearing gunshots behind him. When the gunshots had stopped, Rodriguez went to the Datsun and found Junior Fernandez bleeding from a bullet wound in his head. Junior Fernandez died soon afterwards.
Shortly before the killing, William Fernandez, Junior Fernandez's brother and the owner of the vehicle in which Junior Fernandez was killed, had been summoned to testify at the trial of a person who had been accused of shooting another man in front of the Fernandez market in March, 1989. That trial was scheduled for late February, 1990, just a few days after the shooting of Junior Fernandez. William Fernandez intended to identify the assailant in that case.
There is no contention that the defendant lawfully carried a firearm. The defendant's principal position as to that charge and the charge of assault with intent to kill Rodriguez is simply that he was misidentified. It is clear that a finding was warranted that the defendant unlawfully carried a firearm and used it to assault Rodriguez with intent to kill him. On the murder indictment, the Commonwealth proceeded on the theory that the defendant had participated in a joint venture with his companion to murder Junior Fernandez. The Commonwealth's proof was sufficient to warrant the jury's verdict in that regard. The evidence set forth above disclosed that the defendant and his companion were together for at least thirty minutes facing the victims' automobiles, that, when Junior Fernandez emerged from the market and went to his vehicle, the defendant and his companion simultaneously walked across the street to the vehicles, and that the defendant had a gun. The jury reasonably could have inferred that the companion also had a gun that he used to shoot Junior Fernandez and that the two simultaneous shootings were not mere coincidence but, instead, were concerted actions designed by the two men to result in the deaths of the two victims.
The critical question with respect to whether the evidence set forth above was sufficient to warrant a finding of the defendant's guilt, as a joint venturer, of murder of Junior Fernandez in the first degree, (Citations omitted.) Commonwealth v. Walsh, 407 Mass. 740, 743, 555 N.E.2d 593 (1990). The evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant was present at the scene of the attack on Junior Fernandez, and that that attack and the defendant's attack on Rodriguez were mutually contrived by the defendant and his companion as a joint endeavor to kill the two victims. The judge did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty of any of the charges set forth in the three indictments.
Before the trial, the defendant moved to suppress all out-of-court and in-court identifications of the defendant, claiming that the out-of-court identifications were made under circumstances that were unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistake, and that the in-court identifications had no independent source. After an evidentiary hearing, a judge denied the motion--erroneously, the defendant says. The evidence specifically sought to be suppressed consisted of out-of-court and in-court identifications by Rodriguez and Francisco Fernandez. We recite the material findings of the motion judge which, although challenged in part by the defendant, we are satisfied are supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. The motion judge found in material part as follows: Detective William C. Dwyer of the Boston police department's homicide unit went to the scene of the shooting on the night it occurred, February 17, 1990. ...
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