Com. v. Edmonds

• Decision Date: 21 June 1974
• Citation: 313 N.E.2d 429,365 Mass. 496
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Salathiel EDMONDS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 429

313 N.E.2d 429

365 Mass. 496

COMMONWEALTH v. Salathiel EDMONDS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 5, 1974.

Decided June 21, 1974.

William P. Homans, Jr., Boston, for defendant.

Paul V. Buckley, Asst. Dist. Atty. (Frances M. Burns, Asst. Dist. Atty., with him), for the Commonwealth.

Before TAURO, C.J., and QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY and KAPLAN, JJ.

QUIRICO, Justice.

On December 8, 1972, the grand jury returned two indictments against the defendant, one charging that on October 10, 1972, he committed an assault and battery on one Chris Vernon Scott by means of a revolver, and the other charging that on October 13, 1972, he committed the crime of murder in the first degree, the victim being Anthony Santos. After a trial of the two indictments together under G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A--33G, the jury found the defendant guilty on the first indictment and found him guilty on so much of the second indictment as charged him with murder in the second degree. The case is before us on the defendant's appeal from his convictions on both indictments. The principal questions presented by the appeal relate to the defendant's claim that the acts charged against him were committed in self-defence.

We summarize certain facts which do not appear to be in dispute. From about June or July, 1972, through October 13, 1972, the defendant was the operator of a combination restaurant and recreation center at a building known as the Boston Black Action Committee (BBAC) in Dorchester. His son Salathiel Edmonds, Jr. (herein called Junior) was a high school student and he also worked at the BBAC, performing services assigned to him by the defendant.

About 10 P.M. on October 10, 1972, Scott and Junior had an argument at the BBAC during which Scott struck Junior. Upon learning this the defendant struck Scott. A number of other young men, including Santos, were in the place at the time. Junior ran to the rear of the restaurant to a place where the defendant kept a .32 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver. He took the revolver and gave it to the defendant who shot and struck Scott as a result of which Scott was hospitalized. The defendant gave the revolver to the police the following day.

About 6 P.M. on October 13, 1972, Santos entered the BBAC along with several other persons. Shortly thereafter the defendant took a revolver from under a counter and fired two shots at Santos, striking him in the abdomen with the second shot. Santos died later that evening as a result of the gunshot wound. The revolver used in this shooting was not the same one used in the shooting of Scott, but it was of the same caliber and model.

The defendant does not deny that he shot both Scott and Santos. After each of the shootings he admitted the fact to the police and again while testifying at his trial. Four eyewitnesses testified they saw the defendant shoot Scott, and three that they saw him shoot Santos. The principal, if not the sole, issue at the trial of the two indictments was whether, in the circumstances then existing, the defendant was entitled as a matter of self-defence to use the kind and degree of force which he did against Scott and Santos. The evidence of those circumstances, while conflicting in some respects, was sufficient to require the judge to submit the question of self-defence to the jury, and the judge did so. The case is before us on the defendant's assignments of error in the judge's exclusion of certain evidence which the defendant offered on the issue of self-defence and in the judge's charge to the jury on that subject.

A. Evidentiary Questions.

There was considerable evidence introduced at the trial which indicated that the BBAC was patronized by certain persons whose language included frequent threats of violence and whose conduct included frequent resort to violence, sometimes with the use or display of weapons. There was evidence which, if believed, warranted a finding of both threats and acts of violence by the victims Scott and Santos, and also by other persons acting in concert with them, toward the defendant and Junior for a period of several months leading up to the two shootings in question and in particular on the dates of the shootings.

1. Evidence of Threats and Acts of Violence by Victims. The defendant contends that the judge wrongfully excluded evidence tending to show (a) that the two victims, Scott and Santos, and certain other persons acting in concert with them, threatened and committed acts of violence against him and Junior prior to the time each victim was shot, and (b) that as to those threats and acts which were not made or committed in his presence he was informed of them by Junior and other persons.

The admissibility of such evidence is governed by the following rules stated in Commonwealth v. Rubin, 318 Mass. 587, 588--590, 63 N.E.2d 344, 345 (1945): 'Where self defence is invoked by a defendant, threats of violence made against him by the person hurt or killed by him are generally admissible, when known to the defendant before the act, as evidence of his apprehension for his own safety, and the reasonableness of that apprehension. . . . Similarly the character of the person hurt or killed as a powerful, dangerous, quarrelsome or violent person, if known to the defendant, may be admitted for the same purpose. . . . For this purpose knowledge by the defendant at the time of the act of the threats by or the character of the person hurt or killed, is essential. . . . Threats of violence against a defendant, made by the person hurt or killed by him, whether communicated or not to the defendant before he acted, may be received in evidence upon another ground. It is true that 'the fact that a person's habits or character are such that he would be apt to do an act is not competent evidence that he did the act.' . . . But threats stand differently. A threat is a declaration of purpose, and like other declarations of purpose is evidence that an occurrence that might be in execution of that purpose was in fact in execution thereof. . . . Under this rule, when a defendant contends that he acted in self defence, and there is evidence of some act on the part of the person hurt or killed by the defendant that might constitute such an attack upon the defendant as would justify his use of force, evidence of a threat of violence against the defendant, made by the person hurt or killed, even though the threat was unknown to the defendant, is admissible to show that the person hurt or killed was actually attempting to carry out his threat.' ¹

It seems clear that on several occasions when evidence was offered showing threats by either Scott or Santos to commit acts of violence against the defendant, which was admissible under one or several parts of the rule stated above, the judge excluded it. However, it seems equally clear that ultimately, before the case went to the jury, substantially all of this same evidence was admitted--either on further examination of the same witness or through other witnesses. Much of the previously excluded evidence was placed before the jury by the reading of a statement which the defendant had made to the police. The statement indicated clearly that most if not all of the threats or acts of violence which had not occurred in the defendant's presence had in fact been communicated to him by his son or other persons. Because we are seting aside the verdicts and ordering a new trial of these indictments for the reasons discussed next below, we need not consider or decide the question whether the defendant suffered any prejudice by reason of the initial exclusion of the evidence ultimately admitted.

2. Evidence of Character of Victims. As we noted above, evidence of 'the character of the person hurt or killed as a powerful, dangerous, quarrelsome or violent person, if known to the defendant, may be admitted' as evidence of the defendant's 'apprehension for his own safety, and the reasonableness of that apprehension.' Commonwealth v. Rubin, 318 Mass. 587, 588, 63 N.E.2d 344, 345 (1945). Accord, Commonwealth v. Tircinski, 189 Mass. 257, 258, 75 N.E. 261 (1905); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 356 Mass. 617, 625--626, 255 N.E.2d 191 (1970).

Counsel for the defendant asked Junior in direct examination: 'And do you know what Tony Santos' reputation for violence was before October 13, 1972?' On objection by the prosecutor the judge excluded the question. Counsel for the defendant then offered to prove that the witness would 'answer that he had a reputation--that is, Santos had a reputation, based on his talks--that is, this witness' talks with numerous persons for beating up people, for being violent, for being quarrelsome. The defendant was aware of this, from his talks with this witness and through his own independent--.' The judge thereupon said: 'The fact that the victim might have had a reputation, that would be a subject of proof, but whether or not this man knows about it is of no materiality.' Substantially the same procedure was repeated with respect to the victim Scott, and with the same result, and the defendant duly saved his rights to the exclusion of the evidence. The proffered evidence was not again offered or admitted through the same or any other witness.

It is inferable from the record that the sole reason the judge excluded the evidence that the victims had reputations 'for beating up people, for being violent (and) for being quarrelsome,' and that '(t)he defendant was aware of this,' was that it was being offered through a witness other than the defendant. Defence counsel understood that to be the sole reason. We hold that the exclusion on this ground was error.

When self-defence is claimed by a defendant, there is no requirement limiting the proof of the victim's violent or quarrelsome reputation to the testimony of the defendant alone. The same is true of proof that the defendant knew of such reputation. If the law imposed such...