Com. v. Eichelberger
Decision Date | 23 June 1987 |
Citation | 528 A.2d 230,364 Pa.Super. 425 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Robert Scott EICHELBERGER, Appellee. 263 Harrisburg 1986 |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
R. Scott Cramer, Dist. Atty., Duncannon, for Com., appellant.
John B. Mancke, Harrisburg, for appellee.
Before WIEAND, OLSZEWSKI and TAMILIA, JJ.
On September 3, 1983, at or about 6:42 p.m., Robert Scott Eichelberger was operating a motor vehicle southwardly on Route 34, a two lane highway in Perry County. Suddenly and without prior warning, his vehicle crossed the center line into the northbound lane where it struck two vehicles travelling in the opposite direction. The driver of the second northbound vehicle was killed. Eichelberger was charged with involuntary manslaughter, 1 driving while under the influence of alcohol, 2 homicide by vehicle, 3 homicide by vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, 4 and two summary offenses. 5 Following a non-jury trial, Eichelberger was found guilty only of homicide by vehicle and the summary offenses. Subsequently, in response to a defense motion for post-trial relief, the trial court arrested judgment on the conviction for homicide by vehicle. From this order arresting judgment, the Commonwealth appealed.
The standard for our review was stated in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 351 Pa.Super. 309, 505 A.2d 997 (1986), as follows:
Id. at 311-312, 505 A.2d at 998, quoting Commonwealth v. Nelson, 245 Pa.Super. 33, 36, 369 A.2d 279, 280 (1976), aff'd, 476 Pa. 269, 382 A.2d 715 (1977).
The offense of homicide by vehicle is defined as follows:
Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except section 3731 ( ) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the cause of death.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3732. In Commonwealth v. Heck, 341 Pa.Super. 183, 491 A.2d 212 (1985), allocatur granted, 509 Pa. 535, 505 A.2d 251 (1986), a panel of this Court held that the statute could pass constitutional muster only if it were interpreted so as to require for conviction a degree of misconduct which rose to the level of criminal negligence. 6
When the evidence in the instant case is considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, which won the verdict, it is readily apparent that it was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Eichelberger had violated the statutory provisions requiring that he operate his vehicle on the right side of the roadway. See: 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301, 3302. The law is uniformly clear, moreover, that driving a vehicle on the wrong side of the roadway is sufficient to permit an inference of criminal negligence. See: Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 278 Pa.Super. 490, 420 A.2d 647 (1980) ( ); Commonwealth v. Farrell, 208 Pa.Super. 200, 222 A.2d 437 (1966) ( ); Commonwealth v. Smoker, 204 Pa.Super. 265, 203 A.2d 358 (1964) ( ). Cf. Commonwealth v. Setsodi, 303 Pa.Super. 482, 450 A.2d 29 (1982) ( ).
Eichelberger testified that his vehicle crossed the center line and entered the lane of travel for oncoming vehicles because he had temporarily taken his eyes from the road ahead in order to look in the rear view mirror after hearing a noise behind him. The credibility and weight of this explanation were for the trier of the facts, in this case the trial judge, who could believe some, all, or none of it. So also, it was for the fact finder to determine whether Eichelberger's explanation, if believed, was sufficient to rebut the inference of criminal negligence arising from evidence that he had violated the rules of the road by allowing his vehicle to cross the center line of the roadway where it collided with oncoming vehicles. In weighing Eichelberger's conduct to determine whether he was guilty of criminal negligence, the trier of the facts could also consider Eichelberger's lack of sleep and his consumption of alcohol prior to the accident. 7 When all of this evidence is considered, our conclusion must be that it was sufficient to support the verdict finding Eichelberger guilty of homicide by vehicle.
Because the trial court arrested judgment on the verdict finding Eichelberger guilty of homicide by vehicle, it did not consider the motion for new trial in which Eichelberger contended, for reasons therein stated, that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Therefore, we will remand to permit the trial court to consider his motion for new trial.
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