Com. v. Petroll

• Decision Date: 18 June 1997
• Citation: 696 A.2d 817
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Frederick W. PETROLL, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 817

696 A.2d 817

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Frederick W. PETROLL, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Feb. 18, 1997.

Filed June 18, 1997.

Barrie L. Wellener, Asst. Public Defender, Lancaster, for appellant.

Joseph C. Madenspacher, Dist. Atty., Lancaster, for Com., appellee.

Before POPOVICH and JOHNSON, JJ., and CERCONE, President Judge Emeritus.

CERCONE, President Judge Emeritus:

This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered after a jury found appellant Frederick W. Petroll guilty of three counts of homicide by vehicle, ¹ and the trial court found him guilty of one count each of failing to drive vehicle at safe speed ² and careless driving. ³ We affirm.

The trial court has provided us with an accurate factual summary:

On April 21, 1995, Mr. Petroll caused the deaths of Douglas Harsh, his wife, Connie, and their infant son, Tyler, when he drove his tractor trailer into the rear of the Harsh vehicle which had stopped for traffic on Route 30 in Manheim Township. The impact of the collision caused the vehicle to burst into flames. The damage to the vehicle was so extensive that the Harshes were unable to escape their vehicle, which was destroyed by fire. All three occupants were pronounced dead at the scene. Dr. Wayne Ross, the Lancaster County Forensic Pathologist, performed autopsies on all three victims and determined the cause of death to be from thermal burning and smoke inhalation from the fire which resulted from the accident.

The impact also pushed the Harsh vehicle into the rear of another vehicle, setting off a chain reaction, which resulted in damage and injury to at least three other vehicles and the occupants. A police officer investigating the accident testified that, based upon his training as an Advanced Accident Investigator, the distance from the initial point of impact to the final resting position of the last vehicle was over 200 feet. Defendant's tractor trailer left skid marks of 96.5 feet prior to striking the Harsh vehicle and 69 to 83 feet of skid marks after impact.

Trial court opinion dated 11/7/96 at 1-2. On May 15, 1996, appellant was found guilty of the above-listed crimes. The trial court, on June 28, 1996, sentenced appellant to concurrent terms of imprisonment of not less than eighteen (18) months nor more than three (3) years for each count of homicide by vehicle. The summary offenses merged for sentencing purposes.

In this timely appeal from the judgment of sentence, appellant raises six issues. Initially, appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his truck. He also argues that the trial court improperly denied a motion in limine seeking to preclude the Commonwealth from introducing that evidence. Similarly, he contends that the trial court improperly granted the Commonwealth's motion in limine seeking to preclude evidence that PennDOT, after the accident, altered road signs in the area of the collision. Furthermore, appellant objects to the trial court's qualification of a Commonwealth witness as an accident reconstructionist. In addition, appellant claims that the prejudice engendered by the admission of photographs of the accident rendered them inadmissible. Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for homicide by vehicle.

Because a determination that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction results in discharge, we shall begin by addressing that claim. Commonwealth v. Bybel, 531 Pa. 68, 71, 611 A.2d 188, 189 (1992). When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner and drawing all proper inferences favorable to the Commonwealth, the trier of fact could have determined that all the elements of the crime have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Zimmick, 539 Pa. 548, 554, 653 A.2d 1217, 1220 (1995); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 449 Pa.Super. 319, 325-26, 673 A.2d 962, 965 (1996). In making this determination, we must evaluate the entire trial record and consider all the evidence actually received. Rodriquez, 449 Pa.Super. at 326, 673 A.2d at 965. It is within the province of the fact finder to determine the weight to be accorded each witnesses' testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence introduced at trial. Commonwealth v. Molinaro, 429 Pa.Super. 29, 33, 631 A.2d 1040, 1042 (1993).

As stated, the jury found appellant guilty of homicide by vehicle. A person is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a first degree misdemeanor, if that person "unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic ... when the violation is the cause of death." 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732. Causation will only be found if the defendant's Motor Vehicle Code violation was a direct and substantial factor in the death of the victim and the fatal result was not extraordinary or remote. Commonwealth v. Francis, 445 Pa.Super. 353, 357-58, 665 A.2d 821, 823 (1995); Commonwealth v. Nicotra, 425 Pa.Super. 600, 607-08, 625 A.2d 1259, 1263-64 (1993) (when the defendant's conduct starts the chain of causation leading to the victim's death, criminal responsibility for the crime of homicide may properly be found). Further, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant's conduct was criminally negligent or reckless. Francis, 445 Pa.Super. at 358, 665 A.2d at 823 (citing Commonwealth v. Heck, 517 Pa. 192, 201, 535 A.2d 575, 580 (1987)).

In this case, the Commonwealth charged appellant with the underlying Motor Vehicle Code violations of careless driving and driving his vehicle at an unsafe speed. Any person who drives a vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of careless driving, a summary offense. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714. Falling asleep while operating an automobile manifests a "careless disregard for the safety of persons or property" and therefore constitutes careless driving under section 3714. Commonwealth v. Cathey, 435 Pa.Super. 162, 166, 645 A.2d 250, 252 (1994) (driver who fell asleep while operating his vehicle, crossed over into the oncoming lane of traffic, and struck another vehicle was found guilty of careless driving). "It is impossible to fathom how one who falls asleep while operating an automobile, thus blindly propelling thousands of pounds of steel and glass at tens of miles per hour, cannot be guilty of a degree of negligence beyond mere 'absence of ordinary care.' " Id. at 166, 645 A.2d at 251.

Just after the accident in this case, appellant confided to Carla Cwynar, an employee with the Manheim Township Ambulance service, that he had dozed briefly and that he had problems stopping his truck when he awoke. N.T. 5/10/96 at 258. According to Robert Reeber, an eyewitness to the collision, just before impact, the driver was slouched in the seat, leaning toward the right with his head down. N.T. 5/9/96 at 90, 110. Mr. Reeber speculated that appellant may have been looking downward to adjust the radio or to retrieve something from the floor. N.T. 5/9/96 at 90.

The jury was free to credit Ms. Cwynar's assertion that appellant had fallen asleep. By falling asleep at the wheel, thereby demonstrating negligence beyond mere absence of ordinary care, appellant started the chain of causation that led to the victims' deaths. The evidence was therefore sufficient to support appellant's homicide by vehicle convictions. See Commonwealth v. Eichelberger, 364 Pa.Super. 425, 428-29, 528 A.2d 230, 232 (1987) (evidence that the defendant, who suffered from lack of sleep and had a blood alcohol content of 0.09%, drove his vehicle on the wrong side of the roadway, was sufficient to permit an inference of criminal negligence and to support his conviction for homicide by vehicle). Accordingly, we need not here address the other vehicle code violation charged, failing to drive at safe speed.

We shall next consider the denial of appellant's suppression motion. When reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, an appellate court must first ascertain whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings and then assess the reasonableness of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 442 Pa.Super. 238, 246, 659 A.2d 563, 567 (1995), appeal denied, 542 Pa. 658, 668 A.2d 1123 (1995). When the defendant appeals, we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and so much of the evidence for the defense, as, read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. Id. If the evidence, when so viewed, supports the suppression court's factual findings, we may only reverse if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. Id. The suppression court bears exclusive responsibility for assessing the credibility of witnesses and determining the weight to be accorded to their testimony. Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 439 Pa.Super. 494, 498, 654 A.2d 1086, 1088 (1995). Although we are bound by findings of fact that are supported by the record, we are not bound by legal conclusions drawn from those facts. Id.

Appellant in this case claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his truck, specifically, a radar detector, log book, brown bag, and bank deposit bag. The parties developed the factual background for this motion at a suppression hearing:

After the accident on Route 30, police arrived at the scene. Sergeant Dale McCurdy of the Manheim Township Police Department and supervising officer at the scene, entered Mr. Petroll's tractor trailer without his consent. Sgt. McCurdy testified that he went inside the cab to check to make sure that the brakes of the truck were on. At...