Com. v. Eperjesi

• Decision Date: 23 November 1966
• Citation: 423 Pa. 455,224 A.2d 216
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Wilma EPERJESI.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 216

224 A.2d 216

423 Pa. 455

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Wilma EPERJESI.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Nov. 23, 1966.

John R. Hoye, Dist. Atty., William J. Franks, Asst. Dist. Atty., Uniontown, for appellant

Joseph E. kovach, Peter U. Hook, Uniontown, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

MUSMANNO, Justice.

On July 17, 1965, two small boys, Carl J. Marucci, 7, and Florian Eperjesi, 10, were found dead in a refrigerator in the basement below the two-floor apartment occupied by two women, Mary and Wilma Eperjesi, in the village of Republic, Redstone Township, Fayette County. Florian was the grandson of Mary and the nephew of Wilma. Carl Marucci was Florian's playmate.

The following day Wilma Eperjesi, 38 years of age, was taken into custody by the police as a material witness. She was given a lie-detector test which produced answers which absolved her from any association with the fatal affair of the refrigerator. In view of what followed, it would seem that the lie-detector machine, technically called a polygraph, failed to measure up to the claims advanced for it by its sellers, proponents and champions. Wilma was released from custody and she returned to the normal routine of her living with Mary Eperjesi.

Two days later, on July 20, 1965, John K. Kaminsky, a police officer in Redstone Township, visited the Eperjesi apartment to continue with his investigation into the tragic death of the youngsters, seeking to ascertain what set of circumstances had brought about their untimely end. Were those circumstances purely accidental or had some malevolent hand guided them?

While in the Eperjesi apartment, Wilma Eperjesi, who knew Kaminsky well and regarded him as a friend of the family, called him into a room, locked the door and told him that she was the one who had closed the door of the refrigerator in which the two boys perished.

Subsequently testifying to this disclosure, Kaminsky said:

'She called me in the room and locked the door with a key and she says 'Sit down', and there was a chair here and there was another chair. She sat down beside me and grabbed both of my hands and said 'Johnny, I want to tell you what happened.' I just listened to her. She said she went to feed the peepies, saw the refrigerator door open, and slammed it shut. I said 'Why did you do it?' She says 'I don't know why I done it."

The 'peepies' referred to were little chickens in the basement.

When Kaminsky was asked whether Wilma said anything about knowing the children were in the refrigerator, he replied:

'First she said she didn't know; then about a few minutes later she says 'Well, I might as well tell you the truth; I knew they were in there.'

Q. In the refrigerator?

A. Frigidaire, she said. She didn't say refrigerator, she said frigidaire.

Q. Now was that in the presence of the State Police or in your presence?

A. Just her and I alone.'

Later in the day Wilma was taken to Zoretic in Republic where her utterances the office of Justice of the Peace Nicholas were tape recorded. At this hearing, with several people present, including her brother and sister-in-law, State Trooper Tamallo asked Wilma if she was willing to speak and when she replied in the affirmative, the following ensued:

'Q. Now, Wilma, before making this statement, I want to advise you that you are entitled to an attorney or any legal counsel to represent you before you make this statement. You understand what I mean?

A. Yeah, I know.

Q. Do you want an attorney or legal counsel?

A. Yes * * *

Q. O.K. You will make a statement after we get you an attorney.

A. Yes.'

Then Chief Detective Maggioncalda questioned her:

'Q. We understand that you want an attorney to represent you. Would you care to tell us what happened last Saturday night now, before an attorney talked to you, or are you going to wait until an attorney comes?

A. I want to talk now.

Q. You want to talk now.

A. Yes.

Q. All right, then go ahead and tell us exactly what happened on Saturday night.

A. Well, see, I'm gonna tell you the truth * * *'

On July 22, 1965, Trooper Tomallo with Detective Maggioncalda called on the defendant in the county jail. Maggioncalda testified that he told Wilma 'that she didn't have to tell us anything.' He said that he was questioning her to find out, provided she wanted to speak, the exact time she said she closed the fatal door of the refrigerator. She replied that it was 6 o'clock. Maggioncalda then told her that counsel was being appointed for her and that she didn't have to talk if she didn't desire to do so, but there were some questions he wanted to 'clear up,' and, according to Maggioncalda, 'she agreed to answer them.' At this questioning, according to Trooper Tomallo, who was with Maggioncalda, Wilma admitted that she knew the boys were in the refrigerator when she closed the door.

We will refer to the statements made by Wilma as (1) the oral declaration in her home to John Kaminsky; (2) the statement made into a tape recording machine at the office of the Justice of the Peace; (3) the oral statement in jail to Tomallo and Maggioncalda.

On December 6, 1965, in pursuance of a Petition to Suppress Confessions filed by Wilma's attorneys, the Court conducted a hearing and ordered all of Wilma's statements suppressed. The Commonwealth argues that the Court erred in doing so.

We are satisfied that, in the light of the circumstances fully developed at the hearing in Court, the Court erred in suppressing Statement No. 1. The learned Court, in nullifying that statement as evidence, said that when Wilma told Kaminsky she had closed the refrigerator door, it was his 'duty and responsibility' to advise her 'of her right to remain silent and her right to counsel.' There is nothing in the Federal or Pennsylvania decisions which require police, upon hearing a volunteered statement by anyone, to order the volunteer to cease talking.

In the case of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, one of the most recent freshets pouring into the stream of criminal law on the subject of individual rights as against police investigation, the Supreme Court of the United States specifically stated:

'There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding.'

The circumstances in this case do not reach the environs of a police station where, even there, the police are not compelled to plug their ears when conscience bursts into the doors and the conscience-bearer bares red hands of guilt. Confession No. 1 in this case occurred in a private home. The conversation which encompassed it was initiated by the volunteer, not by the policeman. The processes of the law had not reached the accusatory stage. Indeed, Wilma had already been excluded as a suspect because of the negative results of the lie-detector test. She had been released without bail. She was at home, as free as any other citizen in Republic.

The police did not call at the Eperjesi home with any plan or though of harassing Wilma. As already stated above, there was always the possibility that the refrigerator door had closed on the two young lads accidentally. The newspapers often carry stories on such anguishing events. Kaminsky testified: 'We were checking the refrigerator to see how much pressure it would take to close the door.'

The Court below said:

'When she invited him into a room in her home at which time she allegedly told him she had closed the refrigerator door, he knew or should have known that if he continued this examination he might well elicit an incriminating statement.'

The Court reads into the transcript what is not there. Kaminsky was not 'continuing' an 'examination.' He had not even begun an examination. It was Wilma who called Kaminsky into the room, and, without preliminaries, seized both his hands, and declared she wanted to tell him what had happened. Kaminsky listened. What was he to do? Run out of the room? Was he to clamp his hands over Wilma's mouth? He listened. He would have been a poor guardian of the peace and security of the community if, while conducting an investigation, he would refuse to listen to a person who was at the scene of the event he was investigating.

Of course, a statement that is coerced or is obtained through deceit is of no more value than a confession written by a hand forced over the paper by the iron grip of a captor. But a confession that is freely given, in every possible sense of the word, is not to be discarded through a reading into appellate decisions what is not there. The Supreme Court of the United States specifically stated in the Miranda case, supra, that:

'Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.'

Once an utterance falls from the lips with extemporaneous naturalness, there is no way to declare it non-existent. To order the nullification of such a statement would be like ordering one to re-attach an apple to the limb from which it has fallen, not because of limb shaking or tree climbing, but in consequence of the fruit's ripeness.

When a policeman is investigating a crime or supposed crime it is his duty to note everything, listen to every voice, and study every object which may enter into a reconstruction of the untoward event, whose unknown origin he is seeking to ascertain. Trial courts should not impede officers in the fulfillment of their sworn duties. To so impede them is to imperil the safety of society. A person who has already killed, robbed, or burglarized, may repeat his violence....