Com. v. Evans, 95-P-1266

• Citation: 679 N.E.2d 229,42 Mass.App.Ct. 618
• Decision Date: 03 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-P-1266,95-P-1266
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Troy EVANS. 1
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 229

679 N.E.2d 229

42 Mass.App.Ct. 618

COMMONWEALTH v. Troy EVANS. ¹

No. 95-P-1266.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Hampden.

Argued March 20, 1997.

Decided May 15, 1997.

Further Appellate Review Denied July 3, 1997.

Peter M. Onek, Committee for Public Counsel Services, Boston, for defendant.

Marcia B. Julian, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth.

Before WARNER, C.J., and BROWN and JACOBS, JJ.

WARNER, Chief Justice.

A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of breaking and entering the dwelling of another in the daytime with intent to commit a felony therein (G.L. c. 266, § 18) and larceny in a building (G.L. c. 266, § 20). On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the trial judge erred in failing to give the proper identification instructions to the jury and that defense counsel's failure to request such instructions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) that the prosecutor's comment during his closing argument on the defendant's failure to call a witness created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice; (3) that the judge's premature use of the so-called Tuey-Rodriquez charge, combined with improper comments regarding the probable length of the case, was coercive; and (4) that the omission of essential language from the verdict slip regarding the charge of breaking and entering in the daytime with the intent to commit a felony therein renders his conviction on that charge a nullity. Our review of the record reveals no basis for reversing the defendant's convictions. ²

On January 4, 1994, a cordless telephone was stolen from a house on Union Street in Springfield. Linda Goines, a next door neighbor, heard the sound of breaking glass at about 4:30 P.M. and stepped onto her front porch, where she observed a man climbing through the shattered front window of the house. Goines immediately went into her house and called the police, then promptly returned to the porch, which was approximately ten to fifteen feet from the house. She called to the man, indicating that she had seen him going in, and observed the man as he emerged from the window and ran off. At no time was Goines able to see the thief's face. She did notice, however, that he was African-American, and that he was wearing a short, waist-length, brown leather jacket and "bright," "goldish-yellow" pants.

Two officers from the Springfield police department arrived at Goines's home within minutes of her call. Goines provided them with a description of the man she had observed, and the officers radioed the description to other cruisers in the area. One of the officers picked up a trail of footprints, clearly visible in the freshly fallen snow and leading away from the house. The officer followed the prints for approximately 200 yards, through several backyards onto Eastern Street, past a restaurant called Mr. Fish, and back onto Union Street. He then noticed a man walking on the opposite side of the street, dressed in a leather jacket and yellow pants. The officer also noticed a police cruiser nearby, radioed his observations to the officers in the cruiser, and watched as they apprehended the defendant. When the defendant removed his hands from his pockets a cordless telephone, later identified by Anita Marie Watson as the one stolen from her home, fell to the ground. By all accounts, less than ten minutes had elapsed since police officers initially responded to Linda Goines's call.

The defendant agreed to accompany the officers to Linda Goines's house, where she identified his clothing as that worn by the perpetrator. Goines did not, however, recognize the defendant's face.

At trial, the defendant maintained that he was not the perpetrator and that at the time of the break in, he was eating a meal at the Mr. Fish restaurant. He further testified that as he was preparing to leave Mr. Fish he observed an individual known to him only as "Predator" attempting to sell the cashier a cordless telephone. The defendant stated that, because the antenna on the phone was broken, the cashier was unwilling to meet Predator's asking price and that he had subsequently purchased the phone for ten dollars. Finally, the defendant testified that he was approached by police moments after leaving Mr. Fish.

1. Identification instructions. The defendant contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by his trial attorney's failure to request extensive jury instructions on the issue of identification. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 310-311, 391 N.E.2d 889 (1979); Commonwealth v. Pressley, 390 Mass. 617, 620, 457 N.E.2d 1119 (1983); Commonwealth v. Carter, 423 Mass. 506, 515, 669 N.E.2d 203 (1996). ³ Specifically, he claims that he was entitled to an instruction on the suggestiveness of the identification procedure used by police and the possibility of an honest but mistaken identification by Linda Goines. ⁴

Although the defendant may have been entitled to more detailed identification instructions had defense counsel made a timely request, the failure to give such instructions did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, "trial counsel's failure to request more extensive instructions did not deprive the defendant of his right to effective assistance of counsel." Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 266, 446 N.E.2d 383 (1983). See Commonwealth v. Curtis, 417 Mass. 619, 624-625 n. 4, 632 N.E.2d 821 (1994) (an omission by counsel that does not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice cannot form the basis of a successful claim of ineffective assistance).

"The legal adequacy of a particular instruction ... can only be judged in the context of the whole charge...." Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 270, 552 N.E.2d 558 (1990). Here, we think the charge "adequately cover[ed] the issue" of identification. Commonwealth v. McMaster, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 722, 727, 490 N.E.2d 464 (1986). The judge's instructions fully informed the jurors of the Commonwealth's burden of proof, emphasizing the presumption of innocence and the elements required to find the defendant guilty of the crimes with which he was charged. Further, the judge emphasized the requirement that the Commonwealth prove the accuracy of Linda Goines's identification beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 728, 490 N.E.2d 464. The instructions also alerted the jury to the possibility of a mistaken identification by permitting them to consider the circumstances in which the identification was made, and defense counsel forcefully challenged the reliability of Goines's identification during cross-examination and again in his closing argument. See Commonwealth v. Durant, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 768, 772, 412 N.E.2d 1276 (1980). In these circumstances, there can be no doubt that the defense of mistaken identification was before the jury. See Commonwealth v. Elam, 412 Mass. 583, 587, 591 N.E.2d 186 (1992).

Contrary to the defendant's claim, his entire defense at trial did not depend on the reliability of Linda Goines's identification. Indeed, Goines never claimed to have seen the perpetrator's face, only to have observed his clothing, which she said matched that worn by the defendant. Further, the prosecution's case against the defendant was strong. Footprints were followed from the scene of the crime to near where the defendant was observed wearing clothing matching Goines's description. Moreover, he was apprehended only minutes after the break-in, approximately 200 yards from the crime scene, in possession of the stolen telephone. We are confident that any omissions from the judge's charge could not have influenced the outcome of the trial.

2. Propriety of prosecutor's missing witness comment. Without obtaining the judge's permission, the prosecutor commented briefly, during his closing argument, on the defendant's failure to call as an alibi witness the cashier at Mr. Fish. ⁵ The defendant argues that the prosecutor's failure to obtain a favorable ruling from the judge before making the comment created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

"Where a party has knowledge of a person who can be located and brought forward, who is friendly to, or at least not hostilely disposed toward, the party, and who can be expected to give testimony of distinct importance to the case, the party would naturally offer that person as a witness. If then, without explanation, he does not do so, the jury may ... infer that that person, had he been called, would have given testimony unfavorable to the party." Commonwealth v. Schatvet, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 130, 134, 499 N.E.2d 1208 (1986). Whether to instruct the jury on the propriety of such an inference is "a matter for the trial judge's discretion." Commonwealth v. Graves, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 76, 81, 616 N.E.2d 817 (1993), citing Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 413 Mass. 193, 199, 595 N.E.2d 779 (1992). If, however, "counsel plans to argue to the jury that an inference may be drawn against the [defendant] for failure to call a witness, the proper practice is first to obtain the permission of the trial judge." Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 655, 658, 542 N.E.2d 296 (1989).

It is undisputed that the prosecutor failed to obtain the necessary permission before commenting on the missing witness. His comment was therefore improper. Such impropriety, however, "does not ... ordinarily create a basis for reversal; it merely creates the risk that the attorney will be interrupted by the judge who may then give an unfavorable instruction." Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 36 Mass.App.Ct. 570, 582, 634 N.E.2d 124, S.C., 418 Mass. 777, 641 N.E.2d 1054 (1994). Here, no such interruption occurred. "[W]e must therefore assume that [the judge] found the [prosecutor's reference] justified by the evidence." ⁶ 36 Mass.App.Ct. at 582, 634 N.E.2d 124.

3. Timing of the Tuey-Rodriquez charge. The defendant next challenges the supplemental charge given to the jury in accordance with Commonwealth v....