Com. v. Fanelli
| Decision Date | 30 October 1981 |
| Citation | 436 A.2d 1024,292 Pa.Super. 100 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Lawrence FANELLI, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals, Asst. Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Eric B. Henson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Before SPAETH, STRANAHAN and SUGERMAN, JJ. *
This matter is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered by The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against the appellant, Lawrence Fanelli, following his conviction for unauthorized use of an automobile. 1 The appellant contends, inter alia, that the lower court erred in denying his motion to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(f) where he asserts, the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in bringing him to trial within 180 days after the criminal complaint was filed as mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a)(2). 2 The Court agrees and, therefore, vacates the judgment of sentence and discharges the appellant.
The appellant was arrested on September 5, 1977, and charged with receiving stolen property and unauthorized use of an automobile. The same day, the criminal complaint in this matter was filed. Hence, the Commonwealth had until March 6, 1978 to bring the appellant to trial.
At the appellant's preliminary arraignment, bail was set at $2500.00. The appellant was unable to post bond.
A preliminary hearing was held on September 29, 1977. As a result of that hearing, the appellant was ordered held for trial.
On October 20, 1977, the appellant filed a motion to quash the return of the magistrate's transcript on the basis that the Commonwealth had failed to establish a prima facie case of the appellant's guilt at the preliminary hearing. 3 The lower court granted the motion to quash and discharged the appellant on November 14, 1977.
On December 14, 1977, the Commonwealth filed a petition for reconsideration of the order granting the appellant's motion to quash. The same day and without a hearing, the lower court vacated its order granting the appellant's motion to quash pending reconsideration and entered a Rule on the appellant to show cause why the order granting his motion to quash should not be reversed. 4
The appellant was never notified of the Commonwealth's request for reconsideration or the decision of the lower court to vacate its order granting the appellant's motion to quash pending reconsideration. The appellant's attorney, a public defender, was notified of the lower court's decision to vacate pending reconsideration and, as a result, the public defender filed an answer on December 22, 1977 opposing the Commonwealth's petition for reconsideration. The affidavit attached to that answer, however, was not signed by the appellant. It was signed by the public defender.
After reconsideration, the lower court denied the appellant's motion to quash. Apparently, the lower court did so on January 31, 1978. The Court uses the term "apparently" because the only indication as to when the lower court finally denied the appellant's motion to quash is contained in the Commonwealth's and the appellant's briefs. The order denying the motion to quash, (if one exists), was not included in the record this Court received from the lower court.
The appellant was not notified of the lower court's decision, upon reconsideration, to deny his motion to quash.
The trial in the matter was scheduled for February 22, 1978. The Commonwealth did not notify the appellant of that trial date. The Commonwealth did, however, notify the public defender of the trial date.
The appellant failed to appear for trial on February 22, 1978. As a result, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest and the trial was rescheduled for March 10, 1978.
The Commonwealth filed a petition for an extension of time under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c) on February 23, 1978. In support of that petition, the Commonwealth alleged that it had exercised due diligence in trying to bring the appellant to trial within the 180 days but it was prevented from doing so, first, by the appellant's filing of a motion to quash and, second, by the appellant's failure to appear for trial on February 22, 1978. The lower court granted the Commonwealth's petition and extended the time for commencement of the appellant's trial to March 13, 1978.
On March 10, 1978, the appellant again failed to appear for trial.
The Commonwealth filed a second petition for an extension of time on March 13, 1978.
On April 21, 1978, an investigator for the Commonwealth located the appellant at 2167 East Firth Street and took him into custody. The same day, the lower court held an evidentiary hearing on the Commonwealth's second petition for an extension of time. At that hearing, the Commonwealth introduced the following evidence in support of its allegation that it had acted with due diligence:
A. On February 24, 1978, a letter was sent to the appellant's address as of November 14, 1977, 1831 East Orleans Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to notify him of the March 10, 1978 trial date.
B. On March 10, 1978, a telephone call was placed to 473-1016. There was no answer.
C. On April 4, 1978, the initial field visit was made to 1831 East Orleans Street by an investigator for the Commonwealth. The investigator found no one home at that address. While in the area, the investigator contacted an informant. The informant indicated that the appellant was living with a woman named Sharon in either the 2300 or 2400 block of Firth Street. The investigator went to the 2300 and 2400 blocks of Firth Street and interviewed approximately ten people. None of the individuals interviewed, however, knew of the appellant's whereabouts.
D. On April 18, 1978, a second field visit was made to 1831 East Orleans Street by an investigator for the Commonwealth. Again, the investigator found no one home at that address.
E. On April 20, 1978, an investigator for the Commonwealth contacted a second informant in the 1800 block of East Orleans Street. That informant indicated that the appellant was living at 2167 East Firth Street.
On the basis of this evidence and the procedural history of this case, the lower court found that the Commonwealth had exercised due diligence in attempting to locate the appellant. Therefore, the lower court extended the time for the commencement of the appellant's trial to May 20, 1978.
The appellant was tried on May 3, 1978, 238 days after the criminal complaint was filed.
The appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to act with due diligence in attempting to locate him. Hence, he argues, the lower court erred in denying his motion to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(f).
Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c) provides that a petition for an extension of time "shall be granted only if trial cannot be commenced within the prescribed period despite due diligence by the Commonwealth." To meet the standard of due diligence, the Commonwealth must take every step that it could reasonably be expected to take in trying to bring a defendant to trial within the prescribed period. Commonwealth v. Brinton, 275 Pa.Super. 311, 418 A.2d 737 (1980). The Commonwealth does not have to exhaust every conceivable avenue open to it to bring a defendant to trial within the prescribed period. Commonwealth v. Brinton, supra.
In the case at hand, the reason the appellant's trial was not commenced within the prescribed period was because of the appellant's failure to appear for trial on February 22, 1978. 5 Unlike the typical situation where a defendant fails to appear for trial, however, the appellant was not free on bail nor had he been released on his own recognizance. The appellant was at liberty because he had been discharged from custody when the charges against him were dismissed by the lower court for insufficient evidence.
Under these circumstances, the Court believes that the Commonwealth had a duty to locate and rearrest the appellant after the lower court denied the appellant's motion to quash after reconsideration.
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