Com. v. Gibbs

• Decision Date: 20 November 1950
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. GIBBS.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 608

76 A.2d 608 366 Pa. 182 COMMONWEALTH
v.
GIBBS. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Nov. 20, 1950.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1951.

[366 Pa. 184]

Page 609

W. Hensel Brown, Lancaster, Thomas D. McBride, Philadelphia, Michael von Moschzisker, Philadelphia, for appellant.

William C. Storb, Asst. Dist. Atty., John Milton Ranck, Dist. Atty., Lancaster, for appellee.

Before DREW, C. J., and STERN, STEARNE, JONES, LADNER and CHIDSEY, Jj.

DREW, Chief Justice.

On January 10, 1950, Marian Louise Baker was brutally slain by being beaten to death with a lug wrench. Eight days later Edward Lester Gibbs, defendant, confessed the killing. Thereafter, he was indicted in Lancaster County, tried by a jury, and convicted of murder in the first degree with the penalty fixed at death. Prior to his bringing this appeal, his motion for new trial was denied and sentence was imposed in accordance with the verdict.

At the time of the killing, defendant, a married war veteran twenty-five years of age, was a student at Franklin & Marshall College, Lancaster, Pennsylvania. [366 Pa. 185] In the early afternoon of January 10, 1950, he was in downtown Lancaster when he saw Miss Baker, an employee of the college. He offered to drive her back to the campus in his car and she accepted. However, instead of returning directly to the college, they rode out of town and into the open country. When they reached an isolated spot several miles from the city she commented on the view and defendant stopped the car so that they both might enjoy it. While sitting there he suddenly reached over and began choking her. She broke away and got out of the car. He followed her and after chocking her again, he returned to the car, unlocked and opened the luggage compartment, removed the lug wrench, and beat her over the head with it until she was dead. He then left but later returned to hide the body and remove any incriminating evidence. The body was not discovered until four days later.

On January 18, 1950, defendant admitted committing the crime and on that same day he signed a statement setting forth the facts as we have synopsized them here. Neither at the trial nor at any other time did he deny the truth of that confession and substantially all of the facts contained in it were verified by the independent investigation of the Pennsylvania State Police.

Under these circumstances, defendant concedes, as he must, that he properly deserves to be punished under the law. He contends, however, that because of the admission

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of certain evidence and because of certain alleged errors in the charge, he was precluded from having the jury fairly determine the degree of his guilt.

Two articles of the victim's clothing and several photographs of the body were introduced in evidence over defendant's objections. It is his position that these exhibits were of no value as evidence and were introduced solely to inflame the jury. That question has been raised in numerous cases and the law in respect [366 Pa. 186] to inflamatory evidence has become well settled. So long as the evidence is helpful to the jury in their investigation and deliberation and not introduced solely to arouse their emotions, the trial judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, admit such exhibits but the reason for their admission must be carefully explained to the jury. Commonwealth v. Davis, 363 Pa. 91, 95, 69 A.2d 123; Commonwealth v. Wentzel, 360 Pa. 137, 148, 61 A.2d 309; Commonwealth v. Chavis, 357 Pa. 158, 170, 53 A.2d 96; Commonwealth v. Dreamer, 324 Pa. 220, 224, 188 A. 117. In the instant case the photographs were introduced to show the position and condition of the body and the extent of the wounds. The clothing was introduced for the purpose of showing motive. All of the exhibits were used extensively by the medical experts to illustrate their oral testimony. These were all proper purposes. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 398, 65 A.2d 353; Commonwealth v. Peronace, 328 Pa. 86, 94, 195 A. 57; Commonwealth v. Winter, 289 Pa. 284, 289, 137 A. 261. Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting these exhibits into evidence subject to the precautionary instruction, which he gave, that the jurors were not to allow themselves to be prejudiced by them but were to consider them only for the purposes for which they were offered.

Dr. Edward A. Strecker testified for defendant as a psychiatric expert. On cross-examination he was asked whether he thought defendant might kill again to which he answered: 'I think it is possible that he might. You couldn't be sure.' Defendant urges that it was prejudicial error to allow the witness to answer that question. It is sufficient to say that since the question was not objected to by defendant's counsel, it need not be considered on appeal. Commonwealth v. Luccitti, 295 Pa. 190, 196, 145 A. 85.

[366 Pa. 187] Defendant raises the question of the trial judge's failure to charge on the presumption of innocence. That point is not seriously pressed on this appeal nor could it be in view of the court's repeated instructions to...