Commonwealth v. Gibbs

• Decision Date: 20 November 1950
• Citation: 366 Pa. 182,76 A.2d 608
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. GIBBS.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

76 A.2d 608

366 Pa. 182

COMMONWEALTH v. GIBBS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

November 20, 1950

Argued October 2, 1950

Appeal, No. 276, Jan. T., 1950, from judgment and sentence of Court of Oyer and Terminer, General Jail Delivery, and Quarter Sessions of the Peace of Lancaster County, Dec Sessions, 1949, Complaint No. 160, Indictment No. 1, March T., 1950, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Edward Lester Gibbs. Judgment and sentence affirmed; reargument refused January 12, 1951.

Indictment charging defendant with murder. Before WISSLER, J.

Verdict of guilty with penalty fixed at death. Defendant appealed.

The judgment and sentence is affirmed.

Thomas D. McBride, with him Michael von Moschzisker and W. Hensel Brown, for appellant.

John Milton Ranck, District Attorney, with him William C Storb, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Before DREW, C.J., STERN, STEARNE, JONES, LADNER and CHIDSEY, JJ.

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE DREW

On January 10, 1950, Marian Louise Baker was brutally slain by being beaten to death with a lug wrench. Eight days later Edward Lester Gibbs, defendant, confessed the killing. Thereafter, he was indicted in Lancaster County, tried by a jury, and convicted of murder in the first degree with the penalty fixed at death.Prior to his bringing this appeal, his motion for new trial was denied and sentence was imposed in accordance with the verdict.

At the time of the killing, defendant, a married war veteran twenty-five years of age, was a student at Franklin & Marshall College, Lancaster, Pennsylvania. In the early afternoon of January 10, 1950, he was in downtown Lancaster when he saw Miss Baker, an employe of the college. He offered to drive her back to the campus in his car and she accepted. However, instead of returning directly to the college, they rode out of town and into the open country. When they reached an isolated spot several miles from the city she commented on the view and defendant stopped the car so that they both might enjoy it. While sitting there he suddenly reached over and began choking her. She broke away and got out of the car. He followed her and after choking her again, he returned to the car, unlocked and opened the luggage compartment, removed the lug wrench, and beat her over the head with it until she was dead. He then left but later returned to hide the body and remove any incriminating evidence. The body was not discovered until four days later.

On January 18, 1950, defendant admitted committing the crime and on that same day he signed a statement setting forth the facts as we have synopsized them here. Neither at the trial nor at any other time did he deny the truth of that confession and substantially all of the facts contained in it were verified by the independent investigation of the Pennsylvania State Police.

Under these circumstances, defendant concedes, as he must, that he properly deserves to be punished under the law. He contends, however, that because of the admission of certain evidence and because of certain alleged errors in the charge, he was precluded from having the jury fairly determine the degree of his guilt.

Two articles of the victim's clothing and several photographs of the body were introduced in evidence over defendant's objections. It is his position that these exhibits were of no value as evidence and were introduced solely to inflame the jury. That question has been raised in numerous cases and the law in respect to inflammatory evidence has become well settled. So long as the evidence is helpful to the jury in their investigation and deliberation and not introduced solely to arouse their emotions, the trial judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, admit such exhibits but the reason for their admission must be carefully explained to the jury: Commonwealth v. Davis, 363 Pa. 91, 95, 69 A.2d 123; Commonwealth v. Wentzel, 360 Pa. 137, 148, 61 A.2d 309; Commonwealth v. Chavis, 357 Pa. 158, 170, 53 A.2d 96; Commonwealth v. Dreamer, 324 Pa. 220, 224, 188 A. 117. In the instant case the photographs were introduced to show the position and condition of the body and the extent of the wounds. The clothing was introduced for the purpose of showing motive. All of the exhibits were used extensively by the medical experts to illustrate their oral testimony. These were all proper purposes: Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 398, 65 A.2d 353; Commonwealth v. Peronace, 328 Pa. 86, 94, 195 A. 57; Commonwealth v. Winter, 289 Pa. 284, 289, 137 A. 261. Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting these exhibits into evidence subject to the precautionary instruction, which he gave, that the jurors were not to allow themselves to be prejudiced by them but were to consider them only for the purposes for which they were offered.

Dr. Edward A. Strecker testified for defendant as a psychiatric expert. On cross-examination he was asked whether he thought defendant might kill again to which he answered: "I think it is possible that he might. You couldn't be sure." Defendant urges that it was prejudicial error to allow the witness to answer that question. It is sufficient to say that since the question was not objected to by defendant's counsel, it need not be considered on appeal: Commonwealth v. Luccitti, 295 Pa. 190, 196, 145 A. 85.

Defendant raises the question of the trial judge's failure to charge on the presumption of innocence. That point is not seriously pressed on this appeal nor could it be in view of the court's repeated instructions to the jury that the Commonwealth had the never shifting burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Since that statement is equivalent to saying the defendant is presumed to be innocent, it satisfies the requirements of the law in that respect: Commonwealth v. Corrie, 302 Pa. 431, 437, 153 A. 743; Commonwealth v. Russogulo, 263 Pa. 93, 103, 106 A. 180.

Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that in a felonious malicious homicide the specific intent to kill is the essence of first degree murder and if there is such an intent with sufficient time to deliberate and premeditate, the crime is murder in the first degree. Defendant asserts that this instruction considers only whether he had time for deliberation and premeditation and not whether he did in fact deliberate and premeditate. This portion of the charge fully conformed to the charge in Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 16, which has long been established as a model for cases of this nature. It was clearly correct to charge that if the intention to kill existed, defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree. "Such intent supplies the qualities of willfulness, deliberation and premeditation otherwise essential, by the statute, to murder in the first degree.": Commonwealth v. Samuel Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 526, 50 A.2d 317. See also Commonwealth v. Malone, 354 Pa. 180, 183, 47 A.2d 445; Commonwealth v. Divomte, 262 Pa. 504, 507, 105 A. 821. There must, of course, be sufficient time, however, short it may actually be, for a person to deliberate and premeditate in order to form that intent. But those elements serve merely as guides for the jurors to prevent them from finding an intent where none in fact could have existed. That is precisely the effect of the charge in this case and we are in full accord with it.

Defendant next alleges that it was error for the court to instruct the jury that from the use of a deadly weapon, a presumption of the intent to kill arises. He maintains that such a presumption takes from the jury the right to find whether that intent did exist. In answer to this it is sufficient to say that the statement of the learned trial judge was in complete conformity with Commonwealth v. Drum, supra at p. 17, as well as charges we approved in Commonwealth v. Green, 294 Pa. 573, 579, 144 A. 743; Commonwealth v. Blakeley, 274 Pa. 100, 105, 117 A. 685; Commonwealth v. Lacie, 256 Pa. 526, 100 A. 974; Commonwealth v. Boyd, 246 Pa. 529, 535, 92 A. 705. That presumption in not, as defendant contends, a presumption of law; it is merely a presumption of fact which permits the jury to find intent from the use of a deadly weapon: Commonwealth v. Gidaro, 363 Pa. 472, 478, 70 A.2d 359; Commonwealth v. Prenni, 357 Pa. 572, 575, 55 A.2d 532; Commonwealth v. Robinson, 305 Pa. 302, 310, 157 A. 689. That this is true is made apparent by the fact that it is quite frequently spoken of as an inference rather than a presumption: Commonwealth v. Steele, 362 Pa. 427, 430, 66 A.2d 825; Commonwealth v. Chapman, 359 Pa. 164, 167, 58 A.2d 433; Commonwealth v. Holley, 358 Pa. 296, 302, 56 A.2d 546. While we agree that it is preferable in charging a jury to call it an inference, the two forms are interchangeable. A presumption of fact is nothing more than a prima facie inference: Commonwealth v. Kluska, 333 Pa. 65, 69, 3 A.2d 398. That this presumption is a reasonable one founded on human experience is obvious. One does not normally use a deadly weapon on a vital part of another's body unless he intends to kill. The law could not properly perform its function in society if it were to ignore such fundamental truisms. As we said in Commonwealth v. Wucherer, 351 Pa. 305, 312, 41 A.2d 574: "... there is no reason why a person charged with crime should be exempt from the ordinary presumptions or inferences which attach to the acts of men in all other relations of life..."

Defendant's principal argument is that the trial judge erroneously withdrew second degree murder from the jury. It is a basic rule that in cases of felonious homicides the jury must fix the degree and withdrawing that function from them is prejudicial error requiring a new trial: Commonwealth v Foster, 364...