Com. v. Gilchrest
| Decision Date | 12 November 1973 |
| Citation | 364 Mass. 272,303 N.E.2d 331 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. David Bradford GILCHREST (and five companion cases) 1 . |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Robert V. Greco, Boston, on brief, for defendants.
Terence M. Trover and Barbara A. H. Smith, Asst. Dist. Attys., on brief, for the Commonwealth.
Before TAURO, C.J., and REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER and HENNESSEY, JJ.
These are appeals pursuant to G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A--33G, from the denial of motions to withdraw guilty pleas on grounds of involuntariness. The defendants claim error in the refusal by the judge hearing the motions to grant them a continuance for the purpose of procuring an expert witness to testify to the effects of Librium, a tranquilizing drug which they testified to ingesting in large dosage just prior to entering guilty pleas to the charges of second degree murder, unarmed robbery, and confining for the purpose of stealing. The judge, on the basis of his own knowledge and the prior testimony of the physician at the Billericia jail who had authorized issuance of the drug, thought additional testimony, and thus the continuance, unnecessary. He also treated his recollection of the defendants' apparently normal behavior at the pleading session as corroborative evidence of the drug's minimal effects. The defendants point to certain medical literature which warns that Librium may cause confusion and is contraindicated when acts requiring mental alertness are contemplated, and argue that the judge's reliance on his own knowledge and on the Commonwealth's medical witness was not consistent with the 'full and complete evidentiary hearing' that should be required in this situation. They also contend that when a judge is considering motions to withdraw allegedly drug influenced guilty pleas, it is improper for him to give weight to his recollection of the accuseds' appearance and behavior at the time they entered their pleas, since 'symptoms . . . produced by narcotics will often not be apparent to a lay observer, even a judge.'
In response, the Commonwealth characterizes the judge's refusal to grant a continuance, and his ultimate denial of the motions, as a proper exercise of his discretion. In support of this position, the Commonwealth highlights the following factors: (1) the case had already been continued once, and it had been four months since the defendants first filed their motions; (2) the judge had earlier heard from one expert, and the defendants did not suggest any way a second expert could add to that testimony other than to demonstrate that the effect of a drug varies from individual to individual. The judge clearly indicated that he was aware of possible variations. (3) The judge had personally observed the defendants at the time they entered their pleas.
Thus, the narrow issue before us is, did the judge hearing the defendants' motions abuse his discretion by refusing to grant a continuance for the purpose of allowing the defendants time to procure their own expert witness? In approaching this problem, we are guided by the well established view that a trial judge's decisions on matters of continuance, being committed to his discretion, are not to be disturbed on appeal unless shown to be arbitrary. Commonwealth v. Smith, 353 Mass. 442, 445, 232 N.E.2d 917 (1968). At the same time, we recognize that Id. at 445, 232 N.E.2d at 919.
The sequence of events leading up to the judge's disputed ruling may be summarized as follows. In July of 1968, the Middlesex grand jury returned indictments against the defendants David B. Gilchrest and John F. Moynihan for murder in the first degree, confining for the purpose of stealing, and unarmed robbery. In October of the same year each pleaded guilty to the confining and robbery charges and to so much of the murder charge as alleged murder in the second degree, and was sentenced by the judge to serve a concurrent life term on each charge. Two months later, on December 20, both filed motions to withdraw their guilty pleas. On January 25, 1969, the Massachusetts Defenders Committtee was appointed to represent the defendants, and the hearing on the motions was continued until May 1.
At the may 1 hearing, again before the same judge, the hospital steward at the jail at Billerica testified that during the weekend before the defendants pleaded guilty, each was given six ten milligram Librium capsules, dispensed singly, three times a day, on Saturday and Sunday. It was intended that the capsules be taken when received, and guards had been on hand to see that this was done, but it was 'possible,' in the steward's words, that the defendants had 'mouthed' the capsules, only pretending to have swallowed them. The defendants' testimony was that except for two occasions when Gilchrest swallowed the capsule at the proper time, they had employed the 'mouthing' technique described by the steward and thus, by weekend's end, had accumulated a considerable supply of Librium. Both testified to taking these capsules just prior to appearing in court and entering their guilty pleas, Moynihan ingesting seven and Gilchrest five (thus they maintain that they received seven capsules apiece over the weekend and not six as the Billerica steward had stated).
There is considerable conflict in the testimony concerning the effect these dosages had or might have had on the defendants. Moynihan stated that he had experienced a 'tingling feeling' (I had felt all tingles through my hair and very light on my feet') and depression ('I wanted to talk but I was just, I felt down about everything'). Gilchrest concurred, telling of a headache and a 'feeling like . . . I didn't care about things.' William Baranow, an inmate at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole, where the defendants were transferred for permanent confinement on the same day as they entered their pleas, had the opportunity to observe the defendants as they were being processed in, and testified that and Gilchrest complained of 'a very bad headache.' It was brought out on cross-examination that Baranow had helped prepare the...
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Com. v. Watkins
...--- Mass at --- V, 373 N.E.2d 963. Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, --- Mass. ---, --- W, 353 N.E.2d 732 (1976). Commonwealth v. Gilchrest, 364 Mass. 272, 276, 303 N.E.2d 331 (1973). Commonwealth v. Bettencourt, 361 Mass. 515, 517-518, 281 N.E.2d 220 (1972). For the same reasons discussed above c......
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Commonwealth v. Ray
...cost, potential prejudice, and the burden of the delay on both the parties and the judicial system. Commonwealth v. Gilchrest, 364 Mass. 272, 276, 303 N.E.2d 331 (1973). See Cavanaugh, supra; Reporters' Notes to Rule 10(a), Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1418 (......
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...the resolution of a particular controversy.’ ” Commonwealth v. Cruz, supra at 748, 926 N.E.2d 142, quoting Commonwealth v. Gilchrest, 364 Mass. 272, 276–277, 303 N.E.2d 331 (1973). See Commonwealth v. Dunne, 394 Mass. 10, 14, 474 N.E.2d 538 (1985). At the same time, a “myopic insistence upo......
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