Com. v. Glassman

• Decision Date: 15 December 1986
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. William GLASSMAN, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 865

518 A.2d 865

359 Pa.Super. 230

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. William GLASSMAN, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Oct. 28, 1986.

Decided Dec. 15, 1986.

Elliot B. Platt, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Leonard Deutchman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Com., appellee.

Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and ROWLEY and BECK, JJ.

CIRILLO, President Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Appellant, William Glassman, was convicted of reckless driving and driving without lights to avoid identification and attempting to elude police and was sentenced to pay a fine and court costs totaling $497.00. After the denial of his post-trial motions he appealed to this Court. We affirm.

On January 4, 1985 at 1:40 A.M., police officer Frank Boyle observed a red Honda driving on the wrong side of Warden Drive in Philadelphia. The car disregarded a stop sign and Officer Boyle pulled his vehicle behind the Honda and turned on his dome light. Instead of pulling over, the Honda sped away, ignoring stop signs and speed limits. The driver of the car turned off his headlights as he attempted to out-run the police car which was in pursuit with its siren on. Officer Boyle saw the Honda pull into a driveway and garage in the 3400 block of Queen Lane. The officer confronted the appellant as he walked from his garage to his house. Appellant denied that he had been involved in the incident and insisted that Officer Boyle must have lost sight of the perpetrator's car during the chase. The officer took appellant to the police station where he was detained for a period of time between one and three hours, issued a citation and released. The traffic court disbelieved appellant's assertion that he was not the driver of the car which the officer had observed and chased. On appeal, the Court of Common Pleas reached the same conclusion.

Appellant presents three issues for our review: (1) whether appellant was arrested illegally, rendering the citations invalid; (2) whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a finding that appellant was the driver of the car in question; (3) whether the evidence of intent was sufficient to support a finding of guilt.

Appellant claims that his conviction must be reversed because his arrest was illegal since it violated the procedural requirements mandated by the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Commonwealth claims that appellant was detained for a short period of time but was never arrested. We find it unnecessary to resolve this issue. Even assuming that the appellant was placed under arrest, his subsequent conviction is proper and need not be reversed.

Appellant was charged with reckless driving, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714 and driving without lights to avoid identification or arrest, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3734, both of which are summary offenses. The Rules of Criminal Procedure, at that time, provided in pertinent part:

A. Criminal Proceedings in summary cases shall be instituted in the following manner:

(1) Traffic Offenses (other than parking)

* * *

(c) For a summary offense under the Vehicle Code, the defendant may be arrested without a warrant only as provided in the Vehicle Code.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 51 A. (1)(c) (rescinded 7/1/86).

The relevant section of the Vehicle Code is § 6304. It provides:

Authority to arrest without warrant

(a) Pennsylvania State Police.--A member of the Pennsylvania State Police who is in uniform may arrest without a warrant any person who violates any provision of this title in the presence of the police officer making the arrest.

(b) Other police officers.--Any police officer who is in uniform may arrest without a warrant any nonresident who violates any provision of this title in the presence of the police officer in making the arrest.

(c) Other powers preserved.--The powers of arrest conferred by this section are in addition to any other powers of arrest conferred by law.

Assuming, arguendo, that appellant's detention constituted an "arrest", it is apparent that he was not arrested by a member of the Pennsylvania State Police nor was he a nonresident, nor has the Commonwealth shown that any other power of arrest applies to the situation. Therefore, § 6304 did not authorize the police to arrest appellant without a warrant. The police should not have arrested appellant but should only have issued him a citation. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 51 A. (1)(b) (rescinded 7/1/86).

Appellant claims that this apparent statutory violation mandates reversal of his convictions. We disagree. In support of his argument, appellant cites the following cases: Commonwealth v. Hatfield, 307 Pa.Super. 454, 453 A.2d 671 (1982); Commonwealth v. Stahl, 296 Pa.Super. 507, 442 A.2d 1166 (1982); Commonwealth v. Jonnet, 265 Pa.Super. 315, 401 A.2d 1228 (1979); Commonwealth v. Shelton, 262 Pa.Super. 82, 393 A.2d 1022 (1978). In Jonnet, this Court reversed a summary conviction based upon a violation of the Vehicle Code because of a substantive defect in the citation issued to the defendant. The court followed the line of cases cited above, which hold that in summary prosecutions, the rules of procedure must be strictly complied with or the defendant's arrest is invalid. Id. at 316-19, 401 A.2d at 1228-30. However, at the time each of these cases was decided, the controlling Rule of Criminal Procedure provided in pertinent part:

(b) Substantive Defects:

If a complaint, citation, summons or warrant contains a substantive defect, the defendant shall be discharged unless he waives the defect.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 150(b) (amended 7/1/82).

Therefore, under Pennsylvania law effective at the time, the Jonnet court was required only to determine whether or not the defect at issue was "substantive" or informal. The court decided that it was substantive and reversed the defendant's conviction. However, Pennsylvania law has since been changed. The law in effect at the time the case before us arose, provided:

A defendant shall not be discharged nor shall a case be dismissed because of a defect in the form or content of a complaint, citation, summons, or warrant, or a defect in the procedures of this chapter, unless ... the defect is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 70 (rescinded 7/1/86).

The comments to the Rule make clear that it was intended to eliminate the substantive/informal distinction. Instead, courts were instructed to inquire whether the defendant's rights were prejudiced. If no actual prejudice was present, the court was no longer permitted to discharge the defendant or dismiss the case. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 70 comment ("This rule is intended to clarify when a defendant should be discharged or a case dismissed because of a defect; it eliminates disputes as to what is an informal defect or a substantive defect. As a condition of relief regardless of whether the defect is in form, content or procedure, the court or issuing authority must determine that there is actual prejudice to the rights of the defendant."). Since the line of cases cited by the appellant were adjudicated before Pennsylvania abandoned the substantive/informal distinction, those cases are inapplicable to the instant case. The charges against the appellant may be dismissed only if he can demonstrate that his illegal arrest actually prejudiced his rights. See former Pa.R.Crim.P. 70. This we conclude appellant has failed to do.

Appellant has not demonstrated any way in which he was prejudiced by Officer Boyle's detention of him. Appellant was well aware of the charges filed against him and he certainly had ample time before trial to prepare a defense. Appellant asserts that his arrest in violation of the procedural rules constituted actual prejudice. We must reject this claim. If we were to accept appellant's argument we would render Rule 70 a nullity. Rule 70 applied only in summary cases where a defect in form, content or procedure had occurred. Once such a defect occurs, the proceedings are in violation of the criminal rules but it is Rule 70 which informs courts when such a violation is fatal to the prosecution.

Under appellant's interpretation, a procedural violation would itself constitute prejudice. Therefore, all procedural violations would be fatal to further prosecution and there would be no need for a rule distinguishing fatal from non-fatal defects. Yet, Rule 70 expressly states that it was enacted in order to guide courts in...