Commonwealth v. Marconi

• Decision Date: 22 January 2013
• Citation: 64 A.3d 1036
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. John M. MARCONI, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

64 A.3d 1036

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant

v.John M. MARCONI, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Oct. 19, 2011.

Decided Jan. 22, 2013.

Amy Zapp, PA Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Gregory A. Henry, Bradford, for John M. Marconi.

BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, ORIE MELVIN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice SAYLOR.^*

Appeal was allowed to consider whether sheriffs and their deputies have the authority independently to establish and conduct suspicionless roadside sobriety checkpoints.

I. Background

Section 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b), prescribes that a “police officer” engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers may stop vehicles to secure information to enforce the provisions of the title. Such provisions include the prohibition against driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances (“DUI”). See75 Pa.C.S. § 3802.

In September 2007, sheriffs and deputies of the Forest and Warren County Sheriffs' Departments (the “Sheriffs”) established a temporary sobriety checkpoint in Forest County.¹ Appellee drove a vehicle into the checkpoint, was stopped, manifested signs of alcohol use, and underwent field sobriety and chemical testing. Based on the results, he was arrested and charged with DUI and other offenses.

Appellee challenged the authority of the Sheriffs to conduct suspicionless stops and sought suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of his detention. He invoked a line of this Court's decisions holding that, absent specific statutory authorization, sheriffs are not “police” or “law enforcement” officers authorized to conduct independent investigations where no breach of the peace or felony has been committed in their presence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dobbins, 594 Pa. 71, 934 A.2d 1170 (2007) (holding that sheriffs lacked the authority to conduct independent investigations under the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. §§ 780–101–780–144); Kopko v. Miller, 586 Pa. 170, 892 A.2d 766 (2006) (holding that sheriffs are not authorized to conduct independent investigations under the authority of the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5703–5728). More specifically, Appellee contended that the Sheriffs are not “police officers” for purposes of Section 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code. Thus, Appellee asserted, the stop was illegal, implicating the exclusionary rule.²

The Commonwealth countered that sheriffs' authority to enforce the Vehicle Code was established in Commonwealth v. Leet, 537 Pa. 89, 641 A.2d 299 (1994) (holding that duly-trained sheriffs and their deputies have authority to make warrantless arrests for motor vehicle violations committed in their presence). In particular, the Commonwealth stressed Leet's reliance on the historical, common-law powers of sheriffs, as follows:

Unless the sheriff's common law power to make warrantless arrests for breaches of the peace committed in his presence has been abrogated, it is clear that a sheriff (and his deputies) may make arrests for motor vehicle violations which amount to breaches of the peace committed in their presence. Thus, we search the statute[, i.e., the Vehicle Code,] for authority abrogating the common law power of the sheriff, rather than statutory authority for the sheriff to enforce the law—authority he has always possessed under common law. In other words, although the Superior Court searched in vain for a provision which grants the sheriff an enforcement power under the motor vehicle laws, it is instead necessary to search for a statutory provision which removes the enforcement power of the sheriff (which pre-existed the statute). The latter search is equally vain; there is, in the motor vehicle code, no unequivocal abrogation of the sheriff's common law power to arrest. It is evident, moreover, that the power to arrest subsumes the power to stop, detain, and investigate a motorist who breaches the peace while operating a motor vehicle in the presence of the sheriff.

In short, it is not necessary to find a motor vehicle code provision granting to sheriffs the power to enforce the code—sheriffs have had the power and duty to enforce the laws since before the Magna Carta; rather, it would be necessary to find an unequivocal provision in the code abrogating the sheriff's power in order to conclude that the sheriff may not enforce the code.

Id. at 96, 641 A.2d at 303 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). The Commonwealth highlighted that there simply is no provision in the Vehicle Code abrogating a duly-trained sheriffs' power to enforce its prescriptions using sobriety checkpoints. Furthermore, the Commonwealth observed, in Penn. DOT v. Kline, 559 Pa. 646, 741 A.2d 1281 (1999), this Court relied on Leet in condoning the use of a checkpoint by sheriffs and their deputies. See id. at 655, 741 A.2d at 1286 (holding that a deputy sheriff was authorized to enforce the Vehicle Code, through implementation of its implied consent provision, at a sobriety checkpoint).

The common pleas court agreed with Appellee's position and awarded suppression. See Commonwealth v. Marconi, No. 95 of 2007, slip op. (C.P. Forest Apr. 29, 2009). In its reasoning, the court applied the line of decisions reinforcing the limits of sheriffs' common-law powers and holding that express statutory authority is necessary to support an independent exercise of investigative powers by sheriffs. See id., slip op. at 2–3 (citing Dobbins, 594 Pa. at 71, 934 A.2d at 1170, and Kopko, 586 Pa. at 170, 892 A.2d at 766). While, in relation to the Vehicle Code, the common pleas court recognized that such limitation manifests some disharmony with the broader language employed by the Court in Leet and Kline, the court responded with the observation that “Kline was decided before the Supreme Court's decisions in Dobbins and Kopko and did not have the benefit of these later holdings.” Marconi, No. 95 of 2007, slip op. at 3 (explaining that, in the more current opinions, “the Supreme Court's focus has turned to the investigative powers normally reserved for police officers and not sheriffs”).

The common pleas court found this distinction between investigation and arrest to be of particular significance in the arena of sobriety checkpoints, since suspicionless stops implicate sensitive constitutional rights. The court explained:

“DUI roadblocks are an exception to a citizen's Fourth Amendment right to protection from unreasonable search and seizures and an exception to the protections afforded the citizens under Article I, Section [8] of the Pennsylvania Constitution” and found in the requirements of Comm [ onwealth ] v. Blouse , 611 A.2d 1177 (Pa.1992) and Comm [ onwealth ] v. Tarbert , 535 A.2d 1035 (Pa.1987). A DUI roadblock is inherently investigatory in nature. At a DUI roadblock a citizen is stopped, seized, and investigated as to whether or not he has been drinking. It is only after the end of the investigation that the citizen is allowed to continue or an arrest is made. This situation is quite different from a sheriff's witnessing a driver operating a vehicle while intoxicatedand pulling him over for that reason because at a DUI roadblock there is no determination of a driver [']s sobriety until after the driver's rights have been abrogated and he has been investigated by officers.

Marconi, No. 95 of 2007, slip op. at 4 (quoting Commonwealth v. Culp, No. 67 of 2006, slip op. at 4 (C.P. Forest Oct. 9, 2008)).

Finally, the common pleas court acknowledged that the Vehicle Code contains a broad definition of “police officer” as a “natural person authorized by law to make arrests for violations of law.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 102. Nevertheless, the court observed that this Court's recent decisions reflect that, “when dealing with investigatory powers authorized by statute that intrude upon fundamental constitutional rights, the statute must be strictly construed.” Marconi, No. 95 of 2007, slip op. at 4 (citing Dobbins, 594 Pa. at 85–87, 934 A.2d at 1179–80).

On the Commonwealth's appeal, the Superior Court affirmed based on reasoning similar to that of the common pleas court. See Commonwealth v. Marconi, 996 A.2d 1070, 1075 (Pa.Super.2010) (“[W]e decline to find that the common law authority of sheriffs includes the power to conduct an investigation in the form of a DUI roadblock when such conduct implicates serious constitutional rights of the citizens of this Commonwealth.”). Responding to the Commonwealth's reliance on Kline, the Superior Court distinguished the decision as addressing sheriffs' powers of arrest, as opposed to the authority to conduct and operate checkpoints or suspicionless stops. See id. at 1072 n. 2. We allowed appeal to undertake plenary review of the correctness of the common pleas and intermediate courts' legal rulings.

Presently, the Commonwealth recognizes the inherent limitations on sheriffs' powers in settings other than the Vehicle Code. Nevertheless, it maintains that Leet and Kline establish that duly-trained sheriffs and their deputies are “police officers” for purposes of Vehicle Code enforcement. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 11. The Commonwealth criticizes the Superior Court for distinguishing Kline, since, in the Commonwealth's view, the authority to conduct the sobriety checkpoint and the power of arrest were inextricably intertwined in Kline, as the Commonwealth asserts they also are in the present case. See id. at 16 (asserting that the Kline Court “did not just speak in terms of only one aspect of enforcement— i.e., arrest—but more collectively about the activity in general”). The Commonwealth also faults the common pleas and intermediate courts for looking to the Vehicle Code for express authority for sheriffs to establish and conduct sobriety checkpoints. In this respect, the Commonwealth points to Leet's instruction that the opposite approach—looking to whether...