Com. v. Godfroy

• Citation: 420 Mass. 561,650 N.E.2d 1273
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Louis L. GODFROY.
• Decision Date: 15 June 1995
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1273

650 N.E.2d 1273

420 Mass. 561

COMMONWEALTH v. Louis L. GODFROY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Middlesex.

Argued Dec. 6, 1994.

Decided June 15, 1995.

Nona E. Walker, Boston, for defendant.

William J. Duensing, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Com.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

O'CONNOR, Justice.

In 1986, the defendant was charged in one indictment with two counts of rape and abuse of a child and in a second indictment with two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child. He pleaded not guilty to those charges. In 1987, the defendant retracted his not guilty pleas and offered to plead guilty to all the charges. Although we have not been provided with a transcript of the plea hearing, the parties appear to agree that the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed to a sentencing recommendation and that, on April 21, 1987, after accepting the guilty pleas, the judge followed that recommendation. The judge imposed a general sentence of from seven to fifteen years at Massachusetts Correctional Institution (M.C.I.), Cedar Junction on the two counts of rape and abuse of a child. He placed the indecent assault and battery charges on file with the defendant's consent.

Also on April 21, 1987, at the time of sentencing, the judge committed the defendant pursuant to G.L. c. 123A, § 4, to the treatment center for sexually dangerous persons at the M.C.I. at Bridgewater (treatment center) for a sixty-day period of observation to determine whether the defendant was a sexually dangerous person. Then, on July 22, 1987, after a hearing pursuant to G.L. c. 123A, § 5, the judge found the defendant to be a sexually dangerous person and ordered that he be committed to the treatment center "for a term of not less than one day to a maximum of his natural life." Before us, the parties appear to disagree as to whether the prosecutor and defense counsel had agreed prior to sentencing that at the time of sentencing the defendant would be committed to the treatment center for a sixty-day observation period to be followed by a hearing pursuant to G.L. c. 123A, § 5. In any event, the defendant now represents that, at the time of sentencing and commitment for sixty-days' observation, he personally was unaware of, and did not knowingly waive, the right, which he now asserts, to a delay of sentencing until after the completion of the sixty-day observation period and a subsequent court hearing relative to his sexual dangerousness. Nothing in the record brought to our attention conflicts with the defendant's representation.

Approximately six years later, in early 1993, the defendant filed a pro se motion for release from unlawful restraint pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(a), 378 Mass. 900 (1979), based on the following grounds: (1) that the procedure followed in his sentencing and commitment to the treatment center did not satisfy statutory requirements, and (2) that his continued commitment to the treatment center for from one day to life, in light of the 1990 amendment to G.L. c. 123A, which eliminates all new commitments, violates his right to due process and equal protection of the law. The sentencing judge denied the defendant's pro se motion. Several weeks later, newly appointed counsel for the defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the judge also denied with the following endorsement: "Motion denied without a hearing. The defendant, represented by counsel, agreed to the procedure followed in this case. There was no prejudice to the defendant." The defendant did not seek appellate review of the denial of either motion.

Late in 1993, the defendant, represented by counsel, filed a second motion for release from unlawful restraint pursuant to rule 30(a). The motion was based on the same grounds as was the defendant's first motion. The judge denied the motion "[a]fter consideration" but without a hearing. The defendant filed a timely claim of appeal and we granted the defendant's application for direct appellate review.

First, we address the Commonwealth's argument that the appeal is not properly before us. Relying on Commonwealth v. DeChristoforo, 371 Mass. 26, 32-33, 353 N.E.2d 769 (1976), the Commonwealth's argument is that, because the defendant's asserted grounds for relief under rule 30(a) were identical in the defendant's first and second motions, and the defendant failed to appeal either from the judge's order denying the first motion or from the order denying the motion for reconsideration, the defendant cannot now, in effect, challenge the correctness of those rulings by appealing from the denial of the second motion. We decline to adopt the Commonwealth's position and we shall proceed to the merits of this appeal. If we were to refuse to review this case on the merits, the defendant would be entitled under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to raise the issues he seeks to raise in this appeal by a motion for a new trial under rule 30(b) based on alleged ineffectiveness of defense counsel in having failed to appeal from the denial of the first motion and the motion to reconsider. See Commonwealth v. Cowie, 404 Mass. 119 122-123, 533 N.E.2d 1329 (1989). ¹ No legitimate purpose would be served by our requiring the defendant to file another motion raising the same issues raised previously and then to appeal from an adverse ruling.

The following two questions are presented in this appeal: (1) whether under the provisions of G.L. c. 123A, § 5, as in effect at the time of the defendant's pleas of guilty, the trial judge improperly imposed sentence on the defendant prior to conducting a hearing to determine whether he was a sexually dangerous person; (2) whether, in view of our answer to that question and in light of the Legislature's amendment to G.L. c. 123A, the defendant's commitment now as a sexually dangerous person would be improper. We answer both questions, "Yes." Accordingly, we reverse in part and remand the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant argues that under the provisions of G.L. c. 123A, § 5, as in effect at the time of his guilty pleas, it was error for the judge to sentence him before conducting the hearing to determine whether he was a sexually dangerous person. We agree. The procedure followed in sentencing the defendant and committing him as a sexually dangerous person did not conform to G.L. c. 123A, § 5, as appearing in St.1985, c. 752, § 1. Section 5, as in effect at the time the defendant pleaded guilty, provided in relevant part: "If, after a person's sixty day period of observation, the report filed with the court by the two qualified examiners clearly indicates that the person is a sexually dangerous person, the court shall give notice to such person that a hearing will be held to determine whether or not he is a sexually dangerous person.... If the court finds upon such hearing that the person is a sexually dangerous person, it shall sentence such person as provided by law for the original offense and may also commit such person to the center, or branch thereof, for an indeterminate period of a minimum of one day and a maximum of such person's natural life." "Thus, in a case in which a commitment to the treatment center is being considered, the statute requires that [a sexually dangerous person] hearing precede both any determination that the individual is a sexually dangerous person and the imposition of sentence." Commonwealth v. Desroches, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 866, 868, 545 N.E.2d 64 (1989). In the instant case, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to a term of from seven to fifteen years on April 21, 1987. On the same date, the judge ordered him committed to the treatment center for sixty days observation. Approximately two and one-half months later, the judge, after a hearing, determined that he was a sexually dangerous person and committed him to the treatment center for from one day to life. This was error.

The defendant further argues that the procedure followed deprived him of a substantial right and that, therefore, he is entitled to...