Com. v. Grant
| Citation | 366 Mass. 272,317 N.E.2d 484 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Henry GRANT. |
| Decision Date | 09 October 1974 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Martin C. Gideonse, Boston, on brief, for defendant.
Timothy J. Spillane, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., on brief, for Commonwealth.
Before TAURO, C.J., and REARDON, BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY and WILKINS, JJ.
The defendant is here claiming credit for time spent in confinement in lieu of bail on a Federal charge while awaiting trial on both State and Federal charges. The charges arose out of the same incident which occurred on March 25, 1973, at which time one Jesse Ammons, a witness for the government in certain Federal prosecutions, was assaulted and money was taken from him. Two days later the defendant Grant and one other were arrested by Boston police officers and by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Federal authorities charged Grant with intimidation of a witness. He was brought that same day before the United States District Court and remanded to the Charles Street jail in lieu of bail in custody of the United States Marshal. The Boston police charged Grant with armed robbery and with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. Warrants were apparently lodged with the United States Marshal, and Grant was indicted on the State charges on May 21, 1973.
On June 25, 1973, Grant was released from Federal custody, whereupon bail was set by the Commonwealth and he was returned to the Charles Street jail. He was arraigned on the Suffolk County indictments on July 5, 1973. He remained in the Charles Street jail until November 27, 1973, but in the interim he was acquitted of the Federal offense. Thereafter, on November 27, 1973, he was tried before a judge and a jury in the Superior Court, found not guilty of armed robbery, and convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. For the latter offense a sentence of two and one-half years in the house of correction was imposed. The order of commitment credited him with 145 days served on that sentence while awaiting trial, seemingly based on the date of the Superior Court arraignment. On March 19, 1974, a motion to revise the order of commitment to credit Grant with the full time served from March 27, 1973, was denied.
We are of opinion that Grant should have been credited with his additional time. The statute that we interpret is G.L. c. 279, § 33A, as amended through St.1961, c. 75, which provides: 'The court on imposing a sentence of commitment to a correctional institution of the commonwealth, a house of correction, or a jail, shall order that the prisoner be deemed to have served a portion of said sentence, such portion to be the number of days spent by the prisoner in confinement prior to such sentence awaiting and during trial.' See also G.L. c. 127, § 129B, containing similar provisions addressed to the Commissioner of Correction. We address ourselves to the questions (1) whether the credited time commences on the date of arrest or on the date bail is set by the Commonwealth; (2) whether the confinement to be credited must have been on the same charge as that for which the defendant is ultimately sentenced; and (3) whether the confinement must have been at the hands of the Commonwealth rather than by Federal authorities.
It is the contention of the Commonwealth that the proper date for the beginning of credited time is the date bail was set by the Commonwealth, here June 25, 1973. The Commonwealth argues that the statutory purpose was to afford relief to those held in custody merely because of inability to obtain bail; therefore, the statute is inapplicable before bail is set. But the statute is silent on the subject of bail and makes reference only to time spent in confinement awaiting trial. In addition, it was stated in Needel, petitioner, 344 Mass. 260, 262, 182 N.E.2d 125, 127 (1962), that the 'statutory purpose . . . was to afford relief to those not convicted and not serving any sentence but who because of inability to obtain bail, for example, were held in custody awaiting trial' (emphasis supplied). A review of the legislative history of the statute confirms the view that bail is not a critical element. In the report of the Governor's Committee to Study the Massachusetts Correctional System, 1955 Senate Doc. No. 750, which recommended the enactment of the statute, no reference was made to bail; there was, however, ample indication that the basic purpose of the statute was to provide for relief to those defendants who have served any jail...
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