Com. v. Gravely
Decision Date | 06 July 1979 |
Citation | 486 Pa. 194,404 A.2d 1296 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. William GRAVELY, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Robert B. Lawler, Chief, Appeals Div., Asst. Dist. Atty., William C. Turnoff, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.
Appellant, William Gravely, was convicted by a jury of murder of the second degree in connection with the death of Denise Bennett. Following a denial of post-verdict motions, judgment of sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. This direct appeal followed.
The Commonwealth argues the issues now advanced by Gravely are not properly preserved for appellate review since they were not included in written post-verdict motions. Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975). A brief raising the issues was presented to the post-verdict motion court, and the court considered the issues. Since a majority of this Court has heretofore considered such a brief, along with consideration of the issues raised therein by the trial court, sufficient to preserve issues for review under Commonwealth v. Blair, supra, on the basis of substantial compliance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(a), we must reject the Commonwealth's argument. 1 Commonwealth v. Slaughter, 482 Pa. 538, 394 A.2d 453 (1978); Commonwealth v. Hitson, 482 Pa. 404, 393 A.2d 1169 (1978); Commonwealth v. Jones, 478 Pa. 172, 386 A.2d 495 (1978); Commonwealth v. Pugh, 476 Pa. 445, 383 A.2d 183 (1978); Commonwealth v. Perillo, 474 Pa. 63, 376 A.2d 635 (1977); Commonwealth v. Grace, 473 Pa. 542, 375 A.2d 721 (1977).
But, this Court's experience with Commonwealth v. Grace, supra, and its progeny has not been very satisfying. Counsel have more often than not failed to include the briefs in the record and, indeed, have often failed to even mention a brief was presented or filed in the trial court in the oral arguments and briefs before this Court. This unsatisfactory situation is perhaps best typified by Commonwealth v. Slaughter, supra, wherein we had to grant reargument because counsel had failed to adequately advise us of the existence of a brief. Accordingly, in order to conclude this unsatisfactory situation, we now rule that sixty days after the filing of this opinion, only those issues included in post-verdict motions will be considered preserved for appellate review. We caution that this ruling applies to every post-verdict motion which is filed sixty days hence and to any motion which is already filed, but which may still be supplemented after sixty days from this date. Our ruling is prospective only because of the possibility of reliance by counsel on prior decisions of this Court. Cf. Commonwealth v. Bailey, 463 Pa. 354, 344 A.2d 869 (1975).
With that unsatisfactory situation laid to rest, we shall now consider the merits of Gravely's complaints.
Gravely first complains that his trial, which followed an earlier mistrial, caused him to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense in violation of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. 2
Gravely was originally brought to trial on January 26, 1976, on the murder indictment. During the course of that trial, the Commonwealth called as a witness a veteran police officer, Detective McMillan, to relate the circumstances under which Gravely had provided police with an incriminatory statement. During cross-examination, McMillan responded to a question put forth by defense counsel in an attempt to pinpoint the exact moment during Gravely's police interview when he requested the assistance of counsel. His response indicated Gravely sought the assistance of counsel after "(h)e told me he killed Denise and . . . after I told him he had flunked the polygraph exam." Defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, which, after an in-camera conference, was granted.
Although conceding the testimony which caused the mistrial was " not . . . caused by the (prosecutor)," Gravely argues that "the Commonwealth, through its witness, blatantly disregarded the Defendant's rights." Therefore, he continues, the "mistrial was attributable to the Commonwealth" and Gravely is entitled to be discharged.
"
Subsequent decisions in the United States Supreme Court, which are binding on the states, express a similar view:
United States v. Dinitz, . . . 424 U.S. 600 at 611, 96 S.Ct. 1075 at 1081, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 at 276 ((1976)) (additional citations omitted). Similarly, in Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 53 L.Ed.2d 80 (1977), the Supreme Court stated:
'It follows under Dinitz that there (is) no double jeopardy barrier to (an accused's) retrial unless the judicial or prosecutorial error that prompted (a defendant's mistrial) motions was "intended to provoke" the motions or was otherwise "motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or prejudice" . . .' Id. at 33, 97 S.Ct. at 2148, 53 L.Ed.2d at 89."
Commonwealth v. Potter, 478 Pa. 251, 261-62, 386 A.2d 918, 922-23 (1978) ( ).
Our review of the record is convincing that this is not an instance where a subsequent trial is barred because of double jeopardy protections. 3
The events leading to the end of the first trial appear in the record as follows:
While Detective McMillan testified on direct examination concerning the circumstances surrounding Gravely's statement, the following occurred:
State what he said, sir.
Thereafter, defense counsel objected to any further questioning concerning the polygraph examination and the court ruled:
The Commonwealth carefully adhered to the court's ruling, and no further mention of the polygraph examination or its result was made during direct examination which continued until court recessed for the day. The following morning, direct examination of Detective McMillan resumed and, again, no reference to the polygraph examination was made. It was not until later that day, in response to detailed cross-examination, that the prejudicial disclosure was made.
The record thus indicates that the prosecution initially prevented its witness from testifying concerning the polygraph examination; that testimony concerning the polygraph examination was presented only upon defense counsel's request; that, once the court ruled further reference to the polygraph examination should be precluded, the prosecution at no point mentioned the polygraph again during its case-in-chief; and, that...
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