Com. v. Hale

• Decision Date: 23 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 1999-SC-0120-DG.,1999-SC-0120-DG.
• Citation: 96 S.W.3d 24
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellant, v. Edsel Eugene HALE, Jr., Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

96 S.W.3d 24

COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellant, v. Edsel Eugene HALE, Jr., Appellee.

No. 1999-SC-0120-DG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

January 23, 2003.

A.B. Chandler, III, Attorney General, Perry T. Ryan, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Attorney General, Criminal Appellate Division, Frankfort, for Appellant.

Kathryn G. Wood, Somerset, for Appellee.

Opinion of the Court by Justice KELLER.

I. INTRODUCTION

While in Kentucky on work release from a federal prison sentence, Appellee committed and was convicted of a Kentucky felony offense for which the Pulaski Circuit Court sentenced him to serve four (4) years in the custody of the Kentucky Department of Corrections. Following Appellee's final sentencing for the Kentucky conviction, Pulaski County Detention Center ("PCDC") employees, acting without authorization, delivered Appellee into the custody of federal authorities who subsequently transported Appellee to a federal prison to recommence service of his federal sentence. Approximately seven (7) years later, the federal authorities released Appellee to a Kentucky detainer for service of the Kentucky sentence imposed by the Pulaski Circuit Court. While incarcerated at a Kentucky Correctional Facility in Laurel County, Kentucky, Appellee filed a habeas corpus action alleging that his imprisonment was unlawful and that he was entitled to immediate release from the Pulaski Circuit Court sentence because the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by relinquishing its custody of Appellee to federal authorities, had forfeited its right to enforce the Pulaski Circuit Court sentence. Relying upon a "Forfeiture of Sentence Rule" ("forfeiture rule") announced in Jones v. Rayborn¹ and further defined in its progeny, both the Laurel Circuit Court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that Appellee was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. On the Commonwealth's motion, we granted discretionary review to reexamine the forfeiture rule. We conclude that this "rule" — which is not compelled by any federal or state constitutional provision, and, in fact, lacks any identifiable underlying principle consistent with its past application — is simply an antiquated, judicially-created policy, and, because we can discern no persuasive reason to continue the policy, we now abandon it. We therefore hold that the Commonwealth of Kentucky did not forfeit its right to enforce Appellee's sentence when its agents improperly relinquished custody of Appellee to federal authorities, and we thus reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for it to enter an order denying Appellee's petition.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The matter now before the Court began with Appellee's filing of a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging that his present imprisonment was unlawful and that he was entitled to immediate release from service of the sentence imposed by the Pulaski Circuit Court. In his affidavit, Appellee made no allegation that the Commonwealth or its agents had, through deliberately oppressive actions, violated his substantive due process rights, and instead alleged only that Kentucky had "forfeited jurisdiction and custody over [him] as it relates to further service of the Pulaski County sentence" by "violat[ing] statutory procedures when [PCDC employees] released him to the jurisdiction of the federal authorities."

In its order granting habeas relief, the trial court made findings of fact as to the nature of Appellee's confinement, and these findings, which we find supported by substantial evidence, adequately outline the factual and procedural background to this case:

1. The Petitioner received a federal sentence of twenty-four (24) years on August 15, 1979.

2. On or about June 2, 1987, the Petitioner was transferred by the federal authorities to the Big John Bowling House in East Bernstadt, Kentucky, and was permitted to participate in the Work Release Program.

3. While out on work release, Petitioner was arrested in Pulaski County, Kentucky, on or about August 21, 1987, for the charges of Theft by Unlawful Taking over $100 in violation of KRS 514.030, and lodged in the Pulaski County Detention Center.

4. On or about August 21, 1987, while Petitioner remained incarcerated in the Pulaski County Detention Center, a Detainer was lodged against the Petitioner by the Federal Authorities so that Petitioner would be returned to Federal Custody upon completion of the pending Pulaski County action and any sentence he may receive therefrom.

5. The Petitioner remained in the custody of Pulaski County pursuant to these charges and a plea of guilty to Theft by Unlawful Taking was entered on January 20, 1988, whereby it was Ordered that Petitioner be sentenced to imprisonment for a period of four (4) years. Additionally, the Pulaski Circuit Court noted that the recommendation of the Commonwealth was a sentence of imprisonment for a term of four (4) years to run consecutively with any other sentence he had received.

6 Although there had been a detainer lodged against the Petitioner by the Federal Authorities, there was never any request for custody of the Petitioner pursuant to KRS 440.450-440.510, Kentucky's Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, nor was there any action taken in accordance with KRS 440.150-444.420, Kentucky's Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.

7. On January 20, 1988, after Petitioner had entered a plea of guilty before the Pulaski Circuit Court he was taken back to the Pulaski County Detention Center, whereby he was then delivered by officials at the Detention Center into the custody of the Federal Authorities.

[8.] Although there had been a detainer lodged against the Petitioner by the Federal Authorities, there was never any request for custody of the Petitioner pursuant to KRS 440.450-440.510, Kentucky's Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, nor was there any action taken in accordance with KRS 440.150-440.420, Kentucky's Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.

[9.] On or about May 25, 1988, Pulaski County placed a detainer on the Petitioner with the Federal Authorities so that Petitioner would be placed in the custody of Pulaski County upon his release from federal custody for execution of the four (4) year sentence obtained by Pulaski County.

[10.] On October 27, 1995, Petitioner was released from the custody of the federal authorities in Manchester, Kentucky into the custody of Pulaski County for service of the Pulaski County sentence.

[11.] Since October 27, 1995, Petitioner has been incarcerated pursuant to the Pulaski County sentence.

[12.] On October 9, 1997, the date on which his Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed, Petitioner was incarcerated in Laurel County Detention Center pursuant to the four (4) year sentence imposed in Pulaski County.

After analyzing these factual findings in light of Kentucky case law, the trial court found two (2) separate and independent bases to support the conclusion that Appellant was "being detained without lawful authority,"² and therefore entitled to the relief he sought. First, the trial court concluded that, because there was no statutory authorization for PCDC employees to transfer custody of Appellee to the federal authorities, the transfer was illegal and, under Kentucky precedent, therefore "forfeited Kentucky's right to enforce the execution and to insist upon the Petitioner's completion of his sentence[.]" However, the trial court also concluded that "the four (4) year sentence imposed by the Pulaski Circuit Court in Indictment Number 87-CR-110-3 was to have run concurrently with the federal sentence the Petitioner was then already serving" and thus reasoned that Appellee's Pulaski County sentence "was completed when he was released from the custody of the Federal Institution ... [and] [h]e should not have been reincarcerated on the Pulaski County sentence." Accordingly, the trial court issued a writ of habeas corpus directing that Appellee "shall be immediately released from being incarcerated pursuant to the Pulaski County Sentence."

The Commonwealth then appealed the trial court's order, and the Court of Appeals separately addressed the trial court's alternative grounds for granting the writ. First, the panel held that Appellant's Pulaski Circuit Court sentence ran consecutive to his federal sentence, and thus rejected the fundamental premise of the trial court's conclusion that Appellee's continued incarceration under a fully-exhausted Pulaski Circuit Court sentence was unlawful. As to the forfeiture rule theory, however, the Court of Appeals held that, because it had no authority to "either reverse or modify" existing Kentucky precedent, it was "compelled to affirm" the trial court's issuance of the writ. The panel, however, encouraged this Court to reexamine the forfeiture rule and expressed its belief that the applicable Kentucky precedent has mistaken the nature of the federal-state relationship with regard to criminal jurisdiction:

We would be remiss if we did not point out the problem we have with Jones and Davis. In both cases, Kentucky's highest court applied extradition principles to a transfer from state to federal authorities when such a transfer is not actually an extradition. In both Jones and Davis, as here, the jurisdictions involved are overlapping. Yet, the authorities relied on by the Court in those cases involved a state-to-state extradition and jurisdictions that are separate and equal. It seems to us that neither local officials nor the Governor has any discretion to decline the transfer. When a federal marshal serves an arrest warrant the person named must be turned over without delay. Furthermore, in Davis the Court relied on KRS 440.330 for part of its rationale, ignoring the fact that the United States Government is not a signatory to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, KRS 440.150 to 440.420. None of the provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, including KRS 440.330, have any...