Com. v. Harmon

• Decision Date: 14 December 1976
• Citation: 366 A.2d 895,469 Pa. 490
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Love HARMON, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 895

366 A.2d 895

469 Pa. 490

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Love HARMON, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued July 1, 1975.

Decided Nov. 24, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1976.

F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Steven H. Goldblatt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Maxine Stotland, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellant.

John W. Packel, Asst. Defender, Chief, Appeals Div., Defender Assn. of Philadelphia, Douglas Riblet, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

NIX, Justice.

The singular question presented in this appeal is whether the Constitution of this Commonwealth mandates that an accused who has been tried and convicted in the Municipal Court and who is entitled to a trial de novo in the Court of Common Pleas is also entitled to a relitigation of a previously determined pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. Relying upon its decision in Commonwealth v. White, 228 Pa.Super. 23, 324 A.2d 469 (1974), a majority of the members of the Superior Court ruled that General Court Regulation 72--7, promulgated by the President Judges of the Court of Common Pleas and the Municipal Court, both of Philadelphia County, was unconstitutional and reversed the judgment of sentence. ¹ Commonwealth v. Harmon, 229 Pa.Super. 326, 324 A.2d 473 (1974). We granted allocatur and for the reasons that follow we now reverse the order of the Superior Court. ²

On May 23, 1972, Love Harmon, appellee, was tried and convicted in the Municipal Court for the possession of narcotic drugs. Prior to the trial, appellee had unsuccessfully contested the legality of his arrest by way of a pre-trial motion to suppress prejudicial evidence obtained during the asserted illegal detention. After conviction the trial judge sentenced appellee to a term of imprisonment of six to twelve months. Thereupon, pursuant to the Act of October 17, 1969, P.L. 259, § 18, as amended, Act of July 14, 1971, P.L. 224, No. 45 § 1, 17 P.S. § 711.18 and the Pennsylvania Constitution, Schedule Art. V, § 16(r)(iii), appellee appealed his conviction as a matter of right to the Court of Common Pleas and demanded a trial de novo. On September 8, 1972, when trial was to begin, appellee requested a relitigation of the suppression motion which had previously been denied in the Municipal Court. Acting in accordance with General Court Regulation 72--7, the trial judge refused to hold a second evidentiary hearing on the issue. Appellee was subsequently tried and again convicted of possession of narcotics and after the disposition of post-trial motions appellee was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than six nor more than twelve months. As has been stated on appeal to the Superior Court the judgment of sentence was reversed and a new trial awarded. The ruling of the Superior Court was predicated on the belief that General Court Regulation 72--7 was in conflict with the Constitution and therefore invalid.

The Schedule to Article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Section 16(r) (iii), after conferring jurisdiction in certain criminal cases in the Municipal Court, provided:

'In these cases, the defendant shall have no right of trial by jury in that court, but he shall have the right of appeal for trial de novo including the right to trial by jury to the trial division of the court of common pleas.' ³

On February 29, 1972, the President Judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and the Municipal Court of Philadelphia issued a joint regulation which was designated as General Court Regulation 72--7 and provided:

'Motions to suppress shall be heard on the same day and immediately prior to the Municipal Court trial. The judge hearing the motion to suppress shall hear same as a Common Pleas Court Judge. In the event such motion is denied and defendant convicted on appeal to the Common Pleas Court, the motion may not be reinstated as part of the appeal.'

The question thus posed is whether the constitutional grant of an absolute 'right of appeal for trial de novo' was intended to embrace the right to relitigate pre-trial motions that have been decided initially by a judge of the Municipal Court. To determine whether, in fact, there is a conflict between General Court Regulation 72--7 and the constitutional provision, we are called upon to determine the intention of the people in their adoption of this provision. In its analysis of the intended meaning of the phrase 'trial de novo', the majority of the Superior Court focused its attention upon the words 'de novo'. See Commonwealth v. White, supra, 228 Pa.Super. at 26, 324 A.2d at 471. We believe that the critical word in the phrase is 'trial'. While we quite agree that the words 'de novo' require a new consideration of the subject, this does not answer the question as to the scope of the subject, i.e., the trial.

In this jurisdiction it is unquestioned that motions to suppress are applications that are disposed of prior to the commencement of trial. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 323(b). ⁴ Pre-trial proceedings by definition are distinguishable from the actual trial. ⁵ A constitution is not to receive a technical or strained construction, but rather the words should be interpreted in their popular, natural and ordinary meaning. We should also consider the circumstances attending its formation and the construction probably placed upon it by the people. Commonwealth ex rel. Tate v. Bell, 145 Pa. 374, 22 A. 641 (1891). ⁶ Under the accepted use of the word 'trial' as used in this Commonwealth, we are satisfied that it was not intended to encompass recognized pre-trial proceedings.

The definition of 'trial' which we now interpret as not including pre-trial motions is also consistent with this Court's longstanding use of the term. In Commonwealth v. Sites, 427 Pa. 486, 235 A.2d 387 (1967), we specifically rejected an interpretation of the word 'trial' that would include a hearing upon a motion to suppress evidence:

The decision in Miranda was announced on June 13, 1966, and in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, (86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882) (1966), was held to apply to all 'trials' commencing on and after that date. Despite the fact that the instant trial began on September 19, 1966, the Commonwealth urges that Miranda does not control because the 'trial' on the issue of the admissibility of the evidence involved began April 26, 1966, the date of the hearing on the motion to suppress. Again, we cannot agree. This would give the word 'trial' a new meaning and in our opinion would be contrary to what the United States Supreme Court intended.

Id. at 493, 235 A.2d at 391.

The majority of the Superior Court in reaching its conclusion was obviously influenced by the fact that the evidence challenged in a pre-trial proceeding 'is often the crucial if not the only basis for conviction.' While it is true that the evidence that was the subject of the pre-trial proceeding might have a significant impact upon the ultimate verdict, this fact alone cannot justify a distortion of the clear language of the Constitution. There are many steps in the process between arrest and trial which may have similar impact upon the ultimate result (e.g., custodial interrogation, post-arrest identifications, etc.) which are obviously not part of the trial.

If there remains any question of the intention sought to be conveyed by the use of the word 'trial', a consideration of the objectives sought to be accomplished by the creation of the Philadelphia Municipal Court must satisfy all remaining doubt. The unquestioned purpose of the establishment of a Municipal Court in Philadelphia was to relieve the congestion and backlog that was plaguing the existing system within the County. ⁷ In an effort to expedite the disposition of cases in the criminal area this new court was given jurisdiction over the less serious charges and permitted to dispose of them without the requirement of providing trials by jury. However, to avoid conflict with the constitutional right of trial by jury, an unfettered right to a trial with jury was provided for those litigants who were not satisfied with the disposition of the Municipal Court. Thus, the benefit to be derived from the new system, aside from the additional judicial manpower it provided, ⁸ was dependent upon both the new tribunal's capacity to expedite dispositions and the percentage of litigants willing to accept the decisions of that tribunal as final. ⁹ It is obvious that if the Municipal Court proceeding becomes a mere dress rehearsal for further proceedings in the Common Pleas Courts, then the new system has defeated the very purpose for which it was conceived. It would be violative of fundamental rules of construction to construe a provision in such a manner that it defeats the very purpose it was designed to accomplish. ¹⁰

Although a second proceeding in which a trial by jury may be had upon request is necessarily mandated by Article I, Section 9 of our Constitution there is no such compulsion that would require the relitigation of pre-trial motions. To interpret the provision as requiring an automatic relitigation of the pre-trial suppression decision serves no useful purpose and would unnecessarily further encumber a procedure which was intended to expedite and not delay the disposition of the case load before our courts.

Moreover, appellee has failed to establish any deprivation of an accused's substantive rights that would result under General Court Regulation 72--7. Both Municipal and Common Pleas Courts are bound by the same law and apply the same standards in ruling upon the merits of the suppression motion. ¹¹ The judges of both courts are trained in the law and their decisions are subject to review on post-trial motions and upon appeal to the appellate tribunals of this Commonwealth. Our interpretation of the rule places the accused, who...