Com. v. Haughwout

• Decision Date: 13 November 2003
• Citation: 837 A.2d 480
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Guy HAUGHWOUT, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

837 A.2d 480

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Guy HAUGHWOUT, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted October 7, 2002.

Filed November 13, 2003.

Albert J. Flora, Wilkes-Barre, for appellant.

Frank P. Barletta, Asst. Dist. Atty., Wilkes-Barre, for Com., appellee.

Before: MUSMANNO, GRACI, and MONTEMURO,¹ JJ.

GRACI, J.

¶ 1 Appellant, Guy Haughwout ("Haughwout"), appeals from the judgments of sentence following his guilty pleas for forgery and two counts of indecent assault and the trial court's determination that he is a "sexually violent predator" ("SVP") pursuant to Pennsylvania's Megan's Law II, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9791-99.² After careful review, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 On February 15, 2002, Haughwout was found to be an SVP and sentenced to seven to thirty-six months' imprisonment for indecent assault (count three), 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7), seven to thirty-six months' imprisonment for a second count of indecent assault (count one), 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7), to be served concurrently with the first count of indecent assault (count three), and to one year of probation for forgery (count one), 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4101(a), to be served consecutively to the first count of indecent assault (count three), for incidents involving his five-year-old daughter in the Fall of 2000 and a ten-year-old girl during the Fall of 1996. Haughwout was granted credit for time served.³

¶ 3 On February 25, 2002, Haughwout filed timely motions to modify the sentences. In his motions, he challenged the trial court's finding that he is an SVP and the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law.

¶ 4 On February 26, 2002, the court wrote "Denied" on proposed orders (which accompanied the modification motions) for the district attorney's office to show cause why Haughwout's request for modification of sentences should not be granted.⁴ Haughwout filed his notices of appeal on March 13, 2002.⁵ In his notices of appeal, Haughwout stated that the trial court's judgments of sentence became final on February 26, 2002. This was the date of the above-referenced orders. Haughwout's appeals were timely filed pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(a).⁶

¶ 5 Nonetheless, on April 18, 2002, the trial court purported to modify Haughwout's sentences to seven to twenty-four months' imprisonment, less one day with credit for time served, for the first count of indecent assault (count three), seven to twenty-four months' imprisonment, less one day, for the second count of indecent assault (count one), to be served concurrently with the first count of indecent assault, and two years' probation for forgery (count one), to be served consecutively to the first count of indecent assault (count three).⁷

¶ 6 The following day, on April 19, 2002, the trial court modified the April 18, 2002, order as to the second count of indecent assault (count one) to two years' probation, to be served concurrently with the first count of indecent assault (count three).⁸ Because Haughwout served his minimum sentence, the trial court directed that he be released from incarceration and report to the Luzerne County Adult Probation and Parole Department.⁹

¶ 7 On January 21, 2003, however, this Court held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify Haughwout's sentences. Therefore, we remanded this case to the trial court and ordered that it reinstate the original sentences imposed on February 16, 2002. Moreover, we directed the trial court to file an opinion addressing the SVP determination.

¶ 8 On February 6, 2003, the trial court reinstated Haughwout's sentences imposed on February 15, 2002, and, on February 14, 2003, the trial court filed an opinion addressing the SVP determination. ¶ 9 Haughwout raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant is a sexually violent predator as defined under the provisions of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9792, 9795.4(e)(3)?

...

2. Whether the mandatory registration, notification and counseling provisions of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9791 et seq. violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States?

...

Appellant's Brief, at 2.

II. DISCUSSION

¶ 10 Haughwout first argues that there is insufficient evidence that he is an SVP.

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law requiring a plenary scope of review. See Commonwealth v. Weston, 561 Pa. 199, 749 A.2d 458, 460 n. 8 (2000)

. The appropriate standard of review regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is "whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is sufficient to support all the elements of the offenses." Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 567 Pa. 415, 787 A.2d 394, 398 (2001). As a reviewing court, we "may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder." Commonwealth v. Vetrini, 734 A.2d 404, 407 (Pa.Super.1999). Furthermore, a fact-finder is free to believe "all, part or none" of the evidence presented. Id.

"At the hearing prior to sentencing the court shall determine whether the Commonwealth has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a sexually violent predator." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.4(e)(3). Accordingly, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the determination of SVP status, we will reverse the trial court only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to enable the trial court to determine that each element required by the statute has been satisfied....

Commonwealth v. Krouse, 799 A.2d 835, 837-38 (Pa.Super.2002).

¶ 11 An SVP is defined as "[a] person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense as set forth in section 9795.1 (relating to registration) and who is determined to be a sexually violent predator under section 9795.4 (relating to assessments) due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses." Krouse, 799 A.2d at 838

(quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9792) (emphasis in original). "Mental abnormality" is "[a] congenital or acquired condition of a person that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to the health and safety of other persons." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9792. Moreover, "predatory" is defined as "[a]n act directed at a stranger or at a person with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization." Id.

The statute specifically details the process by which an individual is determined to be an SVP. After a defendant is convicted of an offense specified in Section 9795.1, such as indecent assault [in the instant case], the trial court must order the [State Sexual Offenders] Assessment Board to assess the defendant for the appropriateness of an SVP classification. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.4(a). The administrative officer of the Assessment Board then assigns one of its members to conduct the assessment pursuant to Section 9795.4(b). Section 9795.4(b) specifies that the assessment must include an examination of the following factors:

§ 9795.4 Assessments

...

(b) Assessment.... An assessment shall include, but not be limited to, an examination of the following:

(1) Facts of the current offense, including:

(i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.

(ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense.

(iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.

(iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.

(v) Age of the victim.

(vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the individual during the commission of the crime.

(vii) The mental capacity of the victim.

(2) Prior offense history, including:

(i) The individual's prior criminal record.

(ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.

(iii) Whether the individual participated in available programs for sexual offenders.

(3) Characteristics of the individual, including:

(i) Age of the individual.

(ii) Use of illegal drugs by the individual.

(iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental abnormality.

(IV) BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE INDIVIDUAL'S CONDUCT.

(4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment filed as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.4(b) (emphasis added).

Following the submission of a written report containing the assessment and a praecipe filed by the district attorney, the trial court must hold a hearing. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.4(e). During the hearing on the SVP classification, the following procedural protections apply:

The individual and district attorney shall be given notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard, the right to call witnesses, the right to call expert witnesses and the right to cross-examine witnesses. In addition, the individual shall have the right to counsel and to have a lawyer appointed to represent him if he cannot afford one. If the individual requests another expert assessment, the individual shall provide a copy of the expert assessment to the district attorney prior to the hearing.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.4((e)(2)).

Krouse, 799 A.2d at 838-39.

¶ 12 In the instant case, the trial court relied heavily on the findings of David Humphreys of the State Sexual Offenders Assessment Board whom it found credible in finding that Haughwout is an SVP. Opinion, 2/14/03, at 4. According to Mr. Humphreys, the offenses in the instant case involved multiple victims. One of the victims was a friend of Haughwout's family and the other victim was Haughwout's daughter. Humphreys noted that Haughwout admits to having at least a...