Com. v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 04 December 1981
• Citation: 437 A.2d 387,496 Pa. 349
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Arnold T. HENDERSON, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 387

437 A.2d 387

496 Pa. 349

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Arnold T. HENDERSON, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 14, 1981.

Decided Nov. 5, 1981.

Reargument Denied Dec. 4, 1981.

John R. Merrick, Public Defender, Charles M. J. Nester, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

James R. Freeman, Dist. Atty., Lee Ruslander, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

Kenneth S. Gallant, Asst. Dist. Atty., for amicus curiae.

Before O'BRIEN, C. J., and ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY, KAUFFMAN and WILKINSON, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

On June 5, 1979, our Superior Court entered an order setting aside the conviction of appellant Arnold Henderson, a juvenile, and remanding for a new trial because of the prosecution's use at trial of a statement obtained from appellant in violation of this Commonwealth's "interested adult" rule. 266 Pa.Super. 519, 405 A.2d 940. This Court denied the Commonwealth's petition for allowance of appeal. However, on April 21, 1980, over the dissent of Justices Brennan and Stevens, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the Commonwealth's petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the Superior Court's determination, and remanded the matter to the Superior Court "for further consideration in light of Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197) (1979)." 446 U.S. 905, 100 S.Ct. 1829, 64 L.Ed.2d 256. The Superior Court has transferred the matter to this Court. Hence this opinion.

We conclude that, because Fare v. Michael C. addresses only the rights of the accused under the federal Constitution, it has no effect upon the Superior Court's application of our interested-adult rule, which is founded upon state law. Thus, the order of the Superior Court granting appellant a new trial is reinstated.

I

Our interested-adult rule is premised on this Court's belief that "the administering of Miranda warnings to a juvenile, without providing an opportunity to that juvenile to consult with a mature, informed individual concerned primarily with the interest of the juvenile, (is) inadequate to offset the disadvantage occasioned by his youth." Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 498, 372 A.2d 797, 800 (1977). Thus police seeking to subject a juvenile suspect to custodial interrogation are required first to provide the juvenile with the opportunity to consult with an adult interested in the juvenile's welfare. This rule

"appreciates that the inexperience of the minor affects not only his or her ability to understand the full implication and consequences of the predicament but also renders the judgment inadequate to assess the spectrum of considerations encompassed in the waiver decision."

Commonwealth v. Smith, supra.

Although named after Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1975), the interested-adult rule was applied in earlier cases. Commonwealth v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 335 A.2d 698 (1975); Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 329 A.2d 286 (1974). On numerous occasions this Court has reaffirmed the validity of the rule by granting relief for its violation. ¹ The Superior Court has similarly granted relief, ² as have the courts of common pleas throughout the Commonwealth.

A number of other jurisdictions also recognize the need to provide special protections to juveniles subjected to custodial interrogation. ³ Our rule is also supported by respected scholarship, which recognizes that "(j)uveniles should not be permitted to waive constitutional rights on their own." Institute of Judicial Administration-American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Standards, Police Handling of Juvenile Problems § 3.2 (1980). See also, e. g., Council of Judges of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Model Rules for Juvenile Courts, Rule 25 (1969).

II

The Commonwealth argues that the Supreme Court's mandate vacating the determination of the Superior Court poses an opportunity to consider the wisdom of our interested-adult rule afresh, and to adopt the test applied by the Supreme Court in Fare v. Michael C. Fare set aside a determination of the Supreme Court of California which had held, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that a statement of a juvenile should have been suppressed on the ground that the juvenile's request to see his probation officer constituted an invocation of his Miranda rights. In setting aside the determination, the Supreme Court enforced no federal rights of the State. Rather, the Court held only that the state court had erroneously imposed greater restrictions on police conduct than are required by the federal constitution.

The Supreme Court of the United States has expressly stated:

"Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion."

Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-126, 65 S.Ct. 459, 463, 89 L.Ed. 789 (1945).

Thus the determination of the Supreme Court of the United States interpreting the federal Constitution does not and could not disturb the force of our interested-adult rule, a matter of Pennsylvania law. See Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52, 284 A.2d 700 (1971), cert. granted sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Ware, 405 U.S. 987, 92 S.Ct. 1254, 31 L.Ed.2d 453, subsequently vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910, 92 S.Ct. 1606, 31 L.Ed.2d 821 (1972) ("it appearing that the judgment below rests upon an adequate state ground"). As this Court recently observed,

"(I)t is well settled that a state may provide through its constitution a basis for the rights and liberties of its citizens independent from that provided by the Federal Constitution, and that the rights so guaranteed may be more expansive than their federal counterparts. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-82, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040-41, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). * * * See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489, 503 (1977). This Court has on numerous occasions recognized the Pennsylvania Constitution to be an alternative and independent source of individual rights. See, e. g., Willing v. Mazzocone, 482 Pa. 377, 393 A.2d 1155 (1978); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975); Commonwealth v. Knowles, 459 Pa. 70, 73 n. 3, 327 A.2d 19, 20 n.3 (1974); Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3183, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 93 (1961)."

Commonwealth v. Tate, --- Pa. ---, ---, 432 A.2d 1382, 1387-88 (1981). Although cases applying the McCutchen rule do not expressly articulate the source of the rule, it is clear from numerous decisions which like McCutchen, address issues arising out of the custodial interrogation setting that the McCutchen rule is a matter of state law.

The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), extended the federal fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the setting of custodial interrogation, and applied the extension to the States by way of the fourteenth amendment. As early as 1969, three years after Miranda, this Court began to harmonize Miranda's interpretation of the federal privilege with this Court's interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution's prohibition against the compelling of an accused "to give evidence against himself." Pa.Const. art. I, § 9. In Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 255 A.2d 519 (1969), this Court observed:

"Miranda v. Arizona, extended the right against self-incrimination and the right to the assistance of counsel, from the formal 'criminal proceeding,' i. e., the trial, to police interrogation. For similar reasons, we long ago indicated that the right against self-incrimination protects a person from being compelled to answer any question propounded to him by those making a mental examination 'for the purpose of testifying in regard thereto' at a criminal trial. Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 306, 35 A.2d 307, 311 (1944). Both Miranda and Musto simply recognize that the guilt determining process does not begin at trial."

Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. at 207, 255 A.2d at 523.

Two years later, in Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52, 284 A.2d 700 (1971), this Court addressed the appropriate date on which to commence the application of Miranda. The Commonwealth contended that the rules of Miranda should be applied only to police conduct occurring after the date of the Miranda decision. Concluding that under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966), "the matter is no longer an open question," this Court rejected the Commonwealth's contention and held that "the Miranda standards must be applied to all post-Miranda trials. ..." 446 Pa. at 55, 284 A.2d at 702. The determination in Ware did not rest exclusively upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Johnson. Rather, this Court expressly added that "we adopt the Johnson position as a matter of state law." 446 Pa. at 56, 284 A.2d at 702. Because this Court could have reached the result in Ware by choosing to hold only that the matter was controlled by Johnson, Ware's reliance upon state law is significant. Indeed, the Supreme Court initially granted the Commonwealth's petition for a writ of certiorari, 405 U.S. 987, 92 S.Ct. 1254, 31 L.Ed.2d 453,...