Com. v. Hines
Decision Date | 17 December 1981 |
Citation | 496 Pa. 555,437 A.2d 1180 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. William HINES, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Robert E. Colville, Dist. Atty., Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy Dist. Atty., Kathryn L. Simpson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Before O'BRIEN, C. J., and ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ.
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief. In the petition, appellant sought to withdraw his guilty plea, as he had in the trial court both before and after sentencing, on the ground that it was involuntarily entered. We conclude that the trial court improperly accepted appellant's plea of guilty since the guilty plea colloquy demonstrated no factual basis for appellant's guilty plea and no basis to conclude that appellant understood the nature and elements of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea. Hence, we reverse the order of the PCHA court, vacate appellant's plea of guilty, and remand for trial. 1
Appellant was indicted in 1970 on charges of murder and voluntary manslaughter for the killing of a seventeen-year- old girl who had been raped and stabbed to death. Appellant was fifteen years old and had completed second grade. Pursuant to a court- directed examination, a doctor concluded that appellant was "not psychotic, and although of low intelligence, ... (was) competent to defend himself." The evidence connecting appellant to the scene of the crime consisted of circumstantial evidence, primarily a pair of pink trousers, and a confession by appellant to police on the night of his arrest. In the confession, appellant admitted the rape, but denied having killed the victim. He attributed the killing to an alleged accomplice.
Appellant pleaded guilty to murder generally on September 29, 1970. After a degree-of-guilt hearing, he was found guilty of murder of the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment.
It is a long established principle of constitutional due process that the decision to plead guilty must be personally and voluntarily made by the accused. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). See ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution and Defense Function, The Defense Function § 5.2 (Approved Draft, 1971); Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirement of Personal Participation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 Calif.L.Rev. 1262 (1966). Because a guilty plea is not only an admission of conduct but also is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, and constitutes the waiver of constitutionally-guaranteed rights, the voluntariness of a guilty plea must be affirmatively established. "Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible." Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. at 1712.
Henderson v. Morgan, supra, 426 U.S. at 645 n.13, 96 S.Ct. at 2257 n.13.
In order to satisfy the constitutional requirement that a valid guilty plea must stand as an "intelligent admission of guilt," the law of this Commonwealth has long required that before a judge may properly accept a plea of guilty, a colloquy with the defendant must demonstrate that there is a factual basis for the plea and that the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense charged. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tabb, 477 Pa. 115, 383 A.2d 849 (1978); Commonwealth v. Minor, 467 Pa. 230, 356 A.2d 346 (1976); Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196 (1968). Accord, ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty §§ 1.4-1.6 (Approved Draft, 1968); Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 4.2 (Approved Draft, 1972).
The only portion of the guilty plea colloquy which bears on these requirements is the following:
BY MR. BAXTER (defense counsel) OF THE DEFENDANT:
Q. William, do your understand what you are charged with here today?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You do?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you understand what they are saying you did?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you are pleading guilty to this charge. Is that right?
A. Yes, sir. " 2
This colloquy, which did no more than inform appellant of the name of the crime after he had pled guilty, is grossly inadequate.
Where, as here, no facts underlying the alleged offense are adduced at the time the guilty plea is entered, there is no factual basis for the trial judge to accept the plea. Although charged with murder, appellant was not even asked the threshold question of whether he had killed the victim. In fact, on this record, although appellant has admitted the rape of the victim, he has denied the killing. Compare Commonwealth v. Ingram, supra ( ).
The guilty plea colloquy equally fails to establish that appellant understood the nature and elements of the offenses with which he was charged.
Commonwealth v. Ingram, supra, 455 Pa. at 203-04, 316 A.2d at 80. Prior to pleading guilty, appellant was not even informed of the charges against him. He was asked only whether he was pleading guilty or not guilty to the "felonies" with which he was charged. After pleading guilty, appellant was informed that his plea was to second-degree murder. However, he was never informed of the elements of second-degree murder. Nor was appellant informed of the elements, including the principles of felony-murder, which, if proven at the degree of guilt hearing, would permit the degree of murder to be raised from second to first degree. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tabb, 477 Pa. 115, 383 A.2d 849 (1978). 3
Not only was there no factual basis upon which to accept appellant's guilty plea, and no demonstration that appellant understood the nature and elements of the offense to which he pled guilty, but also there was no basis upon which the trial court could conclude that appellant understood the consequences of his plea. The guilty plea colloquy did not satisfy even one of the areas of questioning mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 319. Rule 319 requires that "at a minimum," the court must elicit the following information from the defendant:
"(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty?
(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
(3) Does the defendant understand that he has the right to trial by jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that he is presumed innocent until he is found guilty?
(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible range of sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged?
(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts such agreement?"
Accord, Commonwealth v. Willis, 471 Pa. 50, 369 A.2d 1189 (1977); Commonwealth v. Dilbeck, 466 Pa. 543, 353 A.2d 824 (1976). See also ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 4.3 (Approved Draft, 1972) (court should advise defendant of right to trial by jury before accepting waiver). Only the first area of questioning, concerning the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charges to which he was pleading...
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