Com. v. Houston

Decision Date09 June 1955
Citation127 N.E.2d 294,332 Mass. 687
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Charles HOUSTON.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

John F. McAuliffe, Asst. Dist. Atty., Boston, for the Commonwealth.

Timothy J. Murphy, Boston, for defendant.

Before QUA, C. J., and RONAN, WILKINS and WILLIAMS, JJ.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

The defendant was tried on an indictment for the murder of one Henry Foster and was convicted of manslaughter. The case is here on his appeal, with a summary of the record, a transcript of the evidence, and an assignment of errors as provided in G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 278, §§ 33A-33G, as amended. It was uncontroverted at the trial that, in the early evening of November 5, 1953, the defendant invited Foster, the deceased, to his apartment on the second floor of 507 Columbus Avenue in Boston to 'shoot craps.' The men went to the apartment and were there joined by one Figgs, whom the defendant also invited. The game was played on a table in the dining room from which there was a doorway leading into a small kitchen. After losing the small amount of money which he had with him, Figgs retired from the game, but remained watching the other two who continued to play for a period of forty-five minutes to an hour. Shortly before nine o'clock a wordy altercation developed between the defendant and Foster over the dice which were being used. A 'tussle' between the men eventuated and Foster was stabbed through the heart with a knife. He died before reaching a hospital and an autopsy disclosed a wound three inches in depth in his left chest which proceeded downwards from the front of the chest at an angle fifteen degrees from the horizontal.

Other than the parties to the quarrel the only eyewitness to the occurrence was Figgs. He testified that the trouble started by Foster refusing to continue shooting with the dice which the defendant had provided. At that time there was $4 on the table. The defendant demanded that Foster shoot with the dice or give him back the money which he had won, and Foster refused either to shoot or to give back the money. The defendant then walked into the kitchen, pulled out a cabinet drawer, and came out with the knife. 'Foster, when he heard the noise, turned around from the table, and walked into the kitchen and when he walked into the kitchen, Charley [the defendant] stabbed him once with the knife * * * in the chest.' 'The blood squashed out' and he 'started tussling' with the defendant. In the tussling a window was broken. There was no tussling before the stabbing. On cross-examination Figgs testified that Foster went into the kitchen behind the defendant when he heard the cabinet drawer open. He was a foot or two behind the defendant and the cabinet was not more than two steps from the dining room door. The defendant walked right to the cabinet drawer, took out a knife, and 'raise[d] it up like that' (as demonstrated). Foster grabbed the defendant's hand after he was stabbed. On redirect examination Figgs testified that Foster was in the doorway leading from the dining room into the kitchen when he was stabbed, and on recross-examination testified that he was in the kitchen. There was evidence from the defendant's wife and minor son that they came downstairs when they heard the noise of the broken window and saw the defendant and Foster tussling.

The assignment of error on which the defendant relies relates to the charge of the judge in reference to self defense. He charged, 'The defence in this court room is self defence, but it is not open to the jury here. The jury would not be warranted on the evidence in this case in finding * * * that the defendant Houston was suffering such an attack by Foster, that Houston thereupon felt any such great peril of death or imminent bodily harm that he was warranted in using a * * * knife upon Foster.'

The defendant did not testify, and what evidence there was concerning self defense other than the testimony of Figgs and the nature of the wound came from the following statements alleged to have been made by the defendant to the police, which were introduced in evidence by the Commonwealth. When the police arrived at the apartment, which was shortly after the stabbing, the defendant was standing by Foster's body which was on the kitchen floor. The defendant said that he did not see the stabbing; that he did not know Foster; and that he was stabbed in another room by some person...

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42 cases
  • Com. v. Garcia
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • January 8, 1980
    ...of excessive force, would constitute manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 367 Mass. 508, 326 N.E. 880 (1975). Commonwealth v. Houston, 332 Mass. 687, 690, 127 N.E.2d 294 (1955). Commonwealth v. Peterson, 257 Mass. 473, 478, 154 N.E. 260 (1926). Commonwealth v. Woodward, 102 Mass. 155, 161......
  • Commonwealth v. Ramos
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • November 28, 2022
    ...harm and a reasonable belief that no other means would suffice to prevent such harm.’ " Anestal, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Houston, 332 Mass. 687, 690, 127 N.E.2d 294 (1955). For the reasons indicated supra, because the presence of the defendant's DNA under the victim's fingernails wou......
  • Com. v. Pike
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • November 19, 1998
    ...not result. 3 See Baseler, supra at 502-503, 645 N.E.2d 1179; Bastarache, supra at 105 & n. 15, 414 N.E.2d 984; Commonwealth v. Houston, 332 Mass. 687, 690, 127 N.E.2d 294 (1955) ("In order to create a right to defend oneself with a dangerous weapon likely to cause serious injury or death, ......
  • Com. v. Bastarache
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 12, 1980
    ...lower level of danger (a reasonable concern for personal safety) than the right to use a dangerous weapon. See Commonwealth v. Houston 332 Mass. 687, 690, 127 N.E.2d 294 (1955) (deadly force may be used only where the person has "a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm and a reasonab......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • § 18.01 General Principles
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2022 Title Chapter 18 Self-Defense
    • Invalid date
    ...440 (Md. 2004).[6] Paul H. Robinson & Tyler Scot Williams, Mapping American Criminal Law 143-45 (2018).[7] See Commonwealth v. Houston, 127 N.E.2d 294, 296 (1955) (stating that the person asserting the claim of self-defense must reasonably believe that "no other means [than the use of force......
  • § 18.01 GENERAL PRINCIPLES
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2018 Title Chapter 18 Self-defense
    • Invalid date
    ...American Criminal Code: General Defenses 13 (2015) (downloadable from http://jla.oxfordjournals.org).[7] . See Commonwealth v. Houston, 127 N.E.2d 294, 296 (1955) (stating that the person asserting the claim of self-defense must reasonably believe that "no other means [than the use of force......
  • TABLE OF CASES
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2018 Title Table of Cases
    • Invalid date
    ...2004), 503 Horne, State v., 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984), 30 Houchin, State v., 765 P.2d 178 (Mont. 1988), 429 Houston, Commonwealth v., 127 N.E.2d 294 (1955), 212 Howard, People v., 104 P.3d 107 (Cal. 2005) , 488, 489, 493 Hsu, United States v., 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998), 379, 381, 429 Hud......

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