Com. v. Ionata

• Decision Date: 22 July 1988
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Humberto IONATA, a/k/a Albert Ionata, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 917

544 A.2d 917

518 Pa. 472

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Humberto IONATA, a/k/a Albert Ionata, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Nov. 13, 1987.

Decided July 22, 1988.

Sandra L. Elias, Chief, Appeals Div., Ann Osborne, Asst. Dist. Atty., Media, for appellant.

Timothy J. Gorbey, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

The opinion of the Court being equally divided, the order of the Superior Court is affirmed.

FLAHERTY, J., files an opinion in support of affirmance in which NIX, C.J., and ZAPPALA, J., join.

McDERMOTT and PAPADAKOS, JJ., file opinions in support of reversal in which LARSEN, J., joins.

OPINION IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE

FLAHERTY, Justice.

This is an appeal by the Commonwealth from a per curiam order and memorandum opinion of the Superior Court, 356 Pa.Super. 588, 512 A.2d 51, which affirmed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County granting a motion to suppress evidence in connection with narcotics offenses charged against the appellee, Humberto Ionata. The sole issue presented is whether items obtained by police during the search of an automobile driven by appellee were properly suppressed. The relevant facts are the following.

On September 7, 1984, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Detective Ceccola of the Upper Darby Police Narcotics Unit met with Cindy Wood after having received a phone call from Wood professing knowledge as to illegal drug dealing. Wood stated that she had received medical treatment for injuries inflicted by her boyfriend, the appellee herein, and that the injuries were inflicted earlier that day in the course of an argument relating to appellee's involvement with illegal drugs. In addition, Wood reported that appellee had been dealing in drugs for the past year at the apartment where she and appellee resided, and that, following the argument that day, appellee departed from the apartment to purchase drugs. Detective Ceccola was told by Wood that appellee was driving a certain automobile that Wood purportedly owned, and that appellee was expected to be returning with the drugs in several hours. Wood also told Ceccola that, following her argument with appellee, she had discarded some of appellee's drugs and related paraphernalia in the apartment's trash receptacle. This information was of timely importance to Detective Ceccola because, just two days prior, on September 5, 1984, Ceccola had received a phone call from a confidential informant of known reliability indicating that the informant had purchased drugs from appellee at the apartment in question.

After talking with Wood, Detective Ceccola immediately applied for and received a search warrant, at approximately 6:00 p.m., covering the person of appellee and the apartment. No application was made for a warrant to search the automobile that appellee was known to be driving, however, despite its known role in transporting the drugs that were being purchased.

Later, around 7:00 p.m. that same day, Detective Ceccola stationed two plainclothes police officers in an unmarked vehicle at the end of the dead-end street where the apartment was located, such that appellee would have to pass by on the way back to the apartment. Ceccola and Wood then went to the apartment where they waited more than two hours for appellee's return, and, ultimately, the plainclothes officers called Ceccola by radio to inform him that appellee had arrived. Approximately twenty minutes before that arrival, Wood had mentioned to Ceccola the exact location in the automobile where appellee usually stored drugs, namely, under the hood. As soon as Ceccola was alerted to appellee's arrival, he left the apartment and met the plainclothes officers in the street. Appellee had already parked and stepped out of the automobile by the time the officers approached him. The officers noticed that another individual, unknown to them at the time but later identified as a security guard for the apartment building, was a passenger in the automobile. That individual exited from the automobile at the request of the officers.

Next, Detective Ceccola looked through the open driver's door of the automobile and noticed a brown bag and a small brown box on the front seat. The box, which was approximately five inches by eight inches in size, had a lid which was closed. Ceccola was not able to determine from that vantage point what was in either the bag or the box, but he noticed glassine bags protruding from the lid of the box. A search of the automobile was then conducted. It was discovered that the box on the front seat contained empty glassine bags, of a type sometimes used for packaging methamphetamines, and a scale of a sort commonly used for weighing drugs. The bag on the front seat contained fifteen hypodermic syringes. In addition, bags of methamphetamines were found under the hood of the automobile. At the conclusion of the search, appellee was placed under arrest.

The Commonwealth argues in the instant appeal that, because appellee concedes that ample probable cause existed to have obtained a warrant to search the automobile, the search was permissible even in the absence of a warrant. Specifically, it is asserted that exigent circumstances are never necessary to justify a warrantless search of a motor vehicle in Pennsylvania. Such an assertion is plainly without merit, in view of well established constitutional principles governing vehicle searches.

In clarification of the applicable analytical framework, it is to be noted that the present case does not fall within the bounds of traditionally recognized exceptions to search warrant requirements. The case does not involve a search incident to an arrest, see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2680, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), since appellee was not arrested until after a search had been conducted. Also, this is not a case involving a search of a vehicle that had been suddenly encountered and stopped by police. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 442 Pa. 98, 275 A.2d 51 (1971) (vehicle suddenly encountered and lawfully stopped by police would have been a proper subject for warrantless search if probable cause had existed to believe evidence of crime was concealed therein). Nor is this a case where identifiable contraband was in plain view in the vehicle, Commonwealth v. Milyak, 508 Pa. 2, 493 A.2d 1346 (1985), or where other purported exceptions to warrant requirements appear applicable.

While certain exceptions to constitutional requirements of obtaining warrants have been recognized in the realm of vehicle searches, it cannot be said that searches of motor vehicles are, per se, exempt from warrant requirements. In Commonwealth v. Milyak, 508 Pa. at 7-8, 493 A.2d at 1349, this Court stated,

While searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a magistrate, are generally unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment ... there is an established departure from the warrant requirement for certain automobile searches based on the inherent mobility of vehicles, with the consequent practical problems in obtaining a warrant prior to infringing a legitimate expectation of privacy....

(Emphasis added). See also Commonwealth v. Cockfield, 431 Pa. 639, 644, 246 A.2d 381, 384 (1968) ("[A]n automobile is not per se unprotected by the warrant procedure of the Fourth Amendment. Although it sometimes may be reasonable to search a movable vehicle without a warrant, the movability of the area to be searched is not alone a sufficiently 'exigent circumstance' to justify a warrantless search."); Pennsylvania Constitution, Art. I, § 8. Accord Commonwealth v. Davis, 270 Pa.Super. 202, 411 A.2d 250 (1979).

Thus, subject to certain carefully delineated exceptions, supra, the presence of exigent circumstances, which create practical problems in obtaining a warrant prior to infringing a legitimate expectation of privacy, is necessary to justify a warrantless vehicle search. See Commonwealth v. Cockfield, 431 Pa. at 643, 246 A.2d at 383 ("Whenever practicable, the police must obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through warrant procedure....") (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Holzer, 480 Pa. 93, 103, 389 A.2d 101, 106 (1978) (Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and under Art. I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, "[i]t is clear that there is no 'automobile exception' as such and that constitutional protections are applicable to searches and seizures of a person's car.... Yet, in considering the reasonableness of a given search or seizure of an automobile, the need for a warrant is often excused by exigent circumstances.")

The Commonwealth argues that, if, as we hold, exigent circumstances are indeed required as a basis for a warrantless vehicle search, the instant search was one conducted pursuant to such circumstances. In this regard, it is claimed that probable cause to search the automobile did not arise until twenty minutes before appellee returned to the apartment, because that was when Wood told Ceccola the exact location, under the hood, where drugs were often stored. Further, the Commonwealth contends that the presence of a passenger in the automobile contributed to the exigencies presented.

The burden is upon the Commonwealth to establish that exigent circumstances were present, such that it was not reasonably practicable to obtain a search warrant. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(h) (Commonwealth has the burden of establishing that challenged evidence was...