Com. v. Johnson

Decision Date26 March 1999
Citation727 A.2d 1089,556 Pa. 216
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Roderick Andre JOHNSON, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

John T. Adams, Reading, for R. Johnson.

Mark C. Balwin, Reading, Robert A Graci, Harrisburg, Iva C. Dougherty, Reading, for Commonwealth.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION

NEWMAN, Justice.

Roderick Andre Johnson (Appellant) files this direct appeal of his two convictions for first-degree murder and death sentence following a jury trial. We affirm.

In our direct review of all cases in which the death penalty is imposed, this Court independently reviews the sufficiency of the evidence regardless of whether the defendant challenges the conviction on that ground. Commonwealth v. Jones, 546 Pa. 161, 173, 683 A.2d 1181, 1186 (1996) (citing Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982)). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible from that, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are sufficient to establish all the elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones, supra.

We review the evidence, discuss the issues, and conclude if there were errors.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant, along with co-Defendants Shawn Bridges (Bridges) and Richard "Rambo" Morales (Morales), was charged in connection with the murders of Damon Banks and Gregory Banks. The trial court record shows, based substantially on statements that Appellant gave to police, that on Saturday, December 7, 1996, the girlfriend of co-Defendant Bridges was robbed at gunpoint. The robbers indicated that they were looking for drugs and money. Although no drugs or money were found, the robbers took a camcorder and a Sony Playstation. News of this incident quickly made its way to Bridges. Bridges' girlfriend told him that the robbers had been wearing green masks and green "hoodies." Bridges recalled seeing Gregory and Damon Banks wearing green hoodies earlier that day. Bridges and the Appellant went to the home of co-Defendant Morales. While there, Bridges grabbed a shotgun and mentioned that he wanted to go to the house of Gregory and Damon Banks and murder them. Bridges showed the Appellant and Morales a 9-mm Glock pistol that he had on him.

On December 8, 1996, the three co-conspirators headed to a local K-mart to purchase shotgun shells. They traveled in a minivan and arrived at Gregory and Damon Banks' house. While Bridges went to talk to them, the Appellant noticed a woman unloading groceries next door. Bridges came out of the house with Gregory and Damon Banks, and stated that he wanted them to take care of his drug-selling operations while he was away. Gregory and Damon Banks entered the minivan with Bridges, the Appellant, and Morales, and the group drove to a dirt road near a car lot and construction site. Bridges and Morales said that they were going to show Gregory and Damon Banks where the drugs were hidden, and asked Gregory and Damon Banks to accompany them. They refused, and Bridges and Morales returned to the van. Bridges then approached Appellant and told him that he would shoot Gregory and Damon Banks on the count of three. Bridges then walked around the front of the van, and shouted "What's on station two and three?" At that point, Bridges started shooting. In statements given to police, Appellant claimed that Bridges also fired a shot at him, hitting him in the side of his torso. Appellant stated that the van then drove away, and Appellant walked two miles to the Queen City Restaurant, where he was subsequently picked up and taken to the hospital for treatment of his gunshot wound.

Appellant was tried separately from the other co-defendants for the murders of Gregory and Damon Banks from November 13, 1997 to November 26, 1997, with the jury returning guilty verdicts of first-degree murder for both victims. At trial, the Commonwealth presented a crucial piece of evidence that contradicted Appellant's claims that he was not involved as a shooter. The Commonwealth presented testimony from a forensic pathologist that one of the bullets recovered from the body of Damon Banks was a .38 caliber bullet. A .38 caliber handgun was recovered close to the murder scene and, according to the testimony of the Commonwealth's ballistics expert, was the weapon used to fire that bullet. George Robles testified at trial that Appellant possessed a .38 caliber handgun like the one found at the murder scene. Robles testified that Appellant told him, while he was visiting Appellant at the hospital, that he had taken the .38 caliber handgun with him, had wiped it off with his shirt and threw it on the side of the road within a quarter mile of the murder scene.

We conclude, based on our independent review of the record, that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove Appellant's guilt of the murders of Gregory and Damon Banks beyond a reasonable doubt. We now turn to the specific allegations of trial court error raised by Appellant.

II. DISCUSSION OF ALLEGED TRIAL COURT ERRORS
A. Alleged Brady Violations
1. The Robles Letter

Appellant claims that the Berks County District Attorney's office violated the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), which requires the production of all material evidence tending to exculpate the defendant. The basis of this claim is the prosecutor's failure to produce a letter written by George Robles, a crucial witness for the Commonwealth, while Robles was in prison on material witness bail1 in connection with another murder case involving Appellant, referred to as the "Schuylkill Avenue" murder. Robles wrote this letter to Angel Cabrera, a member of the Reading police department, and stated:

Angel. Look I can't take this jail. I am doing everything possible to help you. Please, Please help me. I'm not a runner you know that I just want to go home. I can't eat. I can hardly sleep and I feel like I'm in here forever. Angel, I feel like I'm dying here. I am begging you and [Detective] Vega with my word as a man and father to be. I'm not running. Just send me home please. I will do anything. . . .

The letter is not dated, but a police report prepared by Detective Cabrera noting receipt of the letter was dated February 28, 1997. Appellant claims that, had he been in possession of this letter, he could have impeached Robles by showing a strong motive for Robles to fabricate his testimony, and that this letter constituted material impeachment evidence that the prosecutor was required, pursuant to Brady, to produce.

The Sixth Amendment concerns implicated in the Brady rule focus on whether the prosecutor's failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence deprived the defendant of a fair trial. U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). The standard for determining whether the information is "material" varies depending on whether the failure to disclose follows a specific request by the defendant for the information, or a general request for all exculpatory evidence. See Commonwealth v. Green, 536 Pa. 599, 604, 640 A.2d 1242, 1244-45 (1994)

(citing Commonwealth v. Moose, 529 Pa. 218, 233, 602 A.2d 1265, 1272 (1992)). If the defendant made a specific request for the information, then the test for materiality is "whether the evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial." Green, 536 Pa. at 604,

640 A.2d at 1245. However, if the defendant made a general request for exculpatory evidence, then the evidence is considered material only if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. Id.

Material impeachment evidence is included within the scope of the Brady rule. See U.S. v. Pelullo, 105 F.3d 117, 122 (3d. Cir.1997). However, in order to be entitled to a new trial for failure to disclose evidence affecting a witness' credibility, the defendant must demonstrate that the reliability of the witness may well be determinative of his guilt or innocence. Commonwealth v. Morales, 549 Pa. 400, 414, 701 A.2d 516, 523 (1997).

The record indicates that Appellant's counsel filed formal discovery requests with the District Attorney's office on January 31, 1997, and February 4, 1997, in which he requested "[a]ny evidence favorable to the accused which is material either to guilt or to punishment, and which is in the possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth." The record contains no further formal discovery requests from Appellant's counsel. However, during a post-trial evidentiary hearing conducted by the trial court,2 the parties submitted a June 4, 1997 letter from the District Attorney to Appellant's counsel, which was in response to an informal discovery request.3 This letter noted that the discovery packet enclosed with the District Attorney's letter contained "Reading Police Department Crime Investigation Report, Assignment # 96-57168."

Detective Cabrera testified that the Reading Police Department Crime Investigation Report, Assignment Number 96-57168, referred to the department's file on the Schuylkill Avenue murder case. Included in this file was a two-sentence report, dated February 28, 1997, prepared by Cabrera. This report referred to the Robles' letter, and contained a notation "See Letter" at the end of the report. The letter was not, however, appended to the report in the materials produced to Appellant's counsel. On examination, Detective Vega, who was also involved in the investigation of the Schuylkill Avenue murder, testified that the letter was not included in the materials forwarded to the District Attorney, and that only the report had been forwarded. Vega further testified that the letter was not sent to the District Attorney's office until July 15, 1997, when LeRoy...

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