Com. v. Jones

• Decision Date: 18 September 1996
• Citation: 683 A.2d 1181,546 Pa. 161
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Gilbert JONES, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 1181

683 A.2d 1181

546 Pa. 161

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Gilbert JONES, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 25, 1995.

Decided Sept. 18, 1996.

[546 Pa. 172] Mitchell Scott Strutin, for Gilbert Jones.

Catherine Marshall, Robert A. Graci, Attorney General's Office, for Com.

Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CAPPY, Justice.

This is an automatic direct appeal ¹ from three sentences of death imposed upon Appellant following his convictions on four counts of Murder in the First Degree ², two counts of Possession of Instrument of Crime ³ and one count of Burglary. ⁴ Following a penalty hearing, the jury returned verdicts of death on three of the murder counts and a sentence of life imprisonment on the fourth murder count. ⁵ Post-trial motions were filed and argued. The trial court ultimately denied those motions. Appellant was then formally sentenced to the three sentences of death, one life sentence, a concurrent ten (10) to twenty (20) years on the burglary charge and one to five years, also concurrent, on the possession of instruments of crime charge. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions and the judgments of sentence.

As in all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, this court is required to conduct an independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence even where, as here, the defendant has not specifically challenged the conviction on that ground. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient to establish all the elements of the offense(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 Pa. 537, 510 A.2d 1217 (1986). So viewed, the evidence establishes the following.

On Sunday, December 23, 1990, at approximately 2:45 p.m., Appellant met Edna Dorsey, a former girlfriend, at Red's Corner Lounge located at 18th and Moore Streets in South Philadelphia. In a statement given to police, Appellant indicated that shortly after arriving at the lounge, he informed Ms. Dorsey that he was getting married but asked her if she would still see him after he was married. When Ms. Dorsey refused, Appellant pulled a gun from his person and shot Ms. Dorsey in the neck causing her to fall from the bar stool. As Ms. Dorsey lay on the floor, Appellant shot her three more times. Ms. Dorsey died as a result of these gunshot wounds. Appellant then fired a fifth bullet which struck another patron, Leroy Anderson, in the head. Fortunately, Mr. Anderson's wound was not fatal.

About a half hour later on this same date, Appellant returned to his home at 6133 Walnut Street. As he approached his house, Appellant saw Earl Jones enter the house next door. ⁶ Appellant proceeded into his own home, retrieved a .30-.30 caliber rifle, and, armed with both the rifle and a revolver, went next door in search of Earl Jones. Appellant forced his way in the front door and chased Earl Jones upstairs. Earl Jones entered one of the bedrooms, warned Jacqueline Jones, Alan Whitfield, and Felicia Hubert, all three of whom were in that bedroom watching television, that Appellant was after him. After issuing that warning, Earl Jones jumped from the bedroom window to safety. Appellant entered the bedroom and shot and killed all three of the above-mentioned individuals.

Following the shootings, Appellant fled and barricaded himself in his own home. While there, Appellant maintained telephone communications with the police during which time he informed the police that he was armed. The hostage negotiator with whom Appellant spoke asked no questions regarding the shootings, but tried only to convince Appellant to surrender peacefully. During these conversations, Appellant repeatedly volunteered that he intended to commit suicide because he did not want to be incarcerated for killing the victims. It was not until several hours later, after having talked with his son, that Appellant finally surrendered to police. Once in custody, Appellant waived his Miranda rights and gave inculpatory statements respecting all four murders. A search of Appellant's home produced both a revolver and a .30-.30 rifle as well as numerous rounds of live ammunition.

At trial, Appellant asserted a defense of insanity and diminished mental capacity. In support of his defense, Appellant presented the testimony of family and neighbors who testified as to Appellant's military discharge in 1948 after his having been diagnosed as a schizophrenic psychopath. This evidence consisted of layman testimony regarding Appellant's behavior patterns and instances of bizarre behavior. However, Appellant did not present any medical expert testimony in support of these defenses. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, presented the testimony of two board-certified forensic psychiatrists who examined Appellant following the murders. Both concluded that, at the time Appellant committed the instant murders, he was not laboring under any mental illness sufficient to deprive him of his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.

Our independent review of the record convinces us that the evidence presented was, indeed, sufficient to support Appellant's convictions for four counts of first degree murder, two counts of possession of instrument of crime and one count of burglary. Having concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, we shall now address Appellant's particular claims of error.

All but one of Appellant's claims of error allege ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Generally, trial counsel is presumed to be effective and the defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise. Commonwealth v. Williams, 524 Pa. 218, 230, 570 A.2d 75, 81 (1990). To obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant is required to show that there is merit to the underlying claim; that counsel had no reasonable basis for his course of conduct; and finally, that there is a reasonable probability that but for the act or omission in question, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Douglas, 537 Pa. 588, 597, 645 A.2d 226, 230 (1994); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987). In reviewing any particular claim of ineffectiveness, we need not determine whether the first two prongs of this standard are met if the record evinces that Appellant has not met the prejudice prong. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 118, 661 A.2d 352, 357 (1995), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 931, 133 L.Ed.2d 858 (1996).

Appellant first contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue, in post-trial motions, the trial court's denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress certain inculpatory statements made by Appellant both at the time he was barricaded inside his home as well as while he was being transported to the police station. When reviewing a trial court's ruling denying a suppression motion, we must first determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record. Where, as here, it is the defendant who is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and only that evidence of the defense that remains uncontradicted when fairly read in the context of the whole record. If, upon such review, we conclude that the factual findings of the trial court are supported by the record, we are bound by those facts and are permitted to reverse the ruling only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are erroneous. Commonwealth v. Medley, 531 Pa. 279, 612 A.2d 430 (1992).

Initially, Appellant contends that certain inculpatory statements made by him to police during the time he was barricaded inside his home and while he was being escorted to police headquarters should have been suppressed because he had not been given his Miranda rights. As this court recently reiterated, Miranda warnings are required only where there is custodial interrogation. Commonwealth v. Williams, 539 Pa. 61, 650 A.2d 420 (1994). Appellant submits that the telephone contact initiated by the police while he was barricaded inside his home constituted custodial interrogation since the police knew at that time that Appellant was a suspect in the shootings, and thus, should have realized that their efforts to coax Appellant from his home via those oral communications was likely to elicit inculpatory statements. He also submits that he was in police custody insofar as the police had his house surrounded and he was, thus, not free to leave. Appellant's claim is wholly without merit. First, contrary to his assertions, he was not in custody at this time and, therefore, was not entitled to Miranda warnings. See Commonwealth v. Holcomb, 508 Pa. 425, 498 A.2d 833 (1985). Even assuming he was entitled to such warnings, the statements made by Appellant during this stand-off were not the product of police interrogation, but rather were unsolicited statements uttered in response to police negotiations designed to encourage Appellant to surrender peacefully and as such, were admissible. See Commonwealth v. Clark, 454 Pa. 329, 311 A.2d 910 (1973); Commonwealth v. Whitley, 500 Pa. 442, 457 A.2d 507 (1983).

Appellant uttered further inculpatory statements as police were escorting him from his home and driving him to police headquarters as well as when he reached the headquarters. Apparently, as he was being escorted from his home, he yelled to his son that he "should have killed them all" and then, "the ammo is on the...