Com. v. Knowles

Decision Date07 April 2008
Docket NumberSJC-09806.
Citation883 N.E.2d 941,451 Mass. 91
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Thomas KNOWLES.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Andrew S. Crouch, Boston, for the defendant.

David Marc Solet, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, CORDY, & BOTSFORD, JJ.

CORDY, J.

At 6:40 P.M., on a September evening, a Malden police officer, on patrol, received a dispatch reporting a man in a white shirt and jeans "swinging a baseball bat" near the intersection of Ferry and Holyoke Streets. Fewer than ten seconds later, the officer turned the corner from Ferry Street onto Holyoke Street and observed a man fitting that description. The man was standing with his back to the officer's cruiser, leaning into the open trunk of an automobile. The officer observed that as the man leaned into the trunk, he placed a baseball bat up against a telephone pole adjacent to the automobile. There was no one else on the street. The officer pulled his cruiser across the street, diagonal to the man, and got out. The man stood up, turned and noticed the officer, reached into his right pocket, and threw "something" that the officer could not identify into the open trunk. The officer ordered the man to "stop," "step away from the car," and to "come towards" him with his hands out of his pockets. The man complied. As he walked toward the officer, other officers arrived on the scene. The officers then proceeded to "identif[y]" the man as Thomas Knowles,1 after which the first officer left Knowles in the custody of the other officers and went to inspect the open trunk to determine what Knowles had thrown inside "to make sure it wasn't a weapon." He observed what he believed to be "small packages of heroin all rolled up," "a small baggy containing some white powder," and two other bags containing "an assortment of pills."

After this discovery, Knowles was placed under arrest and eventually charged with possession with intent to distribute a Class A substance; possession with intent to distribute a Class B substance; possession of a Class B substance having previously been convicted of a drug offense; and committing a violation of the drug laws within 1,000 feet of a school, all in violation of G.L. c. 94C. Knowles was also charged with being a disorderly person, but that charge was dismissed prior to trial.

Knowles filed a motion to suppress the drugs found in the trunk of his automobile, contending that their seizure violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. An evidentiary hearing was held before a District Court judge, at which the arresting officer was the only witness. The judge apparently credited the uncontradicted testimony of the officer, whose testimony regarding the seizure of Knowles and the subsequent search of his trunk is summarized above.2

The judge denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the officer "was justified" in making "further inquiry" of the defendant, "had an objective basis for concern for his safety," and acted reasonably in ordering the defendant to step away from the vehicle and walk toward him with his hands out of his pockets. The judge made no finding whether or when Knowles was seized (prior to his arrest) or whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Knowles had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime prior to observing the drugs in the trunk.

Knowles was convicted of the charged offenses at a jury-waived trial. The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions and the denial of the motion to suppress. In an unpublished memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 1:28, the Appeals Court concluded that Knowles was "seized," in the constitutional sense, when the officer ordered him to stop where he was, step away from the car, and walk toward him with his hands out of his pockets, and that at the time of the seizure Knowles's conduct was not "indicative" of criminal activity. However, the Appeals Court concluded that the seizure was nonetheless justified as a "reasonable precaution[] for [the officer's] own safety," in conducting an investigation to "make sure that the defendant was not posing a danger to himself or others," analogizing the situation to a "well-being check," Commonwealth v. McDevitt, 57 Mass.App.Ct. 733, 736, 786 N.E.2d 404 (2003), and police "investigation of emergencies," Commonwealth v. Davis, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 88, 89-90, 823 N.E.2d 411 (2005).3 We granted the defendant's application for further appellate review and now reverse.

We agree with the Appeals Court that the defendant was "seized" when the officer ordered him to stop what he was doing, move away from the automobile, and to walk toward him with his hands out of his pockets. Commonwealth v. Barros, 435 Mass. 171, 173-176, 755 N.E.2d 740 (2001). We also agree that in the absence of evidence that might place the defendant's actions in a more sinister context, the substance of the apparently anonymous call to the dispatcher combined with the officer's observations of the defendant's movements thereafter did not create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on which a "threshold inquiry" (or investigative stop) might have been lawful pursuant to Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 405, 318 N.E.2d 895 (1974) ("we have consistently sustained the right of a police office[r] to make a threshold inquiry where suspicious conduct gives the officer reason to suspect that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime").4 We disagree, however, that the exceptions we have carefully carved out for police officers performing their community caretaking function and for emergencies apply in these circumstances, or that the officer had an adequate basis to justify the seizure of Knowles out of a reasonable concern for his safety, at the time it was effectuated.

"Local police officers are charged with `community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.'" Commonwealth v. Evans, 436 Mass. 369, 372, 764 N.E.2d 841 (2002), quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). In carrying out this function, an officer may, when the need arises, stop individuals and inquire about their well-being, even if there are no grounds to suspect that criminal activity is afoot. See Commonwealth v. Murdough, 428 Mass. 760, 763-764, 704 N.E.2d 1184 (1999). An officer may take steps that are reasonable and consistent with the purpose of his inquiry, Commonwealth v. Smigliano, 427 Mass. 490, 499-501, 694 N.E.2d 341 (1998) (Fried, J., concurring), even if those steps include actions that might otherwise be constitutionally intrusive. See Cady v. Dombrowski, supra at 447, 93 S.Ct. 2523; Commonwealth v. Murdough, supra (officers need not have reasonable suspicion to require driver in rest area to step out of vehicle in order to better assess whether he was in condition to resume driving); Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 212, 216, 729 N.E.2d 288 (2000), and cases cited (under community caretaking doctrine, officers may, without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, approach and detain citizens for community caretaking purposes). See also Commonwealth v. Smigliano, supra at 501-503, 694 N.E.2d 341 (Appendix), for a compilation of decisions holding that police officers may approach and detain citizens for community caretaking purposes. If an officer uncovers evidence of criminal activity while operating within the scope of this inquiry, it is admissible. Commonwealth v. Leonard, 422 Mass. 504, 509, 663 N.E.2d 828, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 877, 117 S.Ct. 199, 136 L.Ed.2d 135 (1996).

The decision to make a well-being check must be reasonable in light of an objective basis for believing that the defendant's safety and well-being or that of the public may be in jeopardy. Commonwealth v. McDevitt, supra at 736 n. 5, 786 N.E.2d 404. The Commonwealth has the burden of demonstrating, by objective evidence, that the officer's actions were "divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Cady v. Dombrowski, supra at 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523. See Commonwealth v. Sondrini, 48 Mass. App.Ct. 704, 706-707, 724 N.E.2d 748 (2000) (finding that objective view of facts revealed that police were engaged in criminal investigation, motivated by search for evidence, rather than caretaking).

There is no objective basis present here for believing that the defendant's well-being or the safety of the public was in immediate jeopardy. Any objective view of the actions of the officer leads to the conclusion that he was in fact conducting a criminal investigation. After arriving at the scene, he quickly seized Knowles, made no inquiry about his well-being, and as soon as other officers arrived and took charge of Knowles, he proceeded to examine the contents of the open trunk for evidence of criminal activity. Indeed, the officer himself never justified his seizure of the defendant on the ground that he was acting in his community caretaking capacity.

Similarly, there is no objective basis for believing that the officer was confronted with an emergency situation. "The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860, 84 S.Ct. 125, 11 L.Ed.2d 86 (1963) (opinion of Burger, J.). Accord Commonwealth v. Snell, 428 Mass. 766, 774-775, 705 N.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1010, 119 S.Ct. 2351, 144 L.Ed.2d 247 (1999) (warrantless entry of home justified where police...

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