Com. v. Kronick

• Decision Date: 15 October 1907
• Citation: 82 N.E. 39,196 Mass. 286
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. KRONICK.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

196 Mass. 286

82 N.E. 39

COMMONWEALTH v. KRONICK.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Berkshire.

October 15, 1907

Oct 15, 1907.

COUNSEL

John F. Noxon, for complainant.

Mark E Couch and John E. Magenis, for defendant.

OPINION

SHELDON J.

The defendant's counsel have not argued that any one of their first three requests for instructions should have been given as it was framed. But it is contended that under the charge of the court the jury may have convicted the defendant without sufficient proof of a guilty knowledge on his part that the goods in question had been stolen; that they may have found that the defendant's knowledge of the prior larceny came to him only after whatever dealings he had with the goods in question. If this contention is well founded, manifestly the defendant has been aggrieved. There is only one crime described in Rev. Laws, c. 208, § 51, upon which this indictment was drawn, although that crime may be committed in either one of the specific modes described in that statute. Stevens v. Commonwealth, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 241. Accordingly, as was held in that case, the defendant could be convicted upon this indictment if it appeared that he, knowing that the goods have been stolen, either bought or received them, or aided in their concealment. But it needs no citation of authorities to show that no offense is committed unless the defendant has that guilty knowledge at the time at which he commits the act either of buying, or receiving, or aiding to conceal the stolen goods, with the qualification, to which the defendant did not object, that if the goods have been actually stolen it is enough if the defendant believed this to be the case, even though he may not have had full and complete knowledge. Com. v. Finn, 108 Mass. 466; Com. v. Leonard, 140 Mass. 474, 478, 479, 4 N.E. 96, 54 Am. Rep. 485.

But the defendant's contention does not appear to be well founded. The final instruction to the jury, given in the stead of what had been previously said upon that subject, was that the defendant could be convicted 'if he either knew or believed this property was stolen property at the time it came into his possession, or at any time while it was in his possession he ascertained that it was stolen property and he undertook to deprive the owner of his rightful use of it.' This plainly meant that the defendant's undertaking to deprive the owner of the use of the property must have been subsequent to his ascertaining that it was stolen property. This was enough; for the offense was complete although he may have received the property...