Com. v. Langton

• Decision Date: 29 April 1983
• Citation: 448 N.E.2d 763,389 Mass. 1001
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. William D. LANGTON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 763

448 N.E.2d 763

389 Mass. 1001

COMMONWEALTH v. William D. LANGTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 7, 1983.

Decided April 29, 1983.

William G. Billingham, North Pembroke, for defendant.

Kevin J. Ross, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

RESCRIPT.

The Commonwealth brought a complaint with a single justice of this court under G.L. c. 211, § 3, to vacate an order by a judge of the Superior Court. The Superior Court judge had granted Langton's motion in the nature of a mandamus to order the district attorney to file a petition for the commitment of Langton as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to G.L. c. 123A, § 6. Langton appeals from the judgment of the single justice vacating the order of the Superior Court.

Langton claims error in the exercise by the single justice of our extraordinary powers under G.L. c. 211, § 3. It is true that relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3, should be given only in extraordinary cases. See Rosenberg v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 59, 61, 360 N.E.2d 333 (1977). The instant case presents such circumstances. If the district attorney filed a commitment petition as ordered, and a determination on the merits were made that the defendant is a sexually dangerous person contrary to the belief of the district attorney, it is doubtful that the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party (albeit under duress), would have an effective remedy for an erroneous mandamus order. The error, if any, in the issuance of the order to proceed under G.L. c. 123A, § 6, possibly could not be cured by any appellate review of the commitment hearing resulting from the order to file such a petition. See Whitmarsh v. Commonwealth, 366 Mass. 212, 215, 316 N.E.2d 610 (1974).

The single justice was correct in entertaining the Commonwealth's complaint. We turn now to consider whether he abused his discretion or committed an error of law.

Although Mass.R.Civ.P. 81(b), 365 Mass. 841 (1974), abolished the writ of mandamus, it did not eliminate the relief it afforded. See Reporters' Notes to Mass.R.Civ.P. 81(b), Mass.Ann.Laws, Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure at 701 (Law.Co-op.1982); J.W. Smith & H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice § 81.4 (1981). Allowance of relief in the nature of mandamus is controlled by equitable principles. 9 Moore's Federal Practice par. 110.29, at 316 (1983 & Supp.1982-1983). Mandamus is to be granted only in instances where there is no other adequate and effectual remedy. Coach & Six Restaurant, Inc. v. Public Works Comm'n, 363 Mass. 643, 644, 296 N.E.2d 501 (1973). "[M]andamus does not lie if any other effective remedy exists." County Comm'rs of Middlesex County v. Sheriff of Middlesex County, 361 Mass. 89, 90-91, 278 N.E.2d 751 (1972).

The single justice concluded that the Superior Court judge erred in granting the order to compel the district attorney to petition for a commitment hearing because Langton has an alternative remedy pursuant to G.L. c. 123A, § 8. This provision permits "[a]ny person believing himself to be suffering from a physical or mental condition which may result in sexual trends...