Com. v. Lapham

• Decision Date: 21 June 1892
• Citation: 31 N.E. 638,156 Mass. 480
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. LAPHAM.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

156 Mass. 480

31 N.E. 638

COMMONWEALTH v. LAPHAM.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

June 21, 1892

COUNSEL

Chas N. Harris, Second Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

Francis W. Qua and Harry A. Brown, for defendant.

OPINION

ALLEN J.

1. By Pub.St. c. 205, § 9, it is made criminal corruptly to give offer, or promise a bribe to any executive, legislative, or judicial officer. The present indictment for attempted bribery of a milk inspector does not set forth in terms that he was an executive officer, and therefore the defendant contends that it cannot be supported as a good indictment for the statutory offense; and that it is not a good indictment at common law, because milk inspectors are to be deemed executive officers, and therefore the bribery of a milk inspector must be indicted or punished under the statute, if at all. But, even if a milk inspector is to be deemed an executive officer within the meaning of the statute, (which is open to question,) it is not necessary to set out that inference of law in the indictment. The indictment set out with sufficient fullness all necessary facts in relation to his official position; and whether he was within the meaning of the statute or not, the objection on this ground cannot prevail.

2. Nor is it necessary, in an indictment under the above-mentioned section of the statute, to aver that the corrupt intention to influence the act, opinion, decision, or judgment of the inspector was in relation to any specific and particular matter then pending before him, or which was then expected to come before him. It is enough to aver a corrupt intention so to influence him in any matter which may then be pending, or which may by law come or be brought before him. If, for example, an executive, legislative, or judicial officer is bribed corruptly to favor a particular person in any and all matters affecting that person which may come before such officer, without specification or knowledge of the particular matters likely to come up, the statute is broad enough to include such a case. A narrower construction of a similar statute has been adopted in Alabama, but we cannot follow it. Barefield v. State, 14 Ala. 603.

3. If any averment of what the inspector had already done by way of analysis or test was necessary, the averment that he had caused the specimens of milk to be analyzed or otherwise satisfactorily tested was sufficient. If he...