Com. v. Laventure

• Decision Date: 22 March 2006
• Citation: 894 A.2d 109
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Stephen LAVENTURE, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 109

894 A.2d 109

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Stephen LAVENTURE, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 5, 2005.

Decided March 22, 2006.

Mary Jean Glick, James Jude Karl, for Stephen Laventure, appellant.

Stuart B. Suss, West Chester, Mary Benefield Seiverling, for the Com. of PA.

BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, NEWMAN, SAYLOR and BAER, JJ.

OPINION

Justice SAYLOR.

The question presented is whether a criminal complaint and/or arrest warrant tolls the statute of limitations where the defendant/arrestee is unnamed and described only as "John Doe `Steve'," a white male, in his thirties, address unknown.

On August 2, 1997, a fire engulfed the building located at 3452 Old Philadelphia Pike Intercourse, in Lancaster County, destroying the business known as "Instant Amish," which was owned by Russell Shope and Christopher J. Kluge. Initially, no charges were filed in connection with the fire, but in May 2002, Kluge confessed that he had doused the interior of the building with a flammable substance and left the rear door of the building open so that a white male, known to him only as "Steve," could enter and set the structure ablaze. Kluge explained that his former partner, Shope, had directed him to destroy the building so that they could receive the proceeds of their insurance policy. Kluge also stated that he had watched Shope place approximately $500 in the cash register as payment to Steve for setting the fire.

The statute of limitations for major crimes such as arson or insurance fraud requires that a prosecution must be "commenced" within five years after commission of the offense. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(b).¹ For such purpose, a criminal proceeding generally is commenced when an indictment is found; an information issued; or a warrant, summons or citation issued, if executed without unreasonable delay. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(e). Additionally, commencement of a prosecution may occur by other means established by general rule of court. See id.; 42 Pa.C.S. § 5503(b). In this regard, this Court has prescribed that criminal proceedings in court cases shall be instituted, inter alia, by the filing of a written complaint. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 502(1).

On July 29, 2002, four days before the expiration of the five-year period of limitations under Section 5552(b), the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint alleging arson, insurance fraud, recklessly creating a risk of a catastrophe, and criminal conspiracy, against an unknown defendant, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. In the effort to satisfy both the rule-based requirement that a complaint charging an unknown defendant contain a description of him "as nearly as may be," Pa.R.Crim.P. 504(2), as well as the constitutional prerequisite that a warrant also contain such a description, see PA. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("[N]o warrant . . . to seize any person . . . shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be[.]"),² both the complaint and warrant described the unknown defendant as "John Doe `Steve'," having an unknown address, and who was a white male, in his thirties.

On August 8, 2002, following the expiration of the statutory limitations period, the Commonwealth identified "John Doe `Steve'" as Appellant, Stephen Laventure, and amended the complaint and warrant to reflect such information. After discovering that Appellant was serving a six-year sentence for a robbery conviction in Florida, the Commonwealth secured his presence for trial in Pennsylvania under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9101-9108.

Upon Appellant's pre-trial motion, however, the common pleas court, per the Honorable David L. Ashworth, dismissed the prosecution, holding that, given the generality of the description contained in the initial complaint and warrant, neither instrument was valid or sufficient to support the commencement of a criminal proceeding for purposes of Section 5552(b). See Commonwealth v. Laventure, No. 0027 of 2003, slip op. at 5 (C.P. Lancaster Sep. 15, 2003). The court distinguished the circumstances presented from situations in which the Commonwealth is able to furnish reasonably specific identification characteristics or criteria of an unknown or unnamed individual, such as a DNA profile, reasoning:

In the present case, the complaint did not identify Laventure through DNA, but merely stated "Steve, address unknown, white male, 30's." The purpose of the "statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period" providing the defendant with notice that he is being accused of a crime. Commonwealth v. Cardonick et al., 448 Pa. 322, 292 A.2d 402, 408 (1972) (citing Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970)). "Steve, address unknown, white male, 30's" simply does not meet this purpose.^[*] The statistical safeguards afforded by DNA identification are not present in the instant case and the rationale in [decisions holding that a DNA profile is a sufficient method of identification to support a valid warrant are] therefore inapplicable.

* Defense Counsel noted at oral argument, that according to the Social Security Administration website, in the 1960's and 1970's almost a million individuals were born with the name Steve, underlining the generality of the John Doe warrant in this case.

Id. at 4-5. Additionally, the common pleas court also referenced decisions from other jurisdictions as supportive of its holding.³

In its appeal to the Superior Court, the Commonwealth initially acknowledged the holding of this Court in Cardonick, cited by the common pleas court, that only a valid information or indictment will toll the statute of limitation. See Brief for Appellant (Superior Court), at 14 (citing Cardonick, 448 Pa. at 331, 292 A.2d at 407). The Commonwealth also recognized that the reasoning of Cardonick naturally extended to require a valid complaint or arrest warrant where such means are relied upon to meet the statutory limitations requirement. See id. ("Only a valid criminal complaint and arrest warrant will toll the statute of limitations." (citing, inter alia, Cardonick, 448 Pa. at 331, 292 A.2d at 407)); accord Commonwealth v. Tancredi, 222 Pa.Super. 436, 445, 295 A.2d 174, 178 (1972) ("[I]f an invalid indictment or information will not stop the running of the statute, there is no basis for an argument that some other irregular and improper procedure will toll the statute."). Further, the Commonwealth explicitly accepted that the requirement of Rule 504(2) that an unknown defendant be described "as nearly as may be" derived directly from the constitutional particularity requirement associated with a valid arrest warrant. See Brief for Appellant (Superior Court), at 15 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481 n. 9, 83 S.Ct. 407, 414 n. 9, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (describing the analogous interrelationship between the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Fourth Amendment)). The Commonwealth argued, however, that the complaint and warrant at issue were valid in this regard. In furtherance of this position, the Commonwealth advocated that the constitutional "as nearly as may be" requirement should be deemed satisfied where an original arrest warrant contains all known and available identifying information pertaining to the subject and the warrant is executed without unreasonable delay. See Brief for Appellant (Superior Court), at 8, 18.

A divided panel of the Superior Court credited the Commonwealth's position and reversed. See Commonwealth v. Laventure, 858 A.2d 112 (Pa.Super.2004). The majority initially agreed with both parties that, under Cardonick, only a valid complaint and/or arrest warrant will serve to toll the statute of limitations. See Laventure, 858 A.2d at 114 (citing Cardonick, 448 Pa. at 330, 292 A.2d at 406-07). It then proceeded to assess the constitutional validity of the arrest warrant at issue in terms of the "nearly as may be" criterion,⁴ expressing the position that there was a split among jurisdictions concerning the degree of specificity required to meet constitutional requisites. See id. at 114-15 ("Some jurisdictions have strictly interpreted the constitutional requirement for specificity in warrants[;] . . . [o]ther jurisdictions have allowed more latitude as to the elusive quantum of information sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's specificity requirement, recognizing the fluid nature of criminal investigations."). Furthermore, the Superior Court referenced United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir.1987), indicating that the decision demonstrated that other jurisdictions permit the use of "John Doe" warrants, so long as they include all of the information available to the government at the time. See Laventure, 858 A.2d at 115. Based on the above, the majority, in essence, adopted the standard proposed by the Commonwealth, albeit that it added a requirement of prompt amendment. Specifically, the majority held that a "John Doe" complaint or warrant may be deemed sufficient, even in the absence of particular identifying information relevant to the defendant, if the following questions can be answered affirmatively:

(1) did the Commonwealth set forth all information it knew or should have known in the initial "John Doe" complaint or warrant; and (2) was specific, identifying information obtained later as the result of diligent investigation added to the complaint or warrant within a reasonable amount of time.

Id. The Superior Court majority also offered the following additional explanation:

[W]e find this practical approach particularly apt in the context of issues involving the tolling of statutes of limitations. It is well-settled that the purpose underlying a statute of limitations is to limit the amount of time an individual is exposed to criminal liability because of the inherent difficulties in defending against a criminal charge where a great deal of...