Com. v. Lee

• Citation: 703 A.2d 470
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Fakardeen LEE, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 15 October 1997
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 470

703 A.2d 470

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Fakardeen LEE, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Feb. 3, 1997.

Filed Oct. 15, 1997.

John W. Packel, Asst. Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Peter J. Gardner, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Com., appellee.

Before DEL SOLE, SCHILLER, and MONTEMURO ^*, JJ.

SCHILLER, Judge.

Appellant, Fakardeen Lee, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on December 11, 1995. We affirm.

FACTS:

On June 23, 1994, appellant shot a 21 year old male in the chest at close range. Fortunately, the victim survived. The incident occurred when appellant came out of a store and encountered the victim talking with friends. Appellant and the victim argued briefly and appellant left. He returned shortly thereafter, stood nearby for a moment, then struck the victim in the head and shot him in the left side of the chest. Based on the victim's identification, a warrant was issued for appellant's arrest. On June 29, 1994, appellant, then 16 ¹, surrendered to Philadelphia police.

A petition of delinquency was filed charging appellant with aggravated assault ², possession of an instrument of crime ³, recklessly endangering another person's life ⁴, carrying a firearm without a license ⁵, carrying a firearm on a public street ⁶ and simple assault ⁷. The Commonwealth filed notice that it would seek to have appellant's case transferred to the adult division pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6355. On July 25, 1994, a certification hearing was held, and a prima facie case was established based on the complainant's testimony. In the amenability phase of the hearing, the court reviewed the contents of appellant's J-file ⁸, which included his prior record ⁹, information on his family, and a psychological evaluation ¹⁰. The court also heard testimony from the probation officer's supervisor; this officer, who had only spoken with appellant before the hearing, recommended that he remain within the juvenile system because he had never received services from the system. The psychologist made no recommendation on certification. Argument was also presented by the Commonwealth and defense counsel ¹¹. The court certified appellant's case for transfer to the adult division.

On October 4, 1994, appellant's case was reassigned to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, and, after numerous delays, he was tried without a jury on June 13 and 15, 1995. Appellant was found guilty of aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person and possession of an instrument of crime. A post-trial motion for extraordinary relief ¹² was filed which challenged the transfer of appellant's case to the adult division.

On December 6, 1995, at a post-trial motion and sentencing hearing, the court heard further evidence on appellant's motion regarding his amenability to treatment as a juvenile, and reviewed a pre-sentencing report including mental health and drug and alcohol evaluations. Ultimately, the court refused to grant relief on this motion, concluding that it lacked the power to review the Juvenile Court's decision. Appellant was then sentenced to not less than 5 nor more than 10 years for the aggravated assault charge ¹³ and not less than 2 1/2 nor more than 5 years (concurrent) on the PIC conviction. The court also ordered that appellant be evaluated and considered for placement at a juvenile facility. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION:

On appeal, appellant raises two issues:

Whether the juvenile court erred in transferring appellant's case to the adult division?

Whether the trial court erred in declining to review the juvenile court decision after additional evidence of appellant's amenability was presented at a post-trial hearing?

Before an appellate court will set aside a decision to transfer, the appellant must show a gross abuse of the broad discretion afforded the hearing judge. Commonwealth v. McGinnis, 450 Pa.Super. 310, 315, 675 A.2d 1282, 1285 (1996) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion "is not merely an error of judgment, but the misapplication or overriding of the law or the exercise of a manifestly unreasonable judgment based upon partiality, prejudice or ill will." Id. at 316, 675 A.2d at 1285.

In his first issue appellant contends that in certifying his case to the criminal division, the juvenile court made two errors which entitle him to a new hearing. He alleges that the court failed to state fully the reasons for transferring the case to the adult division, and that in making that decision, the court impermissibly relied on the nature of the crime. We address these contentions in order.

Under our law, when a delinquency petition has been filed alleging criminal conduct, the case may be transferred to criminal court for prosecution "if all of the following exist:"

(1) The child was 14 or more years of age at the time of the alleged conduct.

(2) A hearing on whether the transfer should be made is held in conformity with this chapter.

(3) Notice in writing of the time, place, and purpose of the hearing is given to the child and his parents, guardian, or other custodian at least three days before the hearing.

(4) The court finds:

(i) that there is a prima facie case that the child committed the delinquent act alleged;

(ii) that the delinquent act would be considered a felony if committed by an adult; and

(iii) that there are reasonable grounds to believe all of the following:

(A) That the child is not amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available facilities, even though there may not have been a prior adjudication of delinquency. In determining this the court shall consider the following factors:

Age.

Mental capacity.

Maturity.

The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the child.

Previous records, if any.

The nature and extent of any prior delinquent history, including the success or failure of any previous attempts by the Juvenile Court to rehabilitate the child.

Whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the Juvenile Court jurisdiction.

Probation or institutional reports, if any.

The nature and circumstances of the acts for which the transfer is sought.

Any other relevant factors.

(B) That the child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill.

(C) That the interests of the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint or discipline or that the offense is one which would carry a sentence of more than three years if committed by an adult.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a).

To comply with this section of the Juvenile Act, a certification court "need not make a formal statement or conventional findings of fact, but the statement must be sufficient to demonstrate that the question of certification has received the careful consideration of the juvenile court." Commonwealth v. McGinnis, 450 Pa.Super. at 316, 675 A.2d at 1285, quoting Commonwealth v Sanders, 339 Pa.Super. 373, 383, 489 A.2d 207, 212 (1985). Such a statement must set forth the basis for the certification order "with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful appellate review." Id. (citations omitted). However, an appellate court may not require detailed or intricate explanations of the rationale for certification when a detailed juvenile file and arguments of counsel have been presented for consideration. Commonwealth v. McDonald, 399 Pa.Super. 250, 582 A.2d 328, 333-334 (1990) alloc. denied 527 Pa. 664, 593 A.2d 839 (1991). Appellant claims that in his case the juvenile court certified him without making findings of fact, declining to indicate how it balanced the relevant factors. He characterizes the judge's statement as "boiler plate"; a "bland declaration that is inadequate." The record before us belies these contentions. During the initial phase of the certification hearing, the court heard the victim's testimony that appellant walked up to where he was talking with friends, stood by briefly and then hit him on the head with a gun and shot him in the chest. ¹⁴ During the amenability phase of the hearing, appellant's J-file was entered in evidence and the district attorney and appellant's counsel both presented argument. The Commonwealth noted that appellant was 16, and emphasized his prior record ¹⁵ as well as the seriousness of the crime, in terms of both its arbitrary nature and the severity of the resulting injuries; defense counsel argued for amenability based on reports that indicated appellant's above average I.Q. and stable family background, and the fact that appellant had not had an opportunity to benefit from the services of the juvenile system. The probation officer also recommended against certification because appellant had never been part of the juvenile system.

At the conclusion of this process, the judge made the following statement on the record:

The court has heard and has considered his age and the alleged degree of sophistication in the charges before the court which are very serious, including the facts that are in the record at the preliminary hearing.

I have considered the psychologicals which note that he is not committable to an institution for the mentally ill mentally retarded (sic). Based upon a full reading, also I have to note by stipulation he is not committable.

I know he has a fairly high I.Q. I heard from the probation officer and have the probation officer's recommendation in the record, and I have reviewed the charges from the Tinicum Township Police Department of Delaware County, I believe, regarding his prior arrest, and there is no final disposition made on that case.

I have considered my duties regarding legal restraint and the safety of the community, which is one factor involved in this proceeding, and I am well aware that juvenile court is established to handle matters involving juveniles and we have jurisdiction until the age of 21...