Com. v. Sanders
Decision Date | 07 January 2003 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Larry SANDERS, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
J. Richard Narvin, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Michael W. Streily, Deputy District Attorney, and Karen T. Edward, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Before LALLY-GREEN, TODD, and POPOVICH, JJ.
¶ 1 Appellant, Larry Sanders, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of sentence entered on July 21, 2000. We affirm.
¶ 2 The trial court found the following facts:
Trial Court Opinion, 6/28/02, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
¶ 3 Appellant raises one issue on appeal:
Did the trial court err when it denied the defendant's motion to decertify the case in this matter to the juvenile section of the family division of the Court of Common Pleas?
Appellant's Brief at 4. Appellant essentially argues that the record does not support the decertification court's decision to deny decertification from adult court to juvenile court. Appellant's Brief at 10.
¶ 4 The issue of certification between the juvenile and criminal divisions is jurisdictional and, therefore, not waivable. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 542 Pa. 568, 669 A.2d 315, 320-321 (1995). Decisions of whether to grant decertification will not be overturned absent a gross abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Aziz, 724 A.2d 371, 378 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal denied, 563 Pa. 670, 759 A.2d 919 (2000). An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment but involves the misapplication or overriding of the law or the exercise of a manifestly unreasonable judgment passed upon partiality, prejudice or ill will. Commonwealth v. McGinnis, 450 Pa.Super. 310, 675 A.2d 1282, 1285 (1996).
¶ 5 Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a), when a juvenile has committed a crime, which includes murder, or any of the other offenses listed under paragraph (2)(ii) or (iii) of the definition of "delinquent act" in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302, the criminal division of the Court of Common Pleas is vested with jurisdiction. Likewise, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(e) explains that charges of murder, or any of the other offenses listed under paragraph (2)(ii) or (iii) of the definition of "delinquent act" in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302, requires that the offense be prosecuted in the criminal division. "Robbery," when committed with a deadly weapon, is one of the offenses listed which requires jurisdiction to vest in the criminal division. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.
¶ 6 When a case goes directly to criminal division, the juvenile has the option of requesting treatment within the juvenile system through a transfer process of "decertification." Aziz, 724 A.2d at 373. In determining whether to transfer such a case from criminal division to juvenile division, "the child shall be required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer will serve the public interest." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a). See also, Aziz, 724 A.2d at 373
.
¶ 7 Pursuant to Section 6322(a), the decertification court shall consider the factors contained in Section 6355(a)(4)(iii) in determining whether the child has established that the transfer will serve the public interest. The statutorily set factors to be considered are as follows:
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(a)(4)(iii).
¶ 8 While the Juvenile Act requires that a decertification court consider all of the amenability factors, it is silent as to the weight assessed to each by the court. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 555 Pa. 37, 722 A.2d 1030, 1033 (1999). The ultimate decision of whether to certify a minor to stand trial as an adult is within the sole discretion of a decertification court. Id. at 1034. A decertification court must consider all of the factors set forth in Section 6355 of the Juvenile Act, but it need not address, seriatim, the applicability and importance of each factor and fact in reaching its final determination. Id.
¶ 9 In Jackson, our Supreme Court offered the following instruction regarding the extent to which the decertification court must explain its reasoning in order to provide meaningful appellate review:
The presumption in this Commonwealth remains that if a court has facts in its possession, it will apply them. See Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88, 102, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988)
( ); Commonwealth v. Lee, 703 A.2d 470, 474 (Pa.Super.1997); Commonwealth v. McGinnis, 450 Pa.Super. 310, 317, 675 A.2d 1282, 1286 (1996); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 399 Pa.Super. 250, 258, 582 A.2d 328, 331 (1990). When evaluating the propriety of a certification decision, absent evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court must presume that the juvenile court carefully considered the entire record.
Id. at 1034-1035 (footnote omitted).
¶ 10 Here, Appellant contends that other than the serious nature of the crime, no specific reason is of record supporting the decertification court's ruling. Appellant, thus, asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to explain adequately its reasoning and should have given more weight to Appellant's lack of a prior juvenile record and the testimony of the licensed social worker/youth services intake worker, which indicated that Appellant was a candidate for rehabilitation in the juvenile system.
¶ 11 The trial court offered the following reasoning regarding this issue:
The Juvenile Act 42, Pa.C.S.A. § 6301, et. seq., as amended in 1995 vests original jurisdiction for specified violent felonies with criminal courts. Discretion in the decertification is vested in the trial judge and the burden of proof to justify transfer is placed upon the juvenile defendant, Commonwealth v. Cotto, 562 Pa. 32, 753 A.2d 217 (2000). The trial court's discretion on a decertification ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, Commonwealth v. Pennington, ___ Pa.Super. ___ 751 A.2d 212 (2000). A review of the denial of a petition to transfer applies the same standards as those at the time of the initial review. In determining whether the pubic [sic] interest can be served, the court shall consider the following factors:
(A) the impact of the offense on the victim or victims:
(B) the impact of the offense on the community;
(C) the threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the child;
(D) the nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly committed by the child;
(E) the degree of the child's culpability;
(F) the adequacy and duration of dispositional alternatives available under this chapter and in the adult criminal justice system; and
(G) whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile by considering the following factors;
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