Com. v. Longo
Decision Date | 08 June 1988 |
Citation | 402 Mass. 482,524 N.E.2d 67 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Paul A. LONGO (and two companion cases 1 ). |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
William P. Homans, Jr., Boston, for Paul A. Longo.
Jane A. Donohue, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.
Thomas C. Horgan, Boston, for Richard D. Garthe, Jr., was present but did not argue.
Anthony M. Fredella, Somerville, for Timothy Sullivan, joined in a brief.
Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS and O'CONNOR, JJ.
The defendants, Longo, Garthe, and Sullivan, indicted for murder, were convicted after joint trial of the lesser included offense of assault and battery of Edward Mullan. 2 The Appeals Court reversed the convictions, concluding that the defendants' motions for required findings of not guilty should have been granted. The Appeals Court determined that the Commonwealth failed to introduce sufficient evidence of a criminal joint venture. Commonwealth v. Longo, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 518, 503 N.E.2d 1310 (1987). We granted the Commonwealth's application for further appellate review. We affirm the convictions.
In reviewing the denial of the defendants' motions, the Appeals Court accurately summarized the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680, 686, 393 N.E.2d 820 (1979), as follows: 3 "The Commonwealth's principal witness was David John Charles, who, at the time of the criminal event, had been bunking for two weeks with the Harris family (Harris, his wife Debra, and their two children) and Stephen Sullivan in a ground floor apartment at 40 Jones Road, Revere. The adults were in the parlor when about 11:00 P.M., April 7, 1984, the appellants (defendants) Garthe, Longo, and Timothy Sullivan dropped in. Perhaps a half hour later, Randolph Roderick arrived. During the course of the night there was heavy drinking (Charles, however, said he had only two beers) suffused with the smell of marihuana. Roderick left the parlor one or more times to snort cocaine, which he carried in tinfoil.
Commonwealth v. Longo, supra 23 Mass.App.Ct. at 519-522, 503 N.E.2d 1310.
We summarize the remaining evidence noted by the Appeals Court. A neighbor, awakened at 4:13 A.M. by what she took to be a scream, saw three men at the driveway to No. 52 Jones Road. Before they left, one man kicked something on the ground. Mullan's body was found in the driveway to No. 52 Jones Road. The medical examiner testified that abrasions on Mullan's back were consistent with his having been dragged from No. 40 to 52 Jones Road; their color indicated that Mullan was alive at the time the wounds were inflicted. The cause of death was a stab would to the heart. Id. at 522-523, 503 N.E.2d 1310.
The defendants were charged with murder, as well as with the lesser included offense of assault and battery. The theory of prosecution was joint venture. "The test [for joint venture] is whether each defendant was (1) present at the scene of the crime, (2) with knowledge that another intends to commit the crime or with intent to commit a crime, and (3) by agreement is willing and available to help the other if necessary." Commonwealth v. Bianco, 388 Mass. 358, 366, 446 N.E.2d 1041 (1983). Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 173, 408 N.E.2d 841 (1980). Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 470, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979). The defendants were present at the scene of the crime and in a position to render aid if necessary. The issue, therefore, is their state of mind at the time of the stabbing.
"[T]he jury may infer the requisite mental state [for a joint venture] from the defendant's knowledge of the circumstances and subsequent participation in the offense." Id. "[I]f one is, by agreement, in a position to render aid he is an abettor even if he does not participate 4 in the actual perpetration of the crime because his presence may encourage the perpetrator by giving him hope of immediate assistance." Commonwealth v. Casale, supra; Commonwealth v. Soares, supra at 471-472, 387 N.E.2d 499. 5 "In order to succeed with the joint venture theory, the prosecution must show that each defendant shared the mental state required [for assault and battery]." Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 295, 397 N.E.2d 1097 (1979).
(citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Casale, supra. " Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 387 Mass. 280, 287, 439 N.E.2d 754 (1982), quoting Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 250, 275 N.E.2d 33 (1971). "To the extent that conflicting inferences are possible from the evidence, 'it is for the jury to determine where the truth lies.' " Commonwealth v. Wilborne, 382 Mass. 241, 245, 415 N.E.2d 192 (1981), quoting Commonwealth v. Amazeen, 375 Mass. 73, 81, 375 N.E.2d 693 (1978).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680, 686, 393 N.E.2d 820 (1979), we conclude that the jury reasonably could infer the requisite mental state for a joint venture from the circumstances and from the conduct of the defendants. There was evidence of...
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