Com. v. Lugo

• Decision Date: 25 January 1990
• Citation: 548 N.E.2d 1263,406 Mass. 565
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Wigberto Figueroa LUGO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1263

548 N.E.2d 1263

406 Mass. 565

COMMONWEALTH v. Wigberto Figueroa LUGO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Essex.

Argued Dec. 5, 1989.

Decided Jan. 25, 1990.

Elin H. Graydon, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.

Hugh Samson, Boston, for defendant, submitted a brief.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, NOLAN, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

A jury in the Superior Court convicted the defendant of distributing heroin. The only evidence concerning the defendant's alleged activities came from Sergeant Walter Soriano of the Lawrence police department who testified that, while at an undisclosed location, he had observed the defendant selling drugs in a parking lot. In the initial appeal, the Appeals Court considered the correctness of a pretrial ruling by the judge that allowed the Commonwealth's motion in limine to prohibit the defendant's counsel from questioning Soriano on the exact location from which he made his observations. See Commonwealth v. Lugo, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 494, 503 N.E.2d 974 (1987). The Appeals Court vacated the ruling on the motion in limine and directed the judge to hold an in camera evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant should have been entitled to disclosure of the secret location.

In accordance with the Appeals Court opinion, the judge held an in camera hearing at which Soriano testified and was cross-examined by the defendant's trial counsel. (The defendant had waived his right to be present.) After the hearing, the judge found that Soriano was close to the parking lot and had an unobstructed view, and, consequently, that the defendant had not been prejudiced by not knowing the exact spot from which Soriano made his observations. The judge again granted the Commonwealth's motion in limine. The defendant appealed the order granting the motion, and we allowed his application for direct appellate review. We conclude that the Commonwealth's motion should have been denied. Accordingly, we reverse and order a new trial.

We first give an account of the trial and the hearing after remand.

(a) The trial. At trial, Soriano testified that about 11:30 A.M. on October 13, 1983, he was dropped off at the corner of Walnut and Park Streets in Lawrence. Other officers were left to be called in when needed. Soriano placed himself in a "fixed location" to specifically observe an adjacent parking lot. He stated that he had a clear, unobstructed view of that parking lot. According to Soriano, there were only two people in the lot when he began his surveillance, Hispanic males working on an automobile parked in the middle of the lot at the Bromfield Street end. Later, at approximately 11:45 A.M., a 1968 Volvo automobile, which Soriano had observed earlier with the defendant driving, drove into the parking lot and backed up to a fence along the Walnut Street end.

Soriano testified that the defendant and another man, identified as David Carrion, got out of the automobile. The defendant walked to the rear, opened the trunk and took out a small plastic bag. He closed the trunk, went to the passenger-side rear tire, leaned down and placed the bag near that tire. Soriano stated that he observed "approximately four or five people at different times--but within a short period of time--come in, walk into the parking lot ... [and] talk to either Mr. Lugo or Mr. Carrion, [who] would immediately approach the individual." He testified that he saw the exchange of money. According to Soriano, "[t]he subject would give either Mr. Carrion or Mr. Lugo some money [and] [o]ne of them would go to the rear of the vehicle, lean down, take something out, go back towards the individual, and hand [it] over." Soriano stated that he was able to observe that the object handed over was blue. After each transaction, the defendant would go to the rear of the automobile, open the trunk and deposit the money. Soriano used a diagram of the area to depict the general area of the parking lot and nearby buildings and obstructions.

After five such transactions, Soriano communicated by radio with other officers who immediately drove to the lot. One of the officers testified that he went to the rear of the defendant's vehicle (at the passenger-side rear tire), reached underneath, and came out with a plastic bag which, upon subsequent chemical analysis, was found to contain heroin. The Volvo and its trunk were searched at some point and a wallet and money were seized from the trunk.

The defendant and one Angel Fernandez testified for the defense. The defendant denied any knowledge or association with drugs and stated that he had come to the Park Street area to see Jose Valentine for whom he occasionally worked. Valentine was not home but was expected back. The defendant stated that in order to use his time constructively while waiting for Valentine he returned to his vehicle and began replacing the vehicle's antenna with another antenna he had bought earlier. Because Valentine had not arrived by the time the defendant had finished replacing the antenna, the defendant testified that he began to pass the time talking with Fernandez and his brother about "mechanic" things.

According to the defendant, the police arrived somewhere between 11 and 11:30 A.M., by which time the parking lot was filled with people. The defendant stated that the sight of police sent almost everyone in the lot running in all directions. The defendant testified that one of the police officers detained him while the others searched the entire area. Among the officers was Soriano, whom the defendant knew. According to the defendant, eight months prior to the incident, while the defendant was driving his nephew to school, Soriano had stopped him, searched his vehicle, asserted that the defendant's brother was a drug dealer, and threatened to get the defendant too.

Fernandez corroborated the defendant's testimony as to the events in the parking lot. He testified that when the police came, the other people in the lot ran away, and that the police had conducted a general search of the area. Fernandez indicated that the police looked into garbage cans and other vehicles, suggesting, perhaps, that the officers conducting the search did not know exactly where to look.

Based on the testimony, the defendant's counsel argued to the jury that the parking lot allegedly under surveillance was a "hangout"; that there was a crowd of people there on the morning of October 13, 1987; that Soriano did not see any undisguised transfer of cash for packets as he had claimed; that the most Soriano had seen was suspicious activity obscured by people, trees, and buildings; and that based on suspicion only, Soriano, along with the other officers, had searched the area and detained the defendant, whom Soriano suspected of drug activity because the defendant's brother was a known drug dealer. Defense counsel supported these arguments with the points noted below, ¹ but the core of the defendant's claim--that Soriano could not have seen all that he said he saw, and that inconsistent statements that had been brought out in the course of the trial could not be explained away--found defense counsel speculating as to where Soriano might have been, rather than arguing from certain knowledge.

(b) Remand hearing. At the in camera hearing on remand, Soriano identified his location and again testified that from that location, he had a clear, unobstructed view of the defendant distributing drugs. During cross-examination by the defendant's counsel, however, inconsistencies surfaced in Soriano's testimony with respect to: (1) whether he had been let off at the corner of Walnut and Park Streets as he had previously claimed or at the corner of Bromfield and Park Streets; (2) whether his alleged surveillance location was the first house off Walnut Street or the second; (3) whether a fence at the Walnut Street end of the parking lot obscured his view because it was higher than the defendant's car; (4) whether he was only a few feet from the incident or was in fact as far away as fifty feet (Soriano conceded that the second house off Park Street on the Walnut Street side of the parking lot, one with no view of the defendant's car and one where the defendant argued at trial Soriano had to have been, if anywhere, would maybe have been forty to fifty feet from the defendant's car); and (5) whether he had observed the defendant place a bag under or near the left rear tire or the right rear tire.

Notwithstanding these discrepancies, and the inconsistencies brought out at trial, the judge concluded that "Sergeant Soriano had a clear and unobstructed view at close range and ... was able to see those things that he said he saw." Based on this finding, the judge concluded that the defendant had not been prejudiced by not knowing the exact surveillance location, and that the Commonwealth's interest in preventing disclosure outweighed the defendant's interest in knowing the location.

With this background in mind, we turn to the applicable law. As the Appeals Court opinion noted, counsel have accepted the existence of a so-called "surveillance location privilege" and recognize that it has been analogized to the well-established informer's privilege. Commonwealth v. Lugo, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 494, 497, 503 N.E.2d 974 (1987). Policy reasons comparable to those which favor the nondisclosure of an informer support the privilege to keep a surveillance location secret. Id. at 498, 503 N.E.2d 974.

In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60, 77 S.Ct. 623, 627, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957) the leading case in this area on the informer's privilege, the United States Supreme Court recognized that privileges of this type are limited by a fundamental requirement of fairness. In general, "[w]here ... disclosure ... is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way." Id. at 60-61, 77 S.Ct. at 628. The Court in Roviaro...