Com. v. Macias

• Decision Date: 14 June 1999
• Citation: 711 N.E.2d 130,429 Mass. 698
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Francisco MACIAS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 130

711 N.E.2d 130

429 Mass. 698

COMMONWEALTH v. Francisco MACIAS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Norfolk.

Argued May 7, 1999.

Decided June 14, 1999.

William T. Harrington, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.

Peter M. Onek, Committee for Public Counsel Services, Boston, for the defendant.

Present: WILKINS, C.J., ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY, FRIED, MARSHALL, & IRELAND, JJ.

FRIED, J.

The Commonwealth appeals from an order of a Superior Court judge allowing the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of the defendant's apartment on the ground that the assistant clerk-magistrate who issued the warrant did not have sufficient basis to dispense with the "knock and announce" requirement. We affirm the order of the Superior Court.

I

On March 31, 1998, the Brookline police department applied for a warrant to search an apartment in a multi-unit building for evidence of cocaine and drug paraphernalia. The bases for the warrant, as set out in the affidavit of a police detective were that: (1) officers of the Brookline police department had learned from their counterparts in Boston that two cocaine dealers had moved from Boston to the apartment; and (2) an undercover officer had, on three separate occasions during the week preceding the execution of the warrant, bought an amount of cocaine from an occupant of the apartment. ¹

The penultimate paragraph of the affidavit in support of the application for the search warrant seeks permission to dispense with the knock and announce requirement:

"We are requesting a 'no knock warrant' due to the fact that the suspect's apartment faces the street and the front door is readily visible from the window of apartment # 29. Police will have to enter the building through the front door, continue up the front stairs to the apartment. Also the observations of [the undercover officer] that cocaine is kept secreted in the kitchen stove which is in close proximity to the kitchen sink where the controlled substance could be disposed down the drain. The closet where additional cocaine had been kept is located next to the bathroom where the drugs could easily be disposed. Additionally, we may need to utilize [the undercover officer] inside the unit prior to executing the warrant so that we may need to execute the warrant as swiftly as possible."

On March 31, 1998, the assistant clerk-magistrate issued a warrant suspending the knock and announce requirement. The next day, police officers executed the search warrant at approximately 6:10 P.M. The officers did not knock and announce their presence before entering the apartment. Once inside, the officers seized cocaine, baggies, a scale, and other items associated with the drug trade. The defendant was arrested and charged with three indictments for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and one indictment for trafficking in excess of twenty-eight grams of cocaine.

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from the apartment on the ground that there was insufficient reason shown to justify dispensing with the knock and announce requirement. The motion judge allowed the defendant's motion, reasoning that the application for the search warrant failed to set forth sufficient reasons justifying the officers' entry into the apartment without first announcing their presence. A single justice of this court allowed the Commonwealth's application for interlocutory appeal. The Commonwealth's appeal was transmitted to the Appeals Court. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

II

A

The "knock and announce" rule, requiring that the police, prior to executing a search warrant, identify themselves and state their purpose, has long been part of our common law. ² See Commonwealth v. Antwine, 417 Mass. 637, 638, 632 N.E.2d 818 (1994) (holding that, as a general rule, the police "must knock, announce their identity, and state their purpose"); Commonwealth v. Scalise, 387 Mass. 413, 418 n. 5, 439 N.E.2d 818 (1982) (applying rule to search warrant as well as arrest warrant); Commonwealth v. Cundriff, 382 Mass. 137, 140-147, 415 N.E.2d 172 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 2054, 68 L.Ed.2d 353 (1981) (tracing roots of common-law knock and announce rule to Seventeenth Century England). Among the purposes of this rule are the protection of individual privacy interests and the desire to minimize the potential for violence or property damage. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n. 5, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997); Cundriff, supra at 140-141, 415 N.E.2d 172.

It is equally well established that "the failure of the police to make an announcement may sometimes be justified." Cundriff, supra at 140, 147 n. 15, 415 N.E.2d 172. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995); Antwine, supra at 639, 632 N.E.2d 818; Scalise, supra at 418, 439 N.E.2d 818. One ground justifying suspension of the knock and announce requirement is to avoid the potential destruction of evidence. The defendant contends that, in order to dispense with the knock and announce requirement, there must be probable cause to believe that, in the particular circumstances, evidence will be destroyed. The Commonwealth agrees that probable cause has been the Massachusetts common-law standard, but points out that the United States Supreme Court has recently held that the governing standard for determining whether the police are justified in executing a search warrant without first knocking and announcing their presence is one of reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. Compare Richards, supra at 394-395, 117 S.Ct. 1416, with Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 415 Mass. 447, 450, 614 N.E.2d 649 (1993), and Scalise, supra at 421-422, 439 N.E.2d 818. The Commonwealth contends that, because both the common-law knock and announce rule and its counterpart under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution derive from the same source, English common law, and implicate the same concerns, we should employ the standard that the Supreme Court has determined most appropriately balances the competing interests. Compare Wilson, supra at 930-936, 115 S.Ct. 1914 (discussing English common-law origins of knock and announce rule which is part of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness inquiry), with Cundriff, supra at 140-145, 415 N.E.2d 172 (tracing Massachusetts common-law knock and announce rule's basis to English common law). We see no reason, however, to depart from the rule we have previously followed.

The affidavit filed in support of the application for the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause (though it may have been sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion), based on the particular circumstances, to believe that the evidence would be destroyed. The mere fact that drugs are involved and that they are, by their nature, readily disposable or destructible, is insufficient to provide the necessary showing. See Richards, supra at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416; Rodriguez, supra at 450, 614 N.E.2d 649; Commonwealth v. Gomes, 408 Mass. 43, 45, 556 N.E.2d 100 (1990); Scalise, supra at 417, 421, 439 N.E.2d 818. In Richards, supra, the Supreme Court rejected the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's conclusion that exigent circumstances are always present in felony drug cases and that this interest always outweighs the concerns animating the knock and announce requirement. One example provided by the Court of a situation in which Wisconsin's blanket rule would be problematic was where the police "know that the drugs being searched for were of a type or in a location that made them impossible to destroy quickly." Richards, supra at 393, 117 S.Ct. 1416. The affidavit in support of the application for the search warrant indicates that, on each occasion that the undercover officer purchased cocaine from the defendant, it was packaged in small transparent bags for individual sale. ³ On each occasion the drugs were retrieved from a different location ⁴ and on two of the three occasions (the first and second) the undercover officer noted the presence of numerous such baggies. The affidavit notes the proximity of the oven storage area to the kitchen sink and that the closet from which cocaine was retrieved for the second purchase was next to the bathroom. The fact that the cocaine was individually packaged in baggies (some, if not all, tied) would greatly hinder any attempt to destroy or dispose of it in the kitchen sink. And the fact that the police knew that cocaine was stored in...