Com. v. Maguire

• Decision Date: 12 July 1978
• Citation: 375 Mass. 768,378 N.E.2d 445
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. John J. MAGUIRE. Suffolk
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 445

378 N.E.2d 445

375 Mass. 768

COMMONWEALTH v. John J. MAGUIRE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued April 3, 1978.

Decided July 12, 1978.

Thomas Hoffman, Boston, for defendant.

Michael J. Traft, Sp. Asst. Dist. Atty. (Paul A. Mishkin, Asst. Dist. Atty., with him), for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and BRAUCHER, KAPLAN, WILKINS and LIACOS, JJ.

LIACOS, Justice.

The grand jury for Suffolk County returned two indictments against the defendant. The first charged him with breaking and entering a dwelling house in the nighttime with intent to commit robbery, and with assault of the two inhabitants while armed with a knife. G.L. c. 266, § 14. The second indictment charged the defendant with armed robbery. G.L. c. 265, § 17. Following a trial in the Superior Court, Suffolk County, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged on both indictments. The defendant appealed pursuant to G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33G. The cases were transferred here from the Appeals Court on our allowance of the defendant's motion for direct appellate review. G.L. c. 211A, § 10(A). We find no error and affirm the judgments of the Superior Court.

The defendant assigns three errors, the first of which is waived because it was not argued in the defendant's brief. Commonwealth v. Martin, 358 Mass. 282, 283, 264 N.E.2d 366 (1970). The second assignment attacks the judge's instructions to the jury on the elements of self-defense, asserting that the charge effectively removed that defense from the consideration of the jury, thereby depriving the defendant of his right to a fair trial. To consider this claim we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. Commonwealth v. Peterson, 257 Mass. 473, 477, 154 N.E.2d 260 (1926). The defendant's version of the incident giving rise to the indictments is as follows.

The defendant lived with his brother on the third floor of an apartment building. One John Parsons (Parsons) and his wife lived below them on the second floor. About 11:30 P.M. on February 4, 1975, the defendant and his brother were dressed in their underwear, preparing to go to bed following a party or gathering with friends. In response to a loud knock the defendant and his brother opened their apartment door and discovered Parsons standing there with a rifle pointing at them. ¹ Parsons complained about the noise at the party and threatened to shoot the brothers, whereupon they lunged at Parsons. Parsons dropped the rifle, started down the stairs, and called back to the brothers: "That's all right, I have more downstairs." ² The two brothers proceeded down the stairs after Parsons. ³ The brothers reached Parsons's door just as it shut behind him. The defendant's brother kicked the door open, entered the apartment, and discovered Parsons on the telephone. Parsons's wife was also in the apartment. The brothers hit Parsons and shoved him into the bathroom. The defendant armed himself with a knife found in the kitchen, and used it to cut the telephone line. The brothers opened a display cabinet by unscrewing its hinges, removing four rifles, a handgun, and a locked box. They then returned to the bathroom where Parsons lay unconscious, possibly injured as a result of hitting his head on the bathtub after being pushed into the bathroom. The brothers placed Parsons on a bed and covered him with a blanket. They then left the apartment, taking the guns, a Knights of Columbus ceremonial sword, a skinning knife, and a locked box with them. The locked box contained four $50 bonds, two $100 bonds, and $140 in Canadian money.

1. The claim of self-defense at trial was based on the defendant's theory that he was entitled to have the jury instructed that if they found that the defendant and his brother ⁴ reasonably believed it necessary to pursue Parsons, break into his apartment, and use reasonable force to disarm him so as to prevent a further threat of assault, the defendant should be found not guilty.

The judge charged the jury: "There has been some suggestion to you based upon some evidence that is before you of the question of self defense. Now, again, I want to remind you people that you are the finders of the facts; but I would instruct you that if you find in this situation the facts that this man had gone back into his home, regardless of what had happened prior, had shut the door and that these defendants had pursued him, for the purpose of so-called self defense, based upon the facts as you find them, you would have to find in order for that to be a legitimate self defense that these people were in fact back to the wall, they had no other alternative, that they were in some immediate danger and were in fact threatened by this particular individual. That is your decision to make with reference to these facts" (emphasis added). ⁵

The defendant argues that the judge's charge left the jury with no choice but to reject his claim of self-defense. ⁶ The defendant argues that the cases require only that the person claiming self-defense have a "reasonable belief" that no other means would suffice, or that "no proper means" of avoiding combat exist; whereas the judge required that the jury conclude that the defendant and his brother, in fact, "had no other alternative" but to pursue Parsons into his apartment. Admitting that alternatives were available to him such as calling the police or remaining in his apartment and locking the door the defendant maintains that the lack of qualification in the charge effectively removed the issue of self-defense from the jury. Another aspect of the defendant's argument makes a similar point, emphasizing the difference between a "reasonable apprehension" of harm, as required by the cases, and the judge's instruction to the jury that the defendant and his brother must have been "in some immediate danger and were in fact threatened." The essence of his argument is to treat the facts of these cases as involving a problem of "retreat." See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Gagne, 367 Mass. 519, 326 N.E.2d 907 (1975); Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 367 Mass. 508, 326 N.E.2d 880 (1975), and cases cited therein; Beale, Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 Harv.L.Rev. 567, 580 (1903). In fact, this is a case where the judge properly could have refused as matter of law to give any charge on self-defense. Monize v. Begaso, 190 Mass. 87, 76 N.E. 460 (1906). See Commonwealth v. Peterson, 257 Mass. 473, 154 N.E. 260 (1926).

It is the rule that, where the issue of self-defense has been sufficiently raised by the evidence, the defendant is entitled to an instruction which places on the Commonwealth the burden of disproving the factor of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Collins, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- ^a, 373 N.E.2d 969 (1978); Commonwealth v. Stokes, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- ^b, 374 N.E.2d 87 (1978); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. ---, --- ^c, 352 N.E.2d 203 (1976). Cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (State must prove beyond reasonable doubt absence of heat of passion on sudden provocation when issue properly presented). But such an instruction need not be given where there was insufficient evidence to support a theory of self-defense. Commonwealth v. Lacasse, 365 Mass. 271, 273, 310 N.E.2d 605, 606 (1974) ("Before a defendant is entitled to an instruction on self-defence, there must be evidence that he first took advantage of every opportunity to avoid the combat"). See Commonwealth v. DeCaro, 359 Mass. 388, 390, 269 N.E.2d 673 (1971). Thus, it might be said, and has often been held, that the right of self-defense ordinarily cannot be claimed by a person who provokes or initiates an assault unless that person withdraws in good faith from the conflict and announces his intention to retire. Annot., Withdrawal, after Provocation of Conflict, as Reviving Right of Self-Defense, 55 A.L.R.3d 1000, 1003 (1974). Similarly, it has been held that the right to claim self-defense may be forfeited by one who commits an armed robbery, even if excessive force is used by the intended victim or by any person intervening to prevent the crime or apprehend the robber. Wilson v. State, 473 P.2d 633, 636 (Alaska 1970). See People v. Dillard, 5 Ill.App.3d 896, 284 N.E.2d 490 (1972) (robber has no right to kill his victim to save his own life).

We think the present cases present a situation in which the defendant had no right to claim the protection of the doctrine of self-defense with relation to his activities inside Parsons's apartment, and thus no right to an instruction on self-defense. It is undisputed that the defendant and his brother pursued Parsons down the stairs toward Parsons's apartment, and that Parsons had successfully retreated behind the closed door of his apartment. It thus cannot be disputed that, following their forcible entry, the brothers were trespassers in Parsons's home. The trespass was not merely technical, or made out of necessity, but was the result of an unbridled instinct to pursue and neutralize an adversary without regard to legal or physical barriers presented by the apartment door. But cf. 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 132 (1944); 55 A.L.R.3d, supra at 1016, § 6(d). Cf. Commonwealth v. Crowley, 165 Mass. 569, 570, 43 N.E. 509 (1896). We do not think that the right of self-defense need extend so far as to justify pursuit onto the adversary's property. ⁷ "The control of man's destructive and aggressive impulses is one of the great unsolved problems of our society. Our rules of law should discourage the unnecessary use of physical force between man and man. Any rule which promotes rather than inhibits...