Com. v. Mandile

• Decision Date: 23 April 1986
• Citation: 492 N.E.2d 74,397 Mass. 410
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Richard A. MANDILE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 74

492 N.E.2d 74

397 Mass. 410

COMMONWEALTH v. Richard A. MANDILE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Hampden.

Argued Feb. 3, 1986.

Decided April 23, 1986.

Charles K. Stephenson, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.

William M. Bennett, Springfield (Wendy Sibbison, Northampton, with him), for defendant.

Before WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

This case is before the court on an interlocutory appeal from an order by a Superior Court judge suppressing certain statements made by the defendant to law enforcement officials after his arrest on January 25, 1985. The defendant had filed a motion to suppress asserting that the statements were not voluntary because they were induced by assurances of protection and leniency. After hearing testimony from several witnesses, the judge ordered the statements suppressed. The Commonwealth was granted leave to appeal from the order of the Superior Court, pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 15 (b)(2), 378 Mass. 882 (1979). A single justice reported the appeal to the full court. We reverse.

The motion judge found the following facts. On January 25, 1985, at 2:10 P.M., State Trooper Kevin Murphy placed the defendant under arrest for unlawful possession of ammunition and advised him of his constitutional rights. At 2:52 P.M., State Trooper David Kenney arrived on the scene and arrested the defendant on another charge, advised the defendant of his rights, and asked him if he understood those rights. The defendant stated that he did. En route to the police station (where he arrived at approximately 3:30 P.M.), the defendant stated that in the trunk of his car there was a firearm which had been stolen during a house break, and that he did not shoot anyone. He also stated that he wanted to talk to Trooper Kenney when he arrived. At the station the defendant met with Trooper Kenney in a private office and informed him that he could provide information concerning the death of one Carl Valiton, but only on the condition that he be given leniency, be granted immunity from prosecution with respect to that death, and be placed into a witness protection program. Trooper Kenney informed Detective Lieutenant George W. Powers, Jr., of the defendant's demands. The defendant, without promise or inducement, told Detective Powers that he had picked up an unidentified man, driven him to a house in Buckland, watched the man enter the house and return to the car saying that he had just killed someone. After the defendant repeated his demands, Detective Powers made no promises or inducements, but instead said he would convey the demands to the district attorney. Detective Powers discussed the situation with the first assistant district attorney and informed the defendant that no promises would be made. ¹ Later that day, but before 4:15 P.M., Trooper Kenney discussed the situation with the first assistant district attorney, and then told the defendant that there would be no discussion of leniency unless he showed good faith by revealing the whereabouts of the murder weapon. At approximately 4:15 P.M. the defendant agreed, but a two-hour search of the area that the defendant indicated would yield the weapon was fruitless. ² The defendant was returned to the station, at about 7 P.M., and Trooper Kenney again informed the defendant that the district attorney would make no promises of leniency. The defendant spoke with his attorney by telephone, for about five minutes, shortly afterwards. At 7:45 P.M., after being advised of his constitutional rights and waiving them in writing, the defendant gave a detailed statement, which was tape recorded.

The judge found that during the questioning the defendant was not under the influence of alcohol or narcotics and was not incoherent, emotional, or detached from reality. The defendant is middle-aged, has a ninth grade education, and has had a lengthy involvement with the criminal justice system.

The judge held that all statements made after Trooper Kenney informed the defendant that any discussion of leniency must be preceded by his providing reliable information were involuntary and thus should be suppressed. He held that the defendant had "crossed the Rubicon" in his attempt to show good faith by leading the police on a search of the banks of the Connecticut River, and "had already made a fatal commitment based on a promise--however slight." The judge further stated, "The statement ... given so soon after the ineffectual attempt to show good faith [leads] one to believe the defendant was now coerced by circumstances, to attempt to salvage his deal."

In reviewing a judge's determination regarding a knowing waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness, we "grant substantial deference to the judge's ultimate conclusions and we will not reject a judge's subsidiary findings if they are warranted by the evidence." Commonwealth v. Benoit, 389 Mass. 411, [397 Mass. 413] 419, 451 N.E.2d 101 (1983). Commonwealth v. Williams, 388 Mass. 846, 851, 448 N.E.2d 1114 (1983). Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 144-145, 430 N.E.2d 1198, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137, 102 S.Ct. 2967, 73 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1982). However, we will make an independent inquiry "to ascertain whether the judge properly applied the law in a given case." Commonwealth v. Benoit, supra. Voluntariness turns on the "totality of the circumstances," including promises or other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the defendant's age, education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or the police), and the details of the interrogation, including the recitation of Miranda warnings. See id.; Commonwealth v. Williams, supra, 388 Mass. at 852-854; 448 N.E.2d 1114; Commonwealth v. Wilborne, 382 Mass. 241, 252, 415 N.E.2d 192 (1981); Commonwealth v. Chung, 378 Mass. 451, 456-458, 392 N.E.2d 1015 (1979); Commonwealth v. Meehan, 377 Mass. 552, 563-565, 387 N.E.2d 527 (1979), cert. dismissed, 445 U.S. 39, 100 S.Ct. 1092, 63 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); State v. Jordan, 114 Ariz. 452, 454, 561 P.2d 1224 (1976), judgment vacated as to death penalty, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3138, 57 L.Ed.2d 1157 (1978); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Ky.1970), cert. denied sub nom. Brown v. Kentucky, 404 U.S. 837, 92 S.Ct. 126, 30 L.Ed.2d 70 (1971). Of course, before any admissions or confessions can be admitted in evidence, those statements must be proved to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Tavares, supra, 385 Mass. at 151-152, 430 N.E.2d 1198. See Commonwealth v. Parham, 390 Mass. 833, 838 & n. 3, 460 N.E.2d 589 (1984). Compare Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 626, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972) (admissibility under Federal Constitution requires such a showing only by a preponderance of the evidence).

The findings of the judge...