Com. v. Matos

• Decision Date: 26 February 1996
• Citation: 543 Pa. 449,672 A.2d 769
• Parties: , 64 USLW 2585 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Danny MATOS, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Andrew McFADDEN, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Richard CARROLL, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 769

672 A.2d 769

543 Pa. 449, 64 USLW 2585

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Danny MATOS, Appellant.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Andrew McFADDEN, Appellant.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Richard CARROLL, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Oct. 19, 1994.

Decided Feb. 26, 1996.

[543 Pa. 451] John W. Packel, Helen A. Marino, Philadelphia, for D. Matos, R. Carroll.

Catherine Marshall, Ronald Eisenberg, Hugh J. Burns, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth.

John W. Packel, Ellen T. Greenlee, Helen A. Marino, Philadelphia, for A. McFadden.

Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.

MAJORITY OPINION

CAPPY, Justice. ¹

The three instant appeals were consolidated for oral argument and will be disposed of together in this opinion since they raise a single identical issue; namely, whether contraband discarded by a person fleeing a police officer are the fruits of an illegal "seizure" where the officer possessed neither "probable cause" to arrest the individual nor reasonable suspicion to stop the individual and conduct a Terry frisk. ² In each case, we reverse the Superior Court and hold that the discarded contraband must be suppressed.

The relevant facts of each case shall be set forth briefly.

Matos v. Commonwealth, J-198A

In this case, on April 8, 1991, two Philadelphia police officers responded to a radio broadcast that unknown persons were selling

narcotics in the vicinity of Reese Street. They approached a group of three men in a nearby playground who fled as the officers approached. During the ensuing chase, one of the officers saw Appellant Matos discard a plastic bag. The officer retrieved the bag. Matos was then apprehended and the bag was discovered to have contained 12 vials of [543 Pa. 452] cocaine. Five additional vials of cocaine were found in Matos pocket after he was seized by the officer. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County suppressed the introduction of the vials of cocaine at Matos' trial on drug charges, but the Superior Court reversed.

McFadden v. Commonwealth, J-198B

On October 27, 1990, two Philadelphia police officers in full uniform and in a marked patrol car approached Appellant McFadden, who looked in their direction and promptly ran away. One of the officers chased him for a short distance and, before being caught, McFadden tossed a handgun into the bushes. He was subsequently arrested after the gun was recovered and charged with carrying an unlicensed firearm on a public street. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County suppressed the evidence of the handgun at trial, but the Superior Court reversed.

Carroll v. Commonwealth, J-198C

On November 22, 1989, two uniformed Philadelphia police officers in a marked police vehicle saw two men standing on the sidewalk of Olive Street. Both officers exited their patrol car and one of the officers spoke to one of the two men. The second man, Appellant Carroll, stood with his hands in his jacket pockets. The other officer, with his hand over his gun, approached Carroll and started to ask him to take his hands out of his pockets. Carroll turned and fled into an alley, where he promptly slipped and fell on some debris. As he fell, he was being followed by one of the officers, who saw two broken tinted heat sealed packets containing a white substance fall from Carroll's pocket onto the debris in the alley. The pursuing officer approached Carroll, who was still face down in the debris, drew his gun, and told Carroll to stay on the ground with his hands behind his back. Carroll was then arrested. The officer searched Carroll's coat pockets and found 45 additional brown tinted packets. At his trial for possession of drugs and possession of drugs with intent to deliver, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia suppressed the evidence of the drugs, but the Superior Court reversed.

DISCUSSION

The issue in each of these cases is whether the pursuit by the police officer was a seizure. If it was not a seizure then the contraband was abandoned property, lawfully found by the officer. However, if the pursuit was a seizure, then the abandonment was coerced, and the officer must demonstrate either probable cause to make the seizure or a reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk.

Appellants herein concede that under Fourth Amendment principles as set forth in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), a seizure did not occur. Appellants assert, however, that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution a seizure did occur. Accordingly, we must now determine if Pennsylvania should adopt the reasoning expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Hodari D., or continue to interpret our State Constitution as affording a suspect a greater degree of protection from coercive state action.

Before beginning our review under the Pennsylvania Constitution, we will look at the specifics of the decision in Hodari D. In Hodari D., two police officers (identified by their jackets as police) were patrolling in an unmarked car in a high crime area. They approached a group of youths who fled. The accused youth discarded what appeared to be a small rock before he was tackled and handcuffed by one of the police officers. The "rock" turned out to be crack cocaine. In a 7-2 decision, Justice Scalia held that even if (as was conceded by the State of California) the officers' pursuit had not been based upon reasonable suspicion, the drugs discarded were not the illegal fruit of a "seizure" of his person under the Fourth Amendment. The majority based this conclusion upon its reasoning that an arrest (the quintessential "seizure" of a person under the Fourth Amendment) requires either the application of physical force with lawful authority or submission to the assertion of authority and, under the facts of Hodari D., the accused had not been touched by the pursuing officer at the time he discarded the drugs. Moreover, assuming that the police officers' pursuit constituted a show of authority enjoining the accused to halt, the accused did not comply and therefore was not "seized" until one of the officers tackled him. In passing, Justice Scalia clearly notes that the State of California conceded that the police in Hodari D. did not even have "reasonable suspicion" to stop the accused under Terry, let alone probable cause to arrest.

As we stated in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991), "we are not bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret similar (yet distinct) federal constitutional provisions." 526 Pa. at 388, 586 A.2d at 894. Rather,

it is both important and necessary that we undertake an independent analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution, each time a provision of that fundamental document is implicated. Although we may accord weight to federal decisions where they "are found to be logically persuasive and well reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees," [citations omitted] we are free to reject the conclusions of the United States Supreme Court so long as we remain faithful to the minimum guarantees established by the United States Constitution.

526 Pa. at 389, 586 A.2d at 894-895. We find it most instructive to continue our analysis of the seizure question raised herein in accordance with the four-pronged test set forth in Edmunds. ³

The first two prongs of the Edmunds test require us to examine the text of the constitutional article and its historical application. Although the language of Article I, Section 8 is essentially the same as that in the Fourth Amendment, ⁴ as this Court stated in Edmunds:

Although the wording of the Pennsylvania Constitution is similar in language to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution [footnote omitted], we are not bound to interpret the two provisions as if they were mirror images, even where the text is similar or identical [citation omitted]. Thus, we must next examine the history of Article I, Section 8, in order to draw meaning from that provision ...

526 Pa. at 391-392, 586 A.2d at 896. Our review of the historical context and application of Article I, Section 8 reveals that this Court has traditionally regarded Article I, Section 8 as providing different, and broader, protections than its federal counterpart.

In Edmunds, this Court thoroughly examined the history of Article I, Section 8, and noted that this constitutional provision had its origin prior to the Fourth Amendment, in Clause 10 of the original Constitution of 1776. The Court also recognized that the modern version of Article I, Section 8 has remained untouched for over 200 years, and examined this significance:

[T]he survival of the language now employed in Article I, Section 8 through over 200 years of profound change in other areas demonstrates that the paramount concern for privacy first adopted as part of our organic law in 1776 continues to enjoy the mandate of the people of this Commonwealth.

526 Pa. at 394, 586 A.2d at 897, citing Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 65, 470 A.2d 457, 467 (1983). In Edmunds, the Court reviewed the history of Article I, Section 8 to determine whether the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule was consistent with the protections afforded by Article I, Section 8. After its review of the development of Article I, Section 8, the Court stated:

The history of Article I, Section 8, thus indicated that the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment, as articulated by the majority in [United States v.] Leon, [468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ].

526 Pa. at 394, 586 A.2d at 897. "[A]s this Court has stated repeatedly in interpreting Article I, Section 8, that provision is meant to embody a strong...