Com. v. Matos

• Decision Date: 17 April 1985
• Citation: 476 N.E.2d 608,394 Mass. 563
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. John MATOS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 608

476 N.E.2d 608

394 Mass. 563

COMMONWEALTH v. John MATOS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 4, 1985.

Decided April 17, 1985.

Brownlow M. Speer, Boston, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for defendant.

Michael J. Traft, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

The defendant appealed his convictions of possession of burglarious implements and breaking and entering in the nighttime of an apartment in the North End of Boston. ¹ The Appeals Court reversed the judgments of conviction because the jury instructions did not comply with Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 584-585, 433 N.E.2d 425 (1982). Commonwealth v. Matos, 18 Mass.App. 212, 464 N.E.2d 402 (1984). We granted the Commonwealth's application for further appellate review. G.L. c. 211A, § 11. Mass.R.App.P. 27.1(f), as amended, 367 Mass. 922 (1975). We agree with the Appeals Court that the judge's denial of the defendant's request for further instructions on consciousness of guilt requires reversal.

At trial the Commonwealth offered evidence that the police observed the defendant minutes after the discovery of the burglary "in a sitting-crouching position" beneath a fire escape which gave access to the burglarized apartment. The officer shone a light on the defendant and "ordered [the defendant] to stay where he was." The defendant got up and ran to the rear of the alley in which the fire escape was located and "attempted to scale the fence." The defendant was seized and placed under arrest. At trial the Commonwealth claimed that the defendant's flight indicated consciousness of guilt.

The defendant filed written requests for jury instructions, see Mass.R.Crim.P. 24(b), 378 Mass. 895-896 (1979), containing language suggested in Commonwealth v. Toney, supra, 385 Mass. at 584-585 & n. 6, 433 N.E.2d 425. The judge denied the requests and did not instruct the jurors on the caution to be exercised before considering flight as consciousness of guilt. ² After the instructions but before the jury retired, the defendant requested that the judge remedy his omission from the jury instructions of the previously requested language from Commonwealth v. Toney, supra at 584-585 & n. 6, 433 N.E.2d 425, concerning flight as consciousness of guilt. The judge also denied the defendant's request for additional instructions. Although defense counsel did not formally object to the judge's refusal to give the requested instructions, see Mass.R.Crim.P. 24(b), he brought his request for the additional instructions on consciousness of guilt to the judge's attention before the jury retired to deliberate. "It is a fundamental rule of practice that where a party alleges error in a charge he must bring the alleged error to the attention of the judge in specific terms in order to give the judge an opportunity to rectify the error, if any." Commonwealth v. Reid, 384 Mass. 247, 258, 424 N.E.2d 495 (1981), quoting Commonwealth v. McDuffee, 379 Mass. 353, 357, 398 N.E.2d 463 (1979). See Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 150, 156 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 880, 82 S.Ct. 130, 7 L.Ed.2d 80 (1961). The defendant brought his request for instructions on consciousness of guilt to the judge's attention. The judge denied the defendant's request for further instructions on consciousness of guilt. We conclude that the defendant sufficiently complied with Mass.R.Crim.P. 24(b) so that the correctness of the judge's refusal to give the requested instructions is properly before us. Any other result would exalt form over substance.

Apart from the evidence of flight as consciousness of guilt, the evidence against Matos was sufficient but not overwhelming. The Commonwealth relied on evidence of flight in proving its case and as the Appeals Court noted, in its closing, the Commonwealth "made much of the defendant's attempt to avoid apprehension." Commonwealth v. Matos, supra, 18 Mass.App. at 215, 464 N.E.2d 402. The judge did not give the cautionary instructions suggested in Toney. Further, the instructions which were given on consciousness of guilt did not inform the jurors that they could not convict the defendant solely on evidence of flight as consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Toney, supra, 385 Mass. at 585, 433 N.E.2d 425; Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196, 201, 207 N.E.2d 276 (1965). In these circumstances, we think that the judge erred in not giving fuller...