Com. v. McClease

• Decision Date: 28 March 2000
• Citation: 750 A.2d 320
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Anthony McCLEASE, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

750 A.2d 320

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Anthony McCLEASE, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued February 29, 2000.

Filed March 28, 2000.

Kevin Leckerman, Doylestown, for appellant.

Stephen B. Harris, Asst. Dist. Atty., Warington, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before McEWEN, President Judge, and JOHNSON and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.

JOHNSON, J.:

¶ 1 In this appeal we consider whether an exchange between a police officer and a member of the public may rise from the level of a mere encounter to that of a seizure absent evidence that the purportedly seized person intended to leave the scene prior to or during the exchange with the police officer. We hold that notwithstanding the absence of evidence to establish a person's intent to leave the scene, a seizure occurs when, under all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Therefore, we reverse the suppression court's order that denied Anthony McClease's motion to suppress because the trial court erroneously concluded that the exchange between McClease and the police did not rise to the level of a seizure at the time the police ordered McClease to remain in his vehicle.

¶ 2 McClease appeals from the order denying his post-sentence motion following his convictions for possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, possession of a small amount of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30)-(32) (respectively). McClease alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence upon which his convictions were based because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.

When we review the ruling of a suppression court, we must determine whether its factual findings are supported by the record. Where the defendant challenges an adverse ruling of the suppression court, we will consider only the evidence for the prosecution and whatever evidence for the defense which is uncontradicted on the record as a whole; if there is support on the record, we are bound by the facts as found by the suppression court....

Commonwealth v. Holt, 711 A.2d 1011, 1014 (Pa.Super.1998).

¶ 3 Viewed in light of the foregoing standard, the facts of this case are as follows. On October 24, 1998, shortly after midnight, Detective Randy Morris and Officer Joseph Moors of the Bristol Borough Police Department drove their police cruiser down Spruce Street, a residential street within their jurisdiction. The car, although unmarked, was readily identifiable as a police cruiser. Spruce Street is a narrow one-way street with parking on both sides and a narrow travel lane down the middle. As the officers drove down Spruce Street, they observed McClease sitting alone in his vehicle. McClease's vehicle was legally parked under a railroad overpass. The overpass causes this part of Spruce Street to be darker than other parts of the street. The police had received complaints about ongoing illegal activities around this part of Spruce Street including persons drinking alcohol in public, persons possessing and displaying weapons, and persons involved in drug transactions.

¶ 4 McClease's vehicle was parked on the left side of the road. Detective Morris, who was driving, noticed that McClease's head was lowered as if he was looking at his hands. As the police vehicle passed McClease's vehicle, McClease raised his head and looked at Detective Morris. As McClease did so, his eyebrows raised, his eyes got wider, and he immediately lowered his body. Upon observing these movements, Detective Morris stopped the police cruiser and backed it up until it was abreast with McClease's vehicle. Detective Morris and Officer Moors exited their vehicle and approached McClease's vehicle.

¶ 5 Detective Morris approached McClease's vehicle by rounding the trunk and coming up the left side. Detective Morris testified that while he was walking around the rear of the vehicle, he noticed McClease spin his body "to raise to come out of the vehicle" at which point Detective Morris "ordered him ... `Police Officer. Stay in your vehicle.'" Detective Morris testified that McClease then responded that he "`was getting ready to leave,' or words to that effect." The trial court found that as Detective Morris approached, McClease opened his door causing the interior lights to illuminate. Following Detective Morris's order, McClease remained in the car, but attempted discreetly to jettison a marijuana filled cigar [hereinafter "the blunt"] under the door. Detective Morris observed McClease's hand below the door and ordered him to put his hands in the vehicle where Detective Morris could observe them.

¶ 6 Upon further approaching the vehicle, Detective Morris noticed an open container of alcohol in the vehicle and the blunt on the street below the driver's door. Detective Morris then ordered McClease out of the vehicle so that Detective Morris could pat McClease down. McClease complied. During the course of this exchange, Detective Morris noticed a large sum of cash in the vehicle's ashtray. The pat-down search revealed no weapons, and the officers permitted McClease to stand, without physical restraint, next to his vehicle. While standing, McClease volunteered: "You can check the whole car officers." A search of the trunk yielded 39 bags of crack cocaine and 2 bags of marijuana. Upon seizure of these items, McClease was arrested.

¶ 7 Prior to trial, McClease filed a motion to suppress the blunt, the cash in the ashtray, and the bags containing the crack and marijuana. The motion was denied. Following his convictions, McClease was sentenced to a term of no less than one year's imprisonment nor more than two years' imprisonment and a fine of $5,000. The court denied McClease's post-sentence motion, and McClease filed this appeal.

¶ 8 McClease raises the following question for our review:

Did the Common Pleas Court err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress physical evidence seized following an unlawful investigatory detention where the police lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity being afoot, where the evidence seized by the police was abandoned as a direct and proximate result of Appellant's illegal detention by the police, and where the evidence seized from Appellant's vehicle was tainted because Appellant's consent to search the vehicle occurred after his illegal detention by the police officers?

¶ 9 "Our standard of review of a denial of suppression is whether the record supports the trial court's factual findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are free from error." Commonwealth v. Collazo, 692 A.2d 1116, 1118 (Pa.Super.1997). "Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts." In the Interest of D.M., 743 A.2d 422, 424 (Pa.1999).

¶ 10 The crux of McClease's argument is that Detective Morris lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)

; In the Interest of D.M., 743 A.2d 422. McClease's argument is based on both federal and state constitutional grounds. "The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Pennsylvania Constitution is broader than that under the federal Constitution." Commonwealth v. Jackson, 548 Pa. 484, 698 A.2d 571, 573 (1997). However, "[i]n determining whether reasonable suspicion exists for a Terry stop, the inquiry is the same under either Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution or the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution." In the Interest of D.M., 743 A.2d at 425. Accordingly, though some federal precedents guide us in our decision here, they do not compel the result we reach. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983).

¶ 11 Our Supreme Court has delineated three types of conduct between a police officer and a member of the public:

The first of these is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an "investigative detention" must be supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause.

In the Interest of S.J., 551 Pa. 637, 713 A.2d 45, 47 n. 3 (1998) (citations omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285, 662 A.2d 1043, 1047-48 (1995)).

¶ 12 In the instant case, the trial court determined that the initial exchange between Detective Morris and McClease was a "mere encounter" that did not rise to the level of an "investigative detention." The court concluded that the officers' detention of McClease after Detective Morris discovered the blunt and the open container of alcohol was supported by probable cause. However, McClease argues that the "mere encounter" rose to an "investigative detention" before Detective Morris discovered the blunt and the open container of alcohol. He argues that an "investigative detention" commenced upon Detective Morris's command: "Police Officer. Stay in your vehicle." Consequently, we must determine whether it was error for the trial court to reach the legal conclusion that at all times leading up to Detective Morris's discovery of the blunt and the container of alcohol the interaction between the police and McClease remained a "mere encounter."

¶ 13 In determining whether a "mere encounter" has risen to the level of an "investigative detention," the focus of our inquiry is on whether a "seizure" of the person has occurred. Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 552 Pa. 484, 715 A.2d 1117, 1120 (199...