Com. v. McDaniels

Decision Date13 October 2005
Citation886 A.2d 682
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Audrey McDANIELS, Appellee.
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., and Max Kaufman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Com., appellant.

Samuel C. Stretton, W. Chester, for appellee.

BEFORE: MUSMANNO, MONTEMURO1 and KELLY, JJ.

OPINION BY MONTEMURO, J.:

¶ 1 In this highly unusual Commonwealth appeal, we are asked to determine the validity of a jury verdict of not guilty as to a charge of third degree murder, when the jury had originally declared that it was unable to reach a verdict on both the third degree murder charge and an additional involuntary manslaughter charge, the original verdict had been recorded, and the jury discharged. Because we find that the court's dismissal of the jury's original verdict was improper, we reverse and remand for reinstatement of the charge of third degree murder.

¶ 2 In October of 2002, Appellee was arrested in connection with the death of her stepson, Brahim Dukes. Following an autopsy, Dukes' death was ruled a homicide by starvation and dehydration. Appellee was tried before a jury on charges of first degree murder, third degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the trial judge granted a judgment of acquittal on the first degree murder count. On July 12, 2004, the jury was charged on third degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. The next day, after the jurors had deliberated for some time, the jury sent a note to the judge stating that they were hopelessly deadlocked. The jury was then called into the courtroom and the following exchange took place:

THE COURT: Was there an agreement on any of the two charges?
THE FOREMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: There was?
THE FOREMAN: Yes.
THE COURT: What was the agreement?
THE FOREMAN: That we had agreement on involuntary manslaughter —
JUROR: No.
THE FOREMAN: I mean third degree, I am sorry.
THE COURT: You agreed on third degree?
JUROR: No.
THE FOREMAN: No, we did not agree, I am sorry.
THE COURT: You did not agree. And you did not agree on involuntary?
THE FOREMAN: We had — some did agree on involuntary.
THE COURT: All right. The point is, is there any possibility of a verdict in this case?
THE FOREMAN: At this point, Your Honor, I don't think so.
THE COURT: Okay.
Well, I asked you before, and I will ask you again, if any further deliberations will prove fruitful I will send you back. But if you don't think so then we'll just end it right here. Does anybody on the jury think that further deliberations will be worthwhile? No response.
THE COURT CRIER: For the record, there is nothing on the verdict sheet.
THE COURT: All right. Okay. This case will have to be retried before another jury. That's the problem.
As the foreman, you are telling me there is no hope for a decision in this case?
THE FOREMAN: No, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. With that, the jury will be discharged. And I thank you for trying, and thank you for your services. This case will have to be retried on another date before probably a different jury, maybe even a different Judge. But thank you anyway. With that, you are free to talk about the case when you leave.
(Jurors are excused).
THE COURT: We'll declare it a mistrial.

(N.T., 7/13/04, at 7-9).

¶ 3 Defense counsel then requested to speak to the jurors and the judge replied that he had "no problem with that at all." (Id. at 9-10). First, however, counsel moved for bail. Following a short bail hearing, defense counsel once again asked the judge if he could speak to the jury. The judge again gave his permission, and defense counsel, the prosecutor and the trial judge all proceeded into the jury room. What transpired in that room is not transcribed. However, the trial judge described the events as follows:

On the marker-board in the jury room, the jury had recorded its verdicts for manslaughter and third-degree murder. According to the information on the marker-board, the jury was unanimous in finding that the defendant was not guilty of third-degree murder but was not unanimous on the manslaughter charge.
The judge asked the jurors if this was their verdict and they said yes. The jurors had become confused about how they were supposed to render a verdict and thought that they were required to find on third-degree murder and manslaughter jointly. It was the jury's unanimous decision that the defendant was not guilty of third degree murder. The jury was deadlocked on manslaughter. Therefore, the jury had not delivered its true verdict in court.

(Trial Ct. Op. at 1).

¶ 4 Following this discovery, the trial judge reassembled the jury in the courtroom.

THE COURT: On the record. After the jury went to the jury room there was a conversation concerning the understanding of my question, and the jury explained that they did not fully understand what I was asking. And that in fact, they all had agreed that it was not guilty as to third degree murder. The only thing that they could not agree on is whether or not it was involuntary manslaughter. So with that, Counsel requested that the jury be re-established into the jury box where they are now.
And I ask the foreman to rise and announce to the Court what was the decision of the jury on third degree murder?
THE FOREMAN: Third degree?
THE COURT: Yes.
THE FOREMAN: Not guilty.
THE COURT: Did everyone agree to that?
JURORS: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, can you pole (sic) the jury on that issue.
THE COURT: Everybody just said, yes. Everybody just said, yes.
JURORS: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Is there anybody that says, no? (No response from the jury.)
Okay. The jury had unanimously said that it was not guilty as to third degree murder. As to involuntary could you agree?
THE FOREMAN: Involuntary we had some that agreed.
THE COURT: Some agreed and some did not.
THE FOREMAN: Some did not, yes.
THE COURT: Okay. So that's where the jury was deadlocked. Okay. With that, the jury can retire.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can they fill out the verdict slip correctly and sign it then.
THE COURT: Sure.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I still would like to talk to the jury when we're done.
THE COURT: If you want to, go ahead.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Before you leave the bench, could you then record that verdict officially as not guilty to third degree.
THE COURT: All right. Not guilty of third, and hopelessly deadlocked on involuntary.

(N.T., 7/13/04, at 20-22).

¶ 5 On July 21, 2004, the Commonwealth filed a Motion to Set Aside Illegal Verdict. Following a hearing on July 27, 2004, the motion was denied. This timely appeal follows.

¶ 6 The Commonwealth's sole issue on appeal challenges the jury's not guilty verdict on the charge of third degree murder as a "legal nullity." (Commonwealth's Brief at 15).

¶ 7 Preliminarily, we must address Appellee's motion to quash the appeal, which she argues is "premature" since Appellant still faces an outstanding charge of involuntary manslaughter. (Motion to Quash the Commonwealth's Appeal, at ¶ 7). Because the Commonwealth did not seek permission from the court for an interlocutory appeal, Appellee contends that it must be quashed.2

¶ 8 We agree that this case is an anomaly. At first glance, it appears that the Commonwealth is appealing a verdict of acquittal, which is clearly impermissible. However, because of the unique procedural posture of this case, we find the Commonwealth's appeal proper. In Commonwealth v. Hughes, 468 Pa. 502, 364 A.2d 306 (1976), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed an appeal from an order quashing as unconstitutionally vague one of three indictments returned by the grand jury against the defendant. The Court found that the order was

without question the final order as to the indictment founded upon Section 3302(b). Further it was appropriate for the Commonwealth to hold the trial on the unaffected indictments in abeyance until the resolution of the instant issue. Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973), vacated and remanded, Pennsylvania v. Campana, 414 U.S. 808, 94 S.Ct. 73, 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), re-established Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974).

Id. at 308 n. 2. Although the charge at issue here was not dismissed by pretrial order of the trial court, the same principles apply. As we find infra, the court had no authority to dismiss the deadlocked verdict on third degree murder once it was recorded and the jury dismissed. The court's actions were clearly final as to that charge. Thus, we find the appeal proper, and deny Appellee's motion to quash.

¶ 9 The Commonwealth contends that the not guilty verdict on the charge of third degree murder is a legal nullity, since it was entered after the jury initially announced that it was unable to reach a verdict, and was discharged. We agree.

¶ 10 It cannot be disputed that a jury's recorded verdict is inviolate. "The established rule is that the verdict as recorded is the verdict of the jury and the latter shall not be permitted to impeach or to alter or amend it after their separation or discharge." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 359 Pa. 287, 59 A.2d 128, 129 (1948). "Moreover, once the jury has been discharged and has dispersed, the verdict can no longer be molded by the trial judge." Commonwealth v. Dzvonick, 450 Pa. 98, 297 A.2d 912, 914 (1972). Indeed,

[a]fter the verdict has been recorded and the jury discharged, only in extremely exceptional cases may the verdict be molded and even then only unless to make the corrected verdict conform to the obvious intention of the jury, i.e., to conform to a verdict actually rendered, but informally or improperly stated in writing.

Id. at 914 n. 4 (internal quotations omitted).

¶ 11 The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson, supra, is instructive. In Johnson, the defendant was tried for murder. Upon completion of the jury's deliberations, the foreman announced a verdict of "Not guilty." Id. at 129...

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5 cases
  • McDaniels v. Sci
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • 6 Julio 2017
    ...glance, it appears that the Commonwealth is appealing a verdict of acquittal, which is clearly impermissible." Commonwealth v. McDaniels, 886 A.2d 682, 686 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). The Superior Court, however, focused on the unusual procedural history of the case and declared that the trial "......
  • McDaniels v. Winstead
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • 1 Julio 2014
    ...authority of, and strictly in compliancewith" the applicable Rule of Criminal Procedure.82 By contrast, the Court of Common Pleas in McDaniels bypassed Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 608 and reconstituted the jury to correct its verdict, an act that the Superior Court held to be im......
  • Commonwealth v. Fudge
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 20 Junio 2019
    ...to a jury, there arises an inherent possibility that a unanimous decision will prove elusive. See, e.g. , Commonwealth v. McDaniels , 886 A.2d 682, 688 (Pa. Super. 2005) (rejecting the trial court's efforts to mold a verdict, noting that "a hung jury was a plausible enough result").Many var......
  • Commonwealth v. Landis
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 24 Diciembre 2018
    ...generally not subject to alteration or correction, and the protections afforded by double jeopardy attach. See Commonwealth v. McDaniels , 886 A.2d 682, 686-687 (Pa.Super. 2005) (stating, "[i]t cannot be disputed that a jury's recorded verdict is inviolate. The established rule is that the ......
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