McDaniels v. Sci
| Decision Date | 06 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-3485,14-3485 |
| Parties | AUDREY MCDANIELS v. WARDEN CAMBRIDGE SPRINGS SCI; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY PHILADELPHIA, PA, Appellants |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Before: AMBRO, SMITH, Chief Judge1 and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
Salvatore C. Adamo [ARGUED]
1866 Leithsville Road
Hellertown, PA 18055
Counsel for Appellee
Max C. Kaufman [ARGUED]
Molly S. Lorber
Philadelphia County Office of District Attorney
3 South Penn Square
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Although the jurors in Audrey McDaniels' case initially miscommunicated to the trial judge that they were unable to return a verdict on the charge of third degree murder, they subsequently confirmed in open court that in fact they had unanimously found McDaniels not guilty of that charge. The trial court then recorded a not guilty verdict. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania successfully appealed the trial court's refusal to set aside the not guilty verdict. Thereafter, the Commonwealth tried McDaniels a second time. The second jury found McDaniels guilty of third degree murder, and she received a sentence of 15 to 30 years of imprisonment. Eventually she filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The District Court concluded that the retrial violated McDaniels' rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of our Constitution and grantedrelief. The Commonwealth appealed.3 For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Brahim Dukes, an 18 year old with significant physical disabilities, died of starvation and dehydration in December of 2001. At the time of his death, Brahim was in the custody of McDaniels, who was his stepmother. This horrific crime resulted in the Commonwealth charging McDaniels with, inter alia, third degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. The matter proceeded to trial, and on the first day of deliberations the jury advised the court that it was deadlocked on the charges. Court adjourned for the day and the jury went home.
The following morning, the jury resumed its deliberations. Later that afternoon, they again advised the court by a note that they were deadlocked. The jury returned to the courtroom, and once they were seated in the jury box, the following exchange occurred:
Despite the red flags raised by the foreman's initial indication that there was an agreement and the immediate contradictions from another juror, the trial judge failed to step back and take the time necessary to "scrupulous[ly]" consider whether "manifest necessity" required the declaration of a mistrial. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) (plurality opinion). Instead of carefully examining the foreman and jury to "assure himself that the situation warrant[ed] action on his part foreclosing [McDaniels] from a potentially favorable judgment," id. at 486, the trial judge simply declared a hung jury and discharged them. He and counsel then proceeded to the jury room.
Upon entering the deliberation room, the trial judge was confronted with something remarkable: "On the blackboard each juror had voted, not guilty, right on down the line," on the third degree murder charge. A107. According to the judge, after the jurors returned to the deliberation room they discussed the court's questions concerning their ability to reach a verdict. When the judge entered that room, the jury explained that it A101. McDaniels' counsel then asked that the "jury be re-established into the jury box" and the court granted that request. A101.
Having returned to the courtroom, the trial judge placed on the record what took place when he and counsel entered the jury room. He then "ask[ed] the foreman to rise and announce to the Court what was the decision of the jury on third degree murder."A101. The foreman replied: "Not guilty." Id. The court inquired: "Did everybody agree to that [verdict]?" A102. "Everybody . . . said yes." Id. The court posed a different question to the jurors in an effort to determine if any juror disagreed. When there was no response indicating disagreement, the court declared that the "jury has unanimously said that it was not guilty as to third degree murder." Id. The judge then asked: "And as to involuntary[,] could you agree?" Id. The foreman advised that "we had some that agreed" to the involuntary manslaughter charge and "[s]ome did not." Id. The trial judge noted that the deadlock was on the involuntary manslaughter charge, and he then permitted the jurors to fill out the verdict slip. McDaniels' counsel requested that the judge "record that verdict officially as not guilty as to third degree." Id. The trial judge agreed and announced the verdict of "[n]ot guilty of third and hopelessly deadlocked on involuntary." Id.
Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a motion to set aside the not guilty verdict. At a hearing on the motion, the trial judge stated that when he and counsel walked into the jury room, he saw A107. The judge denied the Commonwealth's motion, stating that "once a person has been found not guilty by a jury, that person is not entitled to be retried a second time." A110. In a subsequent written opinion, he explained that he acted to A436. The judge further noted in his written opinion that he "did not attempt to influence the jurors in any way when he addressed them after the verdict was recorded, and was indeed surprised to see the marker-board that contained the jury's unanimous votes for acquittal on the third-degree murder charge." A437-38.
The Commonwealth appealed. McDaniels' brief in opposition did not explicitly invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause. Nonetheless, after a thorough factual recitation, counsel asserted that the "Commonwealth is seeking to overturn the verdict of not guilty on murder of the third degree." A505 (emphasis added). Counsel argued that it would be a tragedy if McDaniels were to "be retried on third degree murder." A513.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court began its analysis of the appeal by stating: "At first glance, it appears that the Commonwealth is appealing a verdict of acquittal, which is clearly impermissible." Commonwealth v. McDaniels, 886 A.2d 682, 686 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). The Superior Court, however, focused on the unusual procedural history of the case and declared that the trial Id. It determined that the not guilty verdict on third degree murder was "a legal nullity." Id.
On remand, a second trial followed in May of 2007. That jury convicted McDaniels of third degree murder and acquitted her on the involuntary manslaughtercharge. The trial court sentenced McDaniels to 15 to 30 years of imprisonment.4 McDaniels' subsequent direct appeal and her petition for post-conviction relief were unsuccessful. This § 2254 petition followed, which asserts that the retrial following the not guilty verdict in the first trial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. In a comprehensive opinion, District Judge Cynthia M. Rufe agreed and granted relief under § 2254. The Commonwealth filed this timely appeal.
The Commonwealth contends that McDaniels' double jeopardy claim is procedurally defaulted and that we cannot reach its merits. Our review of whether a habeas petitioner has fairly presented and exhausted a constitutional claim is plenary. Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85, 93 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010).
In determining whether McDaniels exhausted her double jeopardy claim, we start by recognizing that "the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that '[a] verdict of acquittal . . . could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise,...
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