Com. v. McGahee

• Citation: 393 Mass. 743,473 N.E.2d 1077
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Otis C. McGAHEE.
• Decision Date: 24 January 1985
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 1077

473 N.E.2d 1077

393 Mass. 743

COMMONWEALTH v. Otis C. McGAHEE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 4, 1984.

Decided Jan. 24, 1985.

Daniel G. Harrington, Boston (Daniel J. Harrington, Medford, with him), for defendant.

Paul J. McCallum, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.

NOLAN, Justice.

The defendant, Otis C. McGahee, appeals from convictions entered October 21, 1983, on two indictments charging murder in the first degree and armed robbery. The issues on appeal concern alleged errors in the grand jury proceedings, the admission of an unsubstantiated allegation of prior criminal activity, the trial judge's denial of the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty and a jury instruction regarding the presumption of innocence. The defendant also seeks relief pursuant to our review power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the defendant's convictions and grant no relief under § 33E.

The events leading to the defendant's indictments are summarized as follows. On the afternoon of July 28, 1982, Charles Morreale, a truck driver, completed a delivery of soda at the rear of Joe's Variety Store in Dorchester. Jose Vasquez, a store employee, then brought the soda from the rear door to the basement. Morreale entered the front of the store where Manuel Paulino, the proprietor and victim, paid him. Morreale bought a drink and a snack and returned to his truck. The truck was parked alongside the front entrance of the store at a point where the passenger door was at the curb about opposite the front door of this store.

While Morreale sat eating in his truck, he heard a bang that sounded like a slamming door. About a minute later, he saw someone come out of the store and run down the street. Morreale observed this individual, later identified as the defendant, putting his hand in his jacket as he was running out the door.

After he finished eating, Morreale went into the store. He observed Vasquez loading the soda into a beverage chest. Initially, he did not see Paulino. Morreale looked in the back of the store and then checked behind the counter. There he observed Paulino lying on the floor. Morreale went around the counter and saw that Paulino was bleeding from the head. The cash drawer was open and contained only some small change. Earlier, the drawer had contained paper money, food stamps, and change. Morreale helped Paulino to the front of the store and remained with him until the police arrived.

Morreale described the person he saw running from the store to the police when they arrived. The following day he went to Boston police headquarters and described this individual to a police artist. As a result of this description, the artist made a composite sketch of the individual Morreale saw running from the store. On the day after his visit to police headquarters, Morreale went to District 11 police station in Dorchester and picked the defendant's picture from a photographic array.

During the investigation, police detectives spoke with Gloria Huguley and Michael Reed. Huguley lived with her family in the third floor apartment across from the store. Reed was her boy friend at the time and was visiting her when the incident occurred. Huguley testified that she and Reed were sitting in the front room of her apartment. Reed was looking out the window in the direction of the variety store. Reed testified that he had then told Huguley that a person running out of the store looked like someone he knew by the name "Otis." When Reed talked to the police, he picked the defendant's photograph from an array. Reed testified that in picking the photograph he told the police that he recognized the defendant from high school but not as the individual running from the store. Various points of Reed's testimony were contradicted by Huguley and a police detective. ¹

The police made several attempts to serve an arrest warrant at the defendant's home. In January, 1983, the defendant was arrested in Kansas City, Missouri, and returned to Boston.

1. Grand jury indictments. The defendant contends that the Commonwealth's failure to present certain exculpatory evidence to the grand jury impaired the integrity of those proceedings. In January, 1983, Morreale viewed a lineup of the defendant and several others at the probable cause hearing. Morreale did not select the defendant as the individual he saw running from the scene. Morreale testified at this hearing that he helped create a composite sketch with the police artist and that he was satisfied that this sketch looked like the person he saw running from the scene. The sketch resembles the defendant. Morreale also testified at the probable cause hearing that he selected the defendant's photograph as that of the person running from the scene.

Morreale did not testify before the grand jury. The Commonwealth presented his testimony through a police detective. That detective testified that Morreale had seen a man running from the store and that Morreale had described the man to the police. The detective described the identification process and the resultant composite sketch. He also testified that Morreale identified the defendant from a photographic array as the person running from the scene. Neither the detective nor the prosecutor informed the grand jury that Morreale had failed to identify the defendant in person at the probable cause hearing.

The defendant asserts that presentation of Morreale's identification of the defendant by hearsay testimony without informing the grand jury of the failed identification impaired the integrity of the indictments. The defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictments based on this assertion. This motion was denied. The judge found that the integrity of the grand jury proceedings was not impaired and that the indictments were based on sufficient evidence to withstand attack.

Prosecutors are not required in every instance to reveal all exculpatory evidence to a grand jury. Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 447, 466 N.E.2d 828 (1984). When the prosecutor possesses evidence which would greatly undermine the credibility of evidence likely to affect the grand jury's decision to indict, the prosecutor must alert the grand jury to the existence of such evidence. Commonwealth v Connor, 392 Mass. 838, 854, 467 N.E.2d 1340 (1984). "[A]n indictment may stand which is based in part or altogether on hearsay." Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 377 Mass. 650, 655, 387 N.E.2d 1135 (1979). However, when a portion of a hearsay statement is withheld from a grand jury in a manner that distorts the remainder's presentation, the indictment must be dismissed. Commonwealth v. O'Dell, supra. Our review of the propriety of any indictment is limited to determining whether the grand jury received sufficient evidence to find probable cause for arrest, Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163, 430 N.E.2d 1195 (1982), and whether the integrity of the grand jury proceedings was impaired. Commonwealth v. Gibson, 368 Mass. 518, 525, 333 N.E.2d 400 (1975). We review this indictment to determine whether the withheld exculpatory evidence would greatly undermine credibility or would distort the identification evidence presented to the grand jury.

Reed and Huguley testified before the grand jury regarding the defendant's identity. Reed testified that, at the time of the incident, he thought the person running from the scene looked like the defendant. However, he stated that he never said it was the defendant. This testimony was contradicted by the detective and Huguley. Reed's and Huguley's grand jury testimony was about the same as their testimony given at the probable cause hearing. The grand jury saw the composite sketch which resembled the defendant and the photograph of the defendant which Morreale and Reed selected from the array. It is unlikely that the impeachment of the credibility of Morreale's identification by his failure to identify the defendant at the probable cause hearing would have affected the grand jury's decision to indict. Furthermore, this evidence was not all that tied the defendant to the crime. The other testimony and the composite sketch sufficiently support an indictment.

Nor does Morreale's failure to identify the defendant at the probable cause hearing distort his earlier identification of the defendant within days of the incident. In O'Dell, the prosecutor presented an inculpatory portion of the hearsay statement but omitted the remaining exculpatory portion. Commonwealth v. O'Dell, supra 392 Mass. at 448, 466 N.E.2d 828. In this case, the omission concerns a failure to make a later identification. An identification made closer to the time of the offense often has greater testimonial value than a later identification. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 367 Mass. 737, 739, 327 N.E.2d 871 (1975). In these circumstances, the omission did not distort the evidence presented to the grand jury. See Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 368 Mass. 281, 283-286, 331 N.E.2d 533 (1975). We do not find any conduct before the grand jury that warrants dismissal. The judge properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictments.

2. The admission of unsubstantiated allegations of criminal activity. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Michael Reed because it tended to identify the defendant as the individual running from the store. Reed denied that he said he saw the defendant running from the store. Rather, he testified that he only said that it looked like the defendant. The prosecutor questioned Reed in a manner which sought to elicit his earlier identification (see note 1 supra ). Two questions contained reference to Reed's alleged attempt to buy marihuana from the defendant. ² After these questions were asked and answered, defense counsel objected and requested a mistrial. Defense co...