Com. v. Merriman
| Decision Date | 18 September 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006-SC-000690-DG.,No. 2006-SC-000330-DG.,No. 2006-SC-000332-DG.,2006-SC-000330-DG.,2006-SC-000690-DG.,2006-SC-000332-DG. |
| Citation | 265 S.W.3d 196 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. James Oscar MERRIMAN, Appellee/Cross Appellant. and Commonwealth of Kentucky, Appellant, v. LeQua Martez Hickman, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
The sole question at issue in these two cases is whether a juvenile, convicted as a youthful offender, is subject to the provisions of KRS 439.3401, the Violent Offender Statute. The Court of Appeals issued opposite opinions from two panels, and since this is a matter of first impression, this Court granted discretionary review on the Commonwealth's motion. The decision of the Court of Appeals in Hickman v. Commonwealth is affirmed and the decision in Merriman v. Commonwealth is reversed and remanded for the review mandated by KRS 640.030(2).
LeQua Hickman entered an Alford plea, as a youthful offender, to Assault in the First Degree and Robbery in the First Degree in 2004. He was sentenced to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice where he remained until his 18th birthday. Pursuant to KRS 640.030(2),1 he was returned to the sentencing court at that time for the adjudications required by that statute. The trial court found that pursuant to the Violent Offender Statute KRS 439.3401, Hickman was statutorily ineligible for probation, imposed his sentence, and sent him to an adult institution. He appealed. The Court of Appeals vacated imposition of his sentence and remanded for the required adjudications. That panel of the Court of Appeals, doing statutory construction, determined that KRS 640.030 and KRS 439.3401 were reconcilable and that it was "the overall legislative purpose of the juvenile code to rehabilitate offenders when possible rather than to punish them." Further, the panel held that even were the statutes not reconcilable, the legislature had the opportunity to amend KRS 640.030 in 2004 to make it conform to the 2002 enactment of the Violent Offender Statute, but did not. Thus, the language in KRS Chapter 640 which specified that its provisions were exceptions to the general law of felony sentencing, "must be taken to apply to KRS 439.3401 as well."
James Oscar Merriman was 16 when he shot the victim with a .357 Magnum hand gun, causing the loss of the victim's right eye. He was tried by a jury, convicted of Assault First Degree, and sentenced to the recommended 12 years in prison. He also was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice until his 18th birthday, when he was returned to the trial court for the adjudications required by KRS 640.030(2). He requested that the trial court grant him conditional discharge or probation. The Commonwealth objected, arguing that he was ineligible for conditional discharge or probation because he was a Violent Offender. The trial court agreed, and applied Mullins v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 222 (Ky.App.1997), holding that Youthful Offenders were not "exempt by implication" from the Violent Offender Statute. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the "plain language" of KRS 439.3401 made it applicable to youthful offenders, and without a specific legislative exemption, KRS 640.030(3) did not control. The trial court was thus affirmed.
These two factually similar cases having resulted in disparate rulings from the Court of Appeals, and because there was no Supreme Court case construing the interaction of these statutes, the Commonwealth sought review in both actions by this Court.
In 1986, the Kentucky Legislature enacted two important pieces of legislation relating to the status and sentencing of a criminal defendant.
The Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code established that jurisdiction related to minors was vested in the District Courts, with a particular exception for "youthful offenders" who could, under the provision of KRS Chapter 640, be transferred to circuit court to stand trial and be sentenced as an adult. However, a caveat was expressed in KRS 640.030 that required the juvenile to be housed in a juvenile detention facility until his sentence expired, he was probated or paroled, or he reached his 18th birthday. If the juvenile turned 18 before expiration, probation, or parole, then the sentencing court had to make further adjudications, which in common parlance came to be called "resentencing." In fact, the length and all other conditions of the Youthful Offender's sentence remain the same except for whatever statutory determinations the trial court makes at that review. The court's options at that point are to place the Youthful Offender on probation or conditional discharge, incarcerate him in adult prison, or return him to the Department of Juvenile Justice to complete a treatment program of up to five months. Under the latter option, the youthful offender again returns to the court after completing a treatment program for it to determine whether to probate, conditionally discharge, or incarcerate.
The other piece of legislation enacted in 1986 that bears on these cases is the Violent Offender Statute, KRS 439.3401. At that point, the statute required violent offenders to serve 50% of their sentences before being eligible for parole, and it did not prohibit probation. In two subsequent amendments, the statute was changed to require service of 85% of the sentence and probation was prohibited.2 The statute further lists twelve offenses that are considered to be violent offenses. Assault and Robbery are subject to the statute's limitations.
Though enacted in the same legislative session, neither statute is referenced in the other, and despite subsequent amendments to both statutes, the legislature has not seen fit to make such references. As the two disparate Court of Appeals decisions indicate, reasonable minds have differed over whether the statutes are in conflict, and whether one is controlling over the other. Therefore, this Court must look to the language of the statutes and make its own construction.
Since the two defendants in this case were juveniles when they committed their respective offenses, they would have been proceeded against under KRS Chapter 635, as Public Offenders, had they not qualified as youthful offenders under KRS Chapter 640. A list of factors for the district court to consider in determining whether a juvenile qualifies as a youthful offender is set forth in KRS 640.010(2)(b). If two or more apply, then the district court may transfer the case to circuit court where the juvenile will be tried as an adult, except for being housed in a juvenile detention facility until serve-out or his 18th birthday. On his 18th birthday, the KRS 640.030(2) adjudications must be made.
The intent of the Juvenile Code was set forth by the legislature in KRS 600.010: "[P]romoting protection of children"; that "Any child ... under KRS Chapters 600 to 645 ... shall have a right to treatment reasonably calculated to bring about an...
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