Com. v. Metz

• Decision Date: 04 February 1992
• Citation: 602 A.2d 1328,412 Pa.Super. 100
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Matthew A. METZ, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1328

602 A.2d 1328

412 Pa.Super. 100

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Matthew A. METZ, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Sept. 3, 1991.

Filed Feb. 4, 1992.

Patrick J. Thomassey, Monroeville, for appellant.

Michael W. Streily, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for Com., appellee.

Before WIEAND, KELLY and POPOVICH, JJ.

POPOVICH, Judge:

We are confronted for the first time with an issue involving the legality of a police stop at a roadblock. This issue presents itself in an appeal from judgment of sentence entered September 28, 1990, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County following the appellant's conviction on, inter alia, two misdemeanor counts of possession of a controlled substance, one misdemeanor count of carrying a firearm without a license and one misdemeanor count of possessing a firearm illegally as a former convict. The sole issue raised by appellant, Matthew A. Metz, is whether the court below erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an automobile stop. We affirm.

Our standard of review is clear. As we stated in Commonwealth v. Fromal, 392 Pa.Super. 100, 572 A.2d 711 (1990):

In an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress our role is to determine whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. In making this determination, we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and so much of the evidence of the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. When the factual findings of the suppression court are supported by the evidence, we may reverse only if there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those factual findings.

Id., at 111, 572 A.2d at 717.

The relevant facts are fairly summarized in the Commonwealth's brief, as follows:

On July 1, 1988 at approximately 11:30 p.m., the Pennsylvania State Police had, pursuant to Pa.C.S. § 6308(b), established a systematic roadblock at the entrance to the Blair Heights Housing Project in Clairton and were stopping vehicles to check for registration, proof of insurance and driver's license. Marked state police vehicles were at the scene (Trial Transcript at 18-19).

While performing the road check, Trooper Raymond Paul noticed a 1967 Pontiac convertible pull up to the check area. The vehicle came to a sudden stop and immediately started to back up and pull away from the officers. The officers immediately pursued the car and stopped it.

Once the vehicle was stopped the officers approached appellant who was driving the car and asked him to step out of the car and produce his driver's license and registration. When appellant got out of his car Trooper Paul observed in plain view from outside the vehicle, a .357 magnum 'down alongside of the driver's seat.' (Trial Transcript 21-23, 34-40). The passengers were then ordered out of the car. The officer recovered the weapon and found it to be fully loaded. Drug paraphernalia was found in the back seat. Appellant did not have a license to carry the gun and later informed police that the weapon had been lent to him as collateral for a loan. (Trial Transcript at 30-31, 55). Appellant was arrested and transported to the police station. Eight packets of heroin and nine packets of cocaine were later discovered in the patrol car behind the seat where appellant was sitting. (Trial Transcript at 26-30, 56-57).

Brief for Appellee, at 10-11.

Appellant does not challenge the legality of the systematic road check. Instead, appellant asserts that the police officers did not possess an adequate reason to stop his vehicle. Appellant contends that his having stopped at the check area and backed his vehicle away from the police officers was not a violation of the Vehicle Code, nor could it have provided the officers with reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. ¹

Proceeding to the merits of appellant's argument, we note that our research has disclosed no opinion of an appellate court of this Commonwealth which addresses the issue of whether a motorist's stopping and turning his vehicle before reaching a police roadblock could, per se, provide the officers conducting the roadblock with reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or that the motorist was in violation of the Vehicle Code. ²

Several of our sister states have, however, ruled on this question. In Snyder v. State, 538 N.E.2d 961 (Ind.Ct.App.1989), a state trooper stopped appellant after he made a U-turn approximately 100 yards from a police roadblock. The appellant had committed no traffic violations and was not driving erratically, but was stopped because it appeared to the trooper as though he was trying to avoid the roadblock. Id. at 963.

Subsequent to the stop, the trooper saw alcohol containers in appellant's vehicle and detected alcohol on his breath. Tests revealed that appellant had a blood alcohol content over the legal limit. He was arrested and charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated and operating a vehicle with .10% or more alcohol in his blood. Id. at 963.

Upholding the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress evidence procured as a result of an unlawful stop, the District Court of Appeals of Indiana stated:

If police officers stationed at roadblocks were not permitted to stop such drivers, the very drivers the police seek to deter could flagrantly avoid the roadblocks and the stops would lose their deterrent value. [One of the troopers] testified that he had pursued and stopped drivers on numerous occasions who sought to avoid roadblocks and inevitably those drivers had suspended or expired licenses, or some other violation of the law.... His experience gave him specific and articulable facts and inferences drawn therefrom to form a reasonable suspicion that Snyder was committing a crime. Such might not always be the case when an officer sees a driver avoid a police roadblock. Likewise, a driver who simply turns off the road before entering the roadblock may not give rise to reasonable suspicion, unless coupled with other articulable facts such as erratic driving or traffic violations. A finding of a reasonable suspicion must be determined on a case by case basis.

The alternative is to tell police officers that in spite of their experience, they may not infer from a driver's attempt to avoid a roadblock that the driver is very likely engaged in the commission of a crime. Such a rule would seem to tell police officers to 'ignore reality.'

Id. at 965-66.

Similarly, in Coffman v. State, 26 Ark.App. 45, 759 S.W.2d 573 (1988), a police officer stopped appellant because he witnessed appellant pull into a driveway and turn his vehicle around before reaching a roadblock. The officer testified that appellant was not driving erratically, nor was he suspected of criminal activity. The sole reason the officer stopped appellant was because it appeared as though he was attempting to avoid the roadblock. An assisting officer detected alcohol on appellant's breath. After failing a field sobriety test, appellant was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Id. at 47, 759 S.W.2d at 574.

Appellant asserted, inter alia, that the stop of his vehicle was an unconstitutional seizure because there was neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion that he had committed or was about to commit a crime. Id. at 47, 759 S.W.2d at 574.

Upon reviewing the record of the trial court, the Arkansas Court of Appeals stated:

There is evidence from which it could be found that the appellant was approaching a roadblock made clearly visible by the presence of police vehicles with flashing blue lights; that the appellant attempted to avoid the roadblock; and that the trained police officers who were conducting the roadblock could reasonably suspect that one who attempted to avoid this roadblock was trying to hide some type of unlawful activity.

Id. at 49, 759 S.W.2d at 575.

Discussing what constitutes reasonable suspicion, the Coffman court, quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), stated:

The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same--and so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library scholars, but as understood by those versed in law enforcement [ (emphasis in Coffman ) ].

To a trained police officer, the fact that a motorist attempted to avoid the roadblock in this case would surely excite a reasonable suspicion that, at the very least, the motorist was drunk, driving a stolen vehicle, did not have a valid driver's license, or had some car light defect. These violations of the law would meet A.R.Cr.P. Rule 3.1 requirements since they involve danger of injury to other motorists. Therefore, we do not agree that the stop of appellant's vehicle was unlawful; and after he was stopped, the appellant's intoxicated condition was apparent and the officers had obvious probable cause to arrest him.

Id. at 49-50, 759 S.W.2d at 575-76.

Likewise, in Stanley v. State, 191 Ga.App. 603, 382 S.E.2d 686 (1989), appellant, upon reaching a police roadblock, stopped abruptly and backed his auto six to eight car lengths down the street away from the roadblock. Two officers on the scene stopped appellant and cited him for improper backing. When appellant got out of his car, the officers smelled alcohol on his breath and noticed that he had bloodshot eyes and was unsteady on his feet. Appellant was arrested. During a search of the appellant's vehicle, the officers discovered contraband. Id. at 603, 382 S.E.2d at 686.

Appellant asserted, inter alia,...