State v. Heapy
Decision Date | 11 January 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 27375.,27375. |
Citation | 151 P.3d 764 |
Parties | STATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Raymond J. HEAPY, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Michelle L. Drewyer (Ranken & Drewyer), Wailuku, for defendant-appellant.
Peter A. Hanano, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, County of Maui, for plaintiff-appellee.
Opinion by ACOBA, J.
We hold that the district court of the second circuit (the court)1 was wrong in denying the motion of Defendant-Appellant Raymond J. Heapy (Defendant) to suppress "all of the evidence and statements obtained as a result of the police stop of [his] vehicle" because (1) the purported investigatory stop by the police violated article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution2 in as much as it was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal conduct and (2) the "chase car" police procedure of stopping all vehicles that lawfully turn onto a public way in advance of a checkpoint exceeded that statutorily authorized. Therefore, the court's June 7, 2005 order denying Defendant's motion to suppress is vacated and the case is remanded to the court with instructions to enter an order granting Defendant's motion to suppress and to allow Defendant to withdraw his conditional no contest plea. See State v. Kealaiki, 95 Hawai`i 309, 314 & n. 6, 22 P.3d 588, 593 & n. 6 (2001) ( ).
It is axiomatic that reasonable suspicion to justify a stop must relate to criminal activity. See, e.g., State v. Eleneki, 106 Hawai`i 177, 180, 102 P.3d 1075, 1078 (2004) ( ). The criminal activity for which Defendant was stopped was operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVII or DUI), Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-61(a) (Supp.2005).3 However, the officer observed no acts indicating a violation of the statute before the stop. He therefore lacked any objective basis — specific and articulable facts — that Defendant was violating HRS § 291E-61(a) so as to justify the stop. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ( ). Accordingly the officer had no grounds for reasonably believing criminal activity was afoot. See, e.g., State v. Trainor, 83 Hawai`i 250, 256, 925 P.2d 818, 824 (1996) ( ). Because such objective grounds were absent, no legal support existed for the stop. See Eleneki, 106 Hawai`i at 180, 102 P.3d at 1078. The stop therefore was unlawful. Additionally, in stopping vehicles turning in advance of the checkpoint, the procedure exceeded the authority granted to the police to establish roadblocks under HRS §§ 291E-19 and -20 (Supp.2005).4 Since the stop was unlawful all evidence derived from the stop must be suppressed. See State v. Aguinaldo, 71 Haw. 57, 61, 782 P.2d 1225, 1228 (1989) ( ).
In reaching today's holding we do not ignore the important State interest in combating drunken driving. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) ( ). We emphasize that our ruling does not affect established roadblock procedures authorized by statutes. As to the practice in issue here, however, "[w]e may not," as the U.S. Supreme Court has instructed, "vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing the guilty to go free." Davis v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2280, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001)).
As was stated in the seminal case of Terry, "`[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.'" 392 U.S. at 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 35 L.Ed. 734 (1891)). Today's holding reaffirms the precepts established in Terry and its progeny which we have adopted, and the longstanding constitutional protections in our jurisdiction that have stood as a bulwark against unreasonable seizures. See e.g., State v. Perez, 111 Hawai`i 392, 397, 141 P.3d 1039, 1044 (2006); Eleneki, 106 Hawai`i at 180, 102 P.3d at 1078; Powell, 61 Haw. at 321, 603 P.2d at 147-48; State v. Bonds, 59 Haw. 130, 133, 577 P.2d 781, 784 (1978); State v. Ogata, 58 Haw. 514, 572 P.2d 1222 (1977); State v. Barnes, 58 Haw. 333, 568 P.2d 1207 (1977); and State v. Goudy, 52 Haw. 497, 479 P.2d 800 (1971).5
Defendant was charged on August 4, 2004 with violating HRS § 291E-61 by
operat[ing] or assum[ing] actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant meaning that he was under the influence of alcohol in an amount sufficient to impair his normal mental faculties or ability to care for himself and guard against casualty, and/or [by] operat[ing] or assum[ing] actual physical control of a vehicle with .08 or more grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters or cubic centimeters of blood, thereby committing the offense of Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant in violation of Section 291E-61 of the [HRS].
On August 11, 2004, Defendant filed a "Motion to Suppress Evidence" contending that "[s]upression is required because the stop of Defendant's vehicle lacked probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, and therefore the nature and scope of the intrusion into Defendant's liberty and privacy exceeded what was constitutionally permissible in light of the facts known to police at the time." Defendant requested that "[a]ll evidence and statement [sic] garnered as a result of the stop be suppressed and the matter dismissed."
On February 18, 2005, the court held a hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress. At the hearing, the prosecution called Maui Police Department Officer Eric Correa (Officer Correa) as a witness. At the end of the hearing, the court orally denied the motion to suppress. That same day, Defendant entered a conditional no contest plea pursuant to HRPP Rule 11(a)(2). Following Defendant's conditional plea, the court sentenced Defendant. On June 7, 2005, the court entered its written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence (Order). On June 9, 2005, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.
On appeal, Defendant contends "it was error for the district court judge to find reasonable suspicion existed because it appeared to [Officer] Correa that [Defendant] was attempting to avoid the intoxication checkpoint." In response, the prosecution maintains that "appellate jurisdiction does not exist where a notice of appeal is filed in violation of time limitations prescribed under [Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule] 4(b)" and "[e]ven assuming arguendo, this court has jurisdiction in this matter, the trial court did not err in denying [Defendant's] Motion to Suppress Evidence." As to the prosecution's first response, we believe jurisdiction may be exercised in this case.6
As to Defendant's appeal and the prosecution's second response, we vacate the court's order denying the motion to suppress. The court's relevant findings are as follows:
1. On June 16, 2004, at approximately 1830 Hours, [Officer Correa] was stationed as the "chase car" at an intoxication checkpoint being conducted by the Maui Police Department on Mokulele Highway just south of the intersection of Mokulele Highway and Mehameha Loop;
2. Officer Correa has been employed with the Maui Police Department for twelve years and is currently assigned the traffic division;
3. Officer Correa was formerly a member for the DUI Task Force unit for four years;
4. Officer Correa has participated in approximately 50 intoxication checkpoints;
5. Officer Correa estimated that he has been assigned the "chase car" position approximately 20 times;
6. Officer Correa indicated that he has effected approximately 40 stops on cars that attempted to avoid the intoxication checkpoint;
7. That in every case the individual avoiding the intoxication checkpoint was either intoxicated or was violating the law in some other way such as, not having vehicle insurance or drivers license, or having an outstanding warrant;
8. The intoxication checkpoint was in place to stop vehicle's traveling...
To continue reading
Request your trial- State v. Tominiko
-
State v. Spillner
... ... Reasonable suspicion, in turn, requires " more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. " United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also State v. Heapy, 113 Hawai`i 283, 292-93, 151 P.3d 764, 773-74 (2007) (holding that "[t]he mere possibility of criminal activity does not satisfy the constitutional requirement that a stop be based on suspicion that criminal activity was afoot" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Goudy, ... ...
-
State v. Won
...368, 917 P.2d at 380. Thus, there is a presumption of invalidity when a warrantless search is at issue, State v. Heapy, 113 Haw. 283, 307, 151 P.3d 764, 788 (2007), which can be rebutted by the State not by proving that the governmental interest outweighs the unauthorized privacy intrusion,......
-
State v. Reis, 27171.
...retroactive application of an ameliorative amendment, the discussion of retroactivity is entirely germane. See State v. Heapy, 113 Hawai`i 283, 304, 151 P.3d 764, 785 (2007) (explaining that where case law is "part and parcel" of the issue raised, discussion of such case law is germane). Fi......
-
Motor Vehicle Searches
...sobriety checkpoint does not create a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a driver is engaged in criminal conduct. State v. Heapy , 151 P.3d 764, (Haw. 2007). The U.S. Supreme Court also has permitted law enforcement to stop and question persons about whether they witnessed a crime in......
-
Motor Vehicle Searches
...sobriety checkpoint does not create a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a driver is engaged in criminal conduct. State v. Heapy , 151 P.3d 764, (Haw. 2007). The U.S. Supreme Court also has permitted law enforcement to stop and question persons about whether they witnessed a crime in......
-
Motor vehicle searches
...sobriety checkpoint does not create a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a driver is engaged in criminal conduct. State v. Heapy , 151 P.3d 764, (Haw. 2007). PR A CTICE P OINT : Stops for Other Purposes The U.S. Supreme Court also has permitted law enforcement to stop and question pe......
-
Motor vehicle searches
...sobriety checkpoint does not create a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a driver is engaged in criminal conduct. State v. Heapy , 151 P.3d 764, (Haw. 2007). The U.S. Supreme Court also has permitted law enforcement to stop and question persons about whether they witnessed a crime in......