Com. v. Michel

• Decision Date: 04 September 1980
• Citation: 381 Mass. 447,409 N.E.2d 1293
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Larry MICHEL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1293

409 N.E.2d 1293

381 Mass. 447

COMMONWEALTH v. Larry MICHEL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Argued May 7, 1980.

Decided Sept. 4, 1980.

Daniel E. Callahan, Lynn, for defendant.

Lila Heideman, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and KAPLAN, WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

After the defendant's convictions for robbery and mayhem were affirmed, see Commonwealth v. Michel, 367 Mass. 454, 327 N.E.2d 720 (1975), he brought a motion for a new trial alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his jury-waived trial because of pervasive conflicts of interest on the part of his trial counsel. In setting forth his claim Michel focuses primarily on the fact that a codefendant with conflicting interests, who became the Commonwealth's main witness against him during the trial, was represented in the present cases by a law associate of his trial counsel and in other pending matters by Michel's own attorney. Michel adds that his trial counsel, acting as an attorney for Michel's wife in divorce proceedings, had him served with a libel for divorce during the criminal trial. Michel asserts that this record indicates that at no time during his trial did he have the undivided loyalty of counsel. We agree. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

We recount the facts concerning the conflicts of interest established by the motion for new trial. On March 19, 1972, one William Cole was robbed and savagely beaten. Twelve days later, Walter D. Coyne III, in the presence of his attorney, Mr. Michael Gorham, made a statement to police which exculpated Coyne ¹ and inculpated Michel and the Dietrich brothers, Ernest and Dennis. At the time Coyne talked with police he indicated he would cooperate with them on these crimes. Coyne, at that time, had three serious charges pending against him in the same court, and on two of those charges he was represented by Mr. Anthony DiFruscia, ² a law associate of Mr. Gorham or Mr. Gorham's law partner.

At a probable cause hearing held in connection with these crimes, Mr. DiFruscia represented Michel, and the complaints against Michel were dismissed. Coyne, represented by Mr. Gorham, was bound over to the grand jury as were the two Dietrich brothers. In September, 1972, the four men were charged by the grand jury with mayhem and robbery. In December, Mr. DiFruscia told Michel that the grand jury had charged Michel as well as Coyne and the Dietrichs with the offenses against Cole. Mr. DiFruscia advised Michel to request his appointment in the Superior Court since he had handled the matter in the District Court. Mr. DiFruscia added that he was representing Michel's wife in a divorce proceeding. At this time Michel was incarcerated on unrelated offenses. Michel did request a Superior Court judge to appoint Mr. DiFruscia to represent him, and the judge did so.

Coyne, meanwhile continued to be represented by Mr. Gorham on the robbery and mayhem charges. In addition, at all times here relevant, Coyne was represented by Mr. DiFruscia on two of the three pending felony charges against him. See note 2, supra. Prior to their joint jury-waived trial Michel and Coyne signed appearance slips on which they wrote they had no objection to their representation by members of the same firm.

In his opening statement, the assistant district attorney indicated that in addition to Cole's testimony, he intended to offer Coyne's statement in evidence. Cole testified as to details of the attack on him but did not identify any of the four defendants as the persons responsible for that attack. The judge held him on a presumption of perjury. G.L. c. 268, § 4. The police officer to whom Coyne had given a statement testified to the conversation he had with Coyne twelve days after the crime. After objection by all defense counsel, the judge ruled that the witness "omit any proper names" in recounting Coyne's statement. ³

On cross-examination, Coyne's attorney elicited testimony from the officer that Coyne had stated that he did not participate in the beating and, in fact, had attempted to help the victim. The thrust of Mr. Gorham's cross-examination of the officer was to disassociate Coyne from his three codefendants. Coyne's attorney also referred to the description of the car that Coyne had given to the police, which, in fact, matched Michel's car.

After completion of the police testimony, the Commonwealth moved to nol prossed the two indictments against Coyne. Mr. Gorham objected on Coyne's behalf, and the judge entered verdicts of not guilty on both indictments. See Commonwealth v. Hart, 149 Mass. 7, 8-9, 20 N.E. 310 (1889); Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 19 140 N.E. 470 (1923). See also Commonwealth v. Dietrich, --- Mass. --- ^a, 409 N.E.2d 1288 (1980).

Coyne was the next witness called. At this point, Attorney Gorham withdrew from the case at the judge's suggestion and new counsel was then appointed for Coyne. The Commonwealth filed a statement of its intent not to prosecute Coyne for any crimes arising from his testimony except for perjury. ⁴ Coyne declined to answer questions and was declared a hostile witness. His testimony was interrupted by a brief recess, after which Mr. DiFruscia moved to withdraw his appearances on the indictments still pending against Coyne (see note 2, supra). The prosecutor then inquired whether an arrangement had been reached among Coyne, the Commonwealth, and Coyne's new attorney. After Coyne replied yes, he began to testify for the Commonwealth as to the events of March 19. Coyne then implicated Michel in the crimes against Cole. Mr. DiFruscia did not cross-examine Coyne. However, other counsel cross-examined Coyne. The cross-examination by other counsel revealed that the Commonwealth told Coyne that if he did not testify, the district attorney would prosecute the other pending charges and if Coyne were convicted he would recommend from fifteen-to-twenty year sentences.

An assistant district attorney also testified that if Coyne's testimony were consistent with the substance of Coyne's pretrial statement to the police, the district attorney would enter a "disclaimer of prosecution" as to the "morals charges" (see note 2, supra). Furthermore, the Commonwealth agreed that no prosecution would be based on Coyne's testimony except for perjury, and that the Commonwealth would not oppose a request for parole on the sentences which Coyne was then serving. The prosecutor added that if Coyne did not cooperate, the previous recommendation of from eighteen to twenty years in the "morals cases" would stand. ⁵ As a result, the other pending charges against Coyne were nol prossed after he testified. On the day Coyne testified Mr. DiFruscia withdrew his appearance and a nolle prosequi was entered on the docket of each of these pending charges. ⁶

A conflict of interest does not arise solely because there is joint representation. Commonwealth v. Soffen, --- Mass. ---, --- ^b, 386 N.E.2d 1030 (1979); Commonwealth v. Davis, --- Mass. ---, --- ^c, 384 N.E.2d 181 (1978). Rather, a conflict exists whenever there is tension between the interests of one client of an attorney and those of another. See S.J.C rule 3:22, ⁷ DR 5-105, 359 Mass. 796, 816 (1972). ⁸ In cases of joint representation "(t)here is an actual, relevant conflict of interests if, during the course of the representation, the defendants' interests do diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action." Cuyler v. Sullivan, --- U.S. ----, ---- n.3, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1722, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). A.B.A. Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 6 (1965) ("(A) lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend that which duty to another client requires him to oppose").

The Commonwealth asserts that the record reveals only a potential conflict of interest and, therefore, Michel must prove actual prejudice. The Commonwealth then carefully reviews the trial record in an effort to establish that Michel was not prejudiced by Mr. DiFruscia's potential conflicts. The Commonwealth suggests that since the defendants had adopted a "united we stand, divided we fall" defense, there was no actual conflict at the beginning of trial, and the withdrawal of Mr. Gorham after Coyne's acquittal eliminated any actual conflict arising during trial. The Commonwealth further claims that Mr. DiFruscia's appearance in the other pending charges did not give rise to any actual conflict since Mr. DiFruscia did not act as Coyne's attorney at trial, and he withdrew his appearance prior to the time Coyne began to testify fully. The Commonwealth concludes that Michel's claim as to Mr. DiFruscia's joint and dual representation did not create an actual conflict, and in the absence of actual prejudice shown on the record, Michel's claim is without merit. We do not agree.

The record suggests that at the beginning of trial Mr. DiFruscia had two rather obvious conflicts: (1) Coyne had already given a statement to the police in the presence of Mr. DiFruscia's law associate shifting blame from himself to Michel and the Dietrichs; and (2) Mr. DiFruscia knew Coyne had felony indictments hanging over his (Coyne's) head, and that Coyne might, if he cooperated with the police and with the prosecutor, secure favorable disposition is those cases. See Commonwealth v. Leslie, --- Mass. ---, --- ^d, 382 N.E.2d 1072 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 910, 99 S.Ct. 2006, 60 L.Ed.2d 381 (1979).

The nub of counsel's conflict was that if Coyne did not testify he would be prosecuted on the pending charges and, if convicted, treated harshly. If Coyne did testify, Michel would be convicted of serious offenses involving savage brutality. Counsel knew or should have known that the prosecutor might use Coyne's pending charges as leverage to secure Coyne's testimony. Since the choice was Coyne's, it was...