Com. v. Moody

• Decision Date: 15 March 1968
• Citation: 239 A.2d 409,429 Pa. 39
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Samuel MOODY, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 409

239 A.2d 409

429 Pa. 39

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Samuel MOODY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 15, 1968.

Gerald I. Roth, John E. Backenstoe, Allentown, for appellant

George J. Joseph, Dist. Atty., Allentown, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

OPINION

EAGEN, Justice.

In October 1965, the appellant, Samuel Moody, was convicted by a jury in Lehigh County of murder in the first degree and the punishment was fixed at life imprisonment. Following denial of a motion for a new trial, judgment of sentence was imposed as the jury directed. This appeal followed.

The single question raised is whether or not the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a written confession given by Moody to the police.

From the testimony offered by the Commonwealth, the following pertinent facts appear: ¹

At about 6 p.m. on December 31, 1964, Moody killed his wife by firing three bullets from a .38 caliber revolver into her back. At about 6:38 p.m. a city police sergeant, William Glatfeller, received a phone call in his office informing him of the shooting. He proceeded by police car in the direction of the address where the shooting occurred. While en route he received via radio a description of the person suspected of committing the crime. Shortly thereafter he saw Moody, who fitted the description, at a public street intersection. With the assistance of another policeman who arrived on the scene he took Moody into custody. Moody was immediately told that he was 'under arrest.' He was searched, handcuffed and taken to the police station.

At about 7 p.m., Arthur Allender, a police detective, received a call at home to report to police headquarters immediately. When he arrived, Moody was seated in a 'cell corridor' behind a locked door. Admittedly he was not free to leave. Allender escorted Moody into his office and, after asking him his name, address and employment, inquired 'what happended?' Moody unhesitatingly replied, 'I shot my wife.' Then Robert E. Sperling, the Captain of the City Detectives, who also had been summoned from his home, arrived on the scene. After Moody was informed who Sperling was, Sperling asked him what happened. Moody replied, 'Mr. Sperling, I'm going to tell you the truth. I shot my wife.' Sperling then interrupted Moody and advised him 'that anything he said could be used against him; that he need not say anything and he had a right to remain silent.' Moody replied, 'I want to get it off my chest. I want to tell the truth. I shot my wife.'

Shortly thereafter Moody was subjected to questions concerning the details of the crime which, together with his answers, were written down in longhand and typewritten. The recorded typewritten statement was then read to Moody and signed by him. Immediately before this particular questioning began, Sperling explained to Moody that he need not make a formal statement, but that if he did so 'it would be of his own free will, without any promises, inducements, or threats, being fully aware anything he said could be used against him * * *.' It is the admission of this statement in evidence that is assigned as error.

Since the instant trial occurred prior to Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the absence of all the procedural safeguards required under that decision in order to secure one's privilege against self-incrimination during police questioning does not in itself constitutionally prescribe evidentiary use of this statement. See Davis v. State of North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966); Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966). However, since the trial was subsequent to Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), the statement is not admissible in evidence unless the Commonwealth establishes that all of the procedural safeguards required by that decision before police custodial questioning commences were first employed.

Under Escobedo, before custodial interrogation is initiated, warnings must be given to the person questioned that he has a right to remain silent and that if he does speak, anything he says can be used against him, Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d 765 (1967). ² Otherwise anything said stemming from such questioning may not be used as evidence.

Since it is conceded that the warnings required by Escobedo were not given to Moody before any questioning was initiated and before the first incriminating admissions were made to Officers Allender and Sperling, evidentiary use thereof ordinarily would be constitutionally proscribed. ³ Under Escobedo, supra, as explicated by Miranda, supra, these warnings must be given before custodial interrogation is initiated. And 'custodial interrogation' occurs if a person is questioned after being 'taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (Emphasis added.) The argument of the Commonwealth that Moody was not 'in custody' at the time is untenable. Moody was clearly in custody from the moment he was apprehended and all of the subsequent police questioning constituted 'custodial interrogation.' See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959).

The central question for decision is whether or not the written statement given by Moody after he received all of the warnings of constitutional rights Escobedo requires ⁴ stemmed from the first illegal questioning and is therefore 'the fruit of the poisonous tree,' or whether the attending circumstances were such as to remove the taint of the initial illegality. We conclude that the latter is so.

A confession secured after the person involved has been adequately advised of his constitutional rights is not rendered inadmissible Ipso facto because an earlier confession or inculpatory admission was made in the absence of a warning of these rights, Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v. Hickey, 247 F.Supp. 621 (E.D.Pa.1965). ⁵ While the United States Supreme Court has not considered the exact factual situation this case presents, ⁶ its decisions concerning the exclusion of valid confessions made following violations by the police of rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment are analogous and applicable.

In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the scope of taint resulting from violations of the Fourth Amendment was considered. The court stated: 'We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. " Id. at 487--488, 83 S.Ct. at 417. ⁷ See also Commonwealth v. Bishop, 425 Pa. 175, 228 A.2d 661, cert. denied 389 U.S. 875, 88 S.Ct. 168, 19 L.Ed.2d 159 (1967). Comment 'Scope of Taint under Exclusionary Rule of the Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination,' 114 U.Pa.L.Rev. 570 (1966).

Applying the above standard enunciated in Wong Sun, supra, it is clear to us that the written statement now challenged lenged was not the result of the exploitation of any prior illegality, but was the product of Moody's own purge of conscience.

The statement was truly voluntary ⁸ and spontaneous. As explained by Moody: 'I want to get if off my chest.' It is also significant to note that at trial Moody testified that when he was apprehended he was on his way to city hall where the police headquarters is located.

Judgment affirmed.

ROBERTS, J., files a dissenting opinion.

ROBERTS, Justice (dissenting).

I agree with the majority that Moody's written confession does not violate Escobedo. ¹ Unfortunately, its resolution of the scope of taint issue is, in my opinion, unsatisfactory, and on this basis I must dissent.

The burden rests upon the prosecution in situations presenting fifth amendment violations to demonstrate that the evidence admitted is not tained by the prior illegality. Thus, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 78 n. 18, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1609 n. 18, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964), a case involving the scope of taint where it was alleged that testimony given after a grant of immunity by one jurisdiction had been employed to obtain information used in a prosecution in another jurisdiction, the Supreme Court insisted: 'Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence.' ² The Commonwealth here, in my view, had to prove that Moody's written confession was not tainted by his prior, oral statements obtained under circumstances violative of Escobedo.

Given this burden, I believe that a remand to the trial court is necessary to obtain an adequate record for the disposition of Moody's claimed denial of his constitutional rights. The court below, as well as counsel for the Commonwealth and the appellant, did not recognize that the dispositive question was whether Moody's written confession was tainted by his oral statements. ³ The suppression hearing involved only the testimony of the two detectives who procured the statement and this testimony was concerned primarily with the nature of the warnings given Moody. Appellant did not testify at this hearing. The record below is thus defective in two respects: the trial court took no account of ...